Openness to argument: A philosophical examination of Marxism and Freudianism. by Percival, Ray Scott
Openness to Argument: A Philosophical 
Examination of Marxism and Freudianism
Ray Scott Percival 
PhD
London School of Economics and Political Science
UMI Number: U047952
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
Dissertation Publishing
UMI U047952
Published by ProQuest LLC 2014. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This work is protected against 
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.
ProQuest LLC 
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346
I H-a&eS,
p
6°i\o
2Abstract
No evangelistic erroneous network of ideas can guarantee the 
satisfaction of these two demands : (1) propagate the 
network without revision and (2) completely insulate itself 
against losses in credibility and adherents through 
criticism. If a network of ideas is false, or inconsistent 
or fails to solve its intended problem, or unfeasible, or is 
too costly in terms of necessarily forsaken goals, its 
acceptability may be undermined given only true assumptions 
and valid arguments. People prefer to adopt ideologies that
(i) are logically consistent, (ii) are more truth-like and 
of higher information content than their rivals, (iii) are 
systematically organised, (iv) solve their problems better 
than their rivals, (v) do not contain unfeasible demands, 
and (vi) do not contain uneconomic demands. Truth and 
validity therefore act as Darwinian-like filters on 
ideologies.
Using Popper's notion of situational analysis and with 
reference to Darwinian evolution, considered as a special 
case of the former, and Bartley's theory of comprehensively 
critical rationalism I argue that a propagandist cannot 
guarantee his message or his movement from sound criticism. 
All positions are in a methodological sense open to 
argument. Moreover, the logic of a propagandist's situation 
constrains him into making his message and himself open to 
criticism in order to maximize its chances of being 
propagated through the population. But he then loses control 
of the message in two respects. Firstly, his audience are 
disposed to select from the competing ideas they encounter 
those that satisfy (i) to (vi) because of man's evolutionary 
history. Secondly, he cannot guarantee protection from 
criticism even a privileged section of his message because 
he cannot predict in a systematic way what logical 
repercussions each protective reformulation of the ideology 
will have on other sections of the ideology and what 
criticism the ideology will encounter. He cannot do the 
latter because of certain logical properties of theories 
that endow them with unfathomable depths.
Marxism and Freudianism serve as case studies, especially 
for the analysis of Popper's notion of the immunizing 
stratagem, a methodological/logical device that is supposed 
to save theories from criticism. "Immunizing stratagems" 
either abandon the ideology they are meant to protect or 
seriously lower its chances of being reproduced.
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1. The Question of Definition.
2. The Problem.
3. The General Thesis.
4. Psychology, Sociology, Logic.
5. Testability of General Thesis.
6. The Special Thesis.
7. A Tentative Definition of Ideology.
The central problem of this thesis is openness to criticism. 
Many works on ideology have been concerned with this 
question, but the question is not confined to the behaviour 
of ideologies. The attempt to evade criticism is familiar 
to us all. "Its like talking to a brick-wall" and "We will 
have to agree to disagree", are figures of speech that 
allude to this common experience and the assumption that 
some people are closed to criticism. If the answer to this 
question is so broad in its implications, why have I focused 
on ideologies? Ideologies are especially interesting 
because they embody some of the more intricate and abstract 
devices for evading criticism, because they allow us to 
explore how evasive parts of a doctrine may affect other 
parts and because we can study how they influence the long 
term future of the doctrine. Evasive moves in everyday 
conversations are too fleeting to permit a study of the 
effectiveness of evasion of criticism in the long term.
81. The Question of Definition.
Most works having a bearing on ideology begin with an 
attempt to define ideology. My method will differ 
significantly from this definitional approach, in line with 
an internal criticism of the work of Karl Popper and 
W.W.Bartley,III. It is therefore appropriate that I begin 
with a digression on definition. There are many definitions 
of the word "ideology" and there are many problems that 
writers on ideology are interested in solving. Where should 
one start: with a definition or with a problem? In 1987
Daniel Bell, author of The End of Ideology, gave a talk on 
ideology at the London School of Economics and Political 
Science. In his talk Bell ran through a long list of 
diverse definitions of ideology given by various writers.
At the end of the list, almost sighing in despair, Bell 
asked: "How are we to find our way through this bramble 
bush?" D J Manning expressed a similar worry, pointing out 
that there is no consistency in the way the term is employed 
from writer to writer, and there is no recourse to the 
conventions of ordinary language. In the absence of the 
criterion of ordinary language, Manning says, there is a 
danger in adopting a stipulative definition. (Manning. Post 
Script to [1980], page. 114.) The answer to Bell's 
question and to Manning's worry is to look at the problems 
that the various writers were trying to solve. Even 
stipulative definitions loose their arbitrariness when tied 
to the solution of a problem. It may be hard to see what 
these problems were; for example, a writer may simply be 
confused and not have a substantial theoretical problem. 
Nevertheless, this seems to be a feasible path through the 
bramble bush.
This thesis assumes that problems have prior status to 
definitions: that is, the problem at issue must first be 
stated before we tailor our vocabulary to its solution.
9Even then the definitions we shall adopt will not be the 
solution to our problem, but simply a concise and clear way 
of formulating a theory, and it is the theory that is 
regarded as the solution. Robinson adopts a similar 
approach to definition in the treatment of ideology. In a 
criticism of John Plamenatz's book Ideology [1971].
Robinson reproaches Plamenatz for his failure to distinguish 
between investigating the meaning of the term "ideology" and 
investigating its referent. (T J Robinson. "Ideology and 
Theoretical Inquiry", in Manning, [1980].) Though helpful, 
Robinson does not diagnose the philosophical malady that 
makes the search for definitions so popular. The malady can 
be traced to the Aristotelian idea that we can intuit the 
real nature of something through the attempt to give it an 
essential definition. To understand why this is a futile 
method one has to examine the relationships between 
definition, problem and theory. 1
2. The Problem
Western culture holds in high esteem the give and take of 
open debate. This seems to have originated with Thales, 
whom Popper argues was the founder of the Ionian school of 
philosophy, the first to encourage criticism of the master. 
Popper argues that before Thales cosmology or philosophy was 
taught by dogmatic schools. These schools had the function 
of preserving the doctrine of the founder or first master. 
New ideas were not admitted, and their inventors were 
dismissed as heretics. This type of school, Popper argues, 
is the general rule in all civilizations. However, Popper 
says, Thales allowed one of his pupils, Anaximander, to 
criticise his own theory. Moreover, since this went against 
tradition, it seems likely that Thales must have actively 
encouraged his pupils to criticise his theories. This would 
explain why a mere two generations later this critical 
attitude is explicitly formulated in the fragments of
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Xenophanes. (Popper. "The Beginnings of Rationalism". 
Chapter 5 of [1963].) It may be conjectured that this 
liberal attitude to criticism was made more popular by the 
rise of science, which the Ionian tradition, revived in the 
Renaissance by Galileo Galilei and others, made possible.
But western culture also seems to have produced systems of 
ideas that scorn open debate, ideas that seem impervious to 
criticism or counterevidence and seem to have gained 
evangelistic strength through this imperviousness. The 
classic examples, for Popper at least, are Marxism and 
Freudianism. Bartley focused his analysis on Christianity. 
Is this imperviousness to criticism real or merely apparent; 
is it absolute or a matter of degree? This is the general 
problem that this thesis addresses.
My answer will be that the imperviousness we see is real but 
merely a matter of degree. Of course, it may be said that 
writers have exaggerated for rhetorical effect, not meaning 
to attribute absolute imperviousness. Some writers 
undoubtedly fall into this bracket. However, many writers 
have attributed absolute imperviousness to some ideas and 
their adherents; and those that have not have often 
overestimated the degree to which ideas and their adherents 
can be insulated from criticism. Those attributing absolute 
imperviousness to certain systems include Bartley, Popper,
D J Manning, Leszeck Kolakowski, Knox, Eric Hoffer, Gustave 
Le Bon. 2 It must be noted that it is not my intention to 
point an accusing finger, but rather to investigate what 
seems to be an interesting problem. A theoretical problem 
and an associated position on that problem have an 
autonomous existence and may be interesting even if they 
cannot be attributed to any one person. Some popular 
theories are trivial; some straw-men are profoundly 
interesting. For example, Popper's criticism of 
historicism was often criticized because it was thought that 
the theory that Popper examined could not be attributed to
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anyone. Nevertheless, the insights that emerged through 
Popper's criticism of a somewhat contrived theory made the 
enterprise worthwhile. So perhaps the question is not 
whether the above writers were exaggerating or not, but 
rather, taking their statements at face value, to what 
extent can their statements be regarded as true and helpful 
in solving the problem of the survival of an ideology in the 
face of criticism.
It is helpful to think of this problem from the point of 
view of the propagandist : how can a propagandist preserve
his message intact against criticism, and ensure its 
propagation and the recruitment of new adherents? Can a 
propagandist protect his message from criticism by relying 
on clever formulation or psychological/sociological 
manipulations, and thereby guarantee it against losses in 
credibility and propagation? Can he do what Leszek 
Kolakowski supposes possible when he asserts that:
Not only in the "socialist bloc", where the 
authorities used every means to prevent 
information seeping in from the outside world, but 
also in the democratic countries, the Communist 
parties had created a mentality that was 
completely immune to all facts and arguments 'from 
outside', i.e. from 'bourgeois' sources.
(Kolakowski. [1978], page 452.)
Or in general, as Hoffer supposes:
...to interpose a fact-proof screen between the 
faithful and the realities of the world. (Hoffer.
[1962], page 75.)
We are then looking at the problem as the strategic problem 
of the propagandist. I intend to develop a general and a 
special thesis to answer this question.
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This approach is conjectured to be a useful heuristic, and 
should not be taken as implying that many of the processes 
by which an ideology is modified under criticism are 
necessarily a matter of planning or conscious control by the 
propagandist. Ever since David Hume raised the important 
problem of the unintended results of intended action, 
unplanned and unforeseen effects of action have loomed large 
in the social sciences. Such patterned effects are of 
considerable importance to this thesis, and indeed they are 
among the reasons why a propagandist cannot guarantee his 
message against criticism. I am simply choosing the most 
difficult case for my thesis: a network of ideas to whose
propagation and protection someone is devoted, someone who 
makes the propagation of these ideas a strategic task.
The general approach of this work is to take for granted two 
central principles in the philosophies of Popper and Bartley 
and to use these principles to undermine some of their views 
on ideologies and criticism. These principles are the logic 
of the situation and Darwinian evolution, the latter being a 
special case of the former. I will make use of other parts 
of their philosophies when and where required. I will also 
make use of the new theory of memetic evolution developed by 
Richard Dawkins among others. The theory of memetic 
evolution applies Darwinian evolutionary principles to the 
evolution of ideas. The term "meme" was coined by Richard 
Dawkins, but both Popper and Bartley had made significant 
contributions to this theory before the publication of 
Dawkins's book The Selfish Gene. [1976], in which the term 
was introduced. This work then is partly an internal (or 
immanent) criticism of the work of Popper and Bartley, and 
must be read with this in mind. However, the thesis does 
have wider implications.
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Others have dealt with a very similar problem. The problem
that Raymond Boudon addresses is very similar to my own. He
even begins with the assumption, that I share, that 
ideologies are rational in important aspects. However, the 
statement of his problem suggests that ideologies are closed 
to argument, and that false ideas have a net survival 
advantage over true ideas:
I repeat that my sole intention is to make a 
modest contribution to sociological theory on 
ideologies by confining myself to one question -
why do people adhere so readily to false or 
dubious ideas. (Boudon. [1989], page 11.)
Boudon analyses ideology in terms of Weber's idea of 
meaningful action:
I have tried to show, firstly, that ideologies are 
a natural ingredient of social life; secondly, 
that ideologies start not in spite of, but because 
of human rationality. This is why I think the 
principles of Weberian methodology can be applied 
to this aspect of social life as well as to 
others. In other words, the received ideas which 
make up ideologies can be regarded, and probably 
deserved to by analysed, as meaningful ideas, 
provided one accepts that the irrational has a 
residual place in their creation and diffusion. 
(Ibid. page 11.)
We will see later (section 2.1.2.) that Weber's approach has 
severe shortcomings, in that it postulates kinds of 
meaningful action that are by implication closed to the 
influence of sound argument. Boudon's analysis suffers, 
like most analyses, from a total neglect of the theories of 
genetic and memetic evolution. Any serious analysis of a 
general tendency in humans to adhere to "false or dubious 
ideas" must check whether this view of man is consistent 
with his having evolved through Darwinian evolution. It 
must also take cognizance of the new theory of memetic 
evolution (how the creation, diffusion and elimination of
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ideas can be analysed in terms of non-biological Darwinian- 
type evolution.) Boudon's approach at least has the merit 
of attributing a rational element to the creation and 
diffusion of ideologies. But because of Boudon's neglect of 
the evolutionary approach to culture he focuses on the 
creation and diffusion of ideologies without any explicit 
treatment of their elimination.
3. The General Thesis
No evangelistic erroneous network of ideas can guarantee the 
satisfaction of these two demands : (1) propagate the 
network without revision and (2) completely insulate itself 
against losses in credibility and adherents through sound 
criticism. If a network of ideas is false, or inconsistent 
or fails to solve its intended problem, or unfeasible, or is 
too costly in terms of necessarily forsaken goals, its 
acceptability may be undermined given only true assumptions 
and valid arguments. By "acceptability" I mean the 
disposition of people to adopt and propagate the network of 
ideas. People prefer to adopt ideologies that (i) are 
logically consistent, (ii) are more truth-like and of higher 
information content than their rivals, (iii) systematically 
organise their content, (iv) solve their problems better 
than their rivals, (v) do not contain unfeasible demands 
(vi) do not contain uneconomic demands. Truth and validity 
therefore act as Darwinian-like filters on ideologies. It 
is tempting to object and point to all the un-eliminated 
erroneous doctrines. But such an objection is too 
superficial, since a Darwinian-like filter does not have to 
be 100% effective to be effective. People are fallible, 
hence some ideologies that violate one or more of (i) to 
(vi) may escape rational elimination. However, this does 
not mean that having escaped rational elimination, they will 
continue to do so.
15
It is easy to conflate two quite different theses: (1) that
by sound argument any person can be persuaded to give up any 
position violating conditions (i) to (vi); and (2) that no 
person can guarantee that he will maintain such a position 
despite any sound argument to the contrary. I sympathize 
with the first thesis, but I will be most concerned to argue 
the second thesis. The import of these ideas is clarified in 
sections 4 & 5.
The general thesis follows from three main positions:
(a) Bartley's philosophy of Comprehensively Critical 
Rationalism. All positions, not just false assumptions and 
invalid arguments, are criticizable in a 
methodological/logical sense.
(b) Popper's idea of the logic of the situation. In a 
situational analysis one takes the aims, knowledge, skills 
of an agent, plus the constraints he is acting under and 
explains the intended and unintended consequences that flow 
from this situation (section 1.3.). A situational analysis 
of the propagandist using assumptions accepted by Popper 
shows two things: (i). The successful propagandist cannot 
ignore criticism, but indeed has an interest in meeting 
criticism. Ignoring criticism means that (a) the 
propagandist has less opportunity to improve his ability to 
convince others of the ideology, (b) reduced chances to 
consolidate his retention of the ideology, (c) a failure to 
take account of competing ideas. (Section 1.3.1.) However, 
in meeting criticism he exposes his message to criticisms he 
cannot predict. (Sections 1.3.1. & chapter 4, especially 
4.4.) (ii) Theories have an infinite number of implications 
and ramifications, and these logical properties preclude 
propagandistic efforts to guarantee a systematic exclusion
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of dissent and the unintentional evolution of factions. 
(Section 4.4.)
(c) That man is a creature of Darwinian evolution. The 
theory of evolution indicates that organisms do not thrive 
on error, but are likely to be biased in various ways to 
adapting to reality. Humans are rational in the following 
senses: they take account of the opportunity costs and 
benefits of their actions (section 2.1.); they prefer to 
abandon what is futile (2.2.) ; explore the unknown (2.3.); 
and develop beliefs in important issues in accord with 
fearful and wishful thinking enabling these beliefs to be 
better tested (2.4.); try to resolve inconsistencies in 
their beliefs and think in accord with the rules of logic 
(2.5.); try to make their emotional reactions appropriate to 
the world (chapter 3.). With certain reservations 3 , 
Popper and Bartley subscribe to Darwinian theory. But 
Darwinian theory can be used to argue that humans are 
rational in the above ways, thus undermining their view 
(shared by many) that ideologies can be made absolutely 
impervious to criticism. One might argue, as Popper has, 
that Darwinian evolution is a specific application of 
situational logic to the genetic evolution of organisms in 
general. Nevertheless, it is worth taking these principles 
one by one.
Because emotion is regarded by many as an absolute barrier 
to argument I devote the whole of chapter 3 to it. I argue 
that intense emotion is no absolute barrier to argument, 
though it may impair the understanding of critical argument. 
The theory that people adopt ideologies because of 
thoughtless emotion seems to imply that they are closed to 
argument, for what would the target of that argument be?
But all emotion is under the control of our theory about the 
world and our place within it, and so even intensely 
passionate ideologies have a theoretical target for
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criticism. It makes evolutionary sense that the emotions we 
have are under the control of our theory of the world for 
how else could they be appropriate to fairly complex, 
subtle, remote or hypothetical circumstances?
To see how responsive people are to criticism, it is 
important to distinguish (a) the meaningful content of the 
ideology, (b) the number of adherents at any time, and (c) 
the rate at which particular members join and leave the 
movement. A movement may have a large membership but a high 
turn over rate; or a small membership with a low turnover 
rate.
Without these distinctions what we see before us are 
ideological movements apparently perpetuated unchanged down 
the decades, centuries or milleniums.
But what do we mean by the perpetuation or change of a 
movement or a network of ideas? When we talk of a movement 
we refer nebulously to a mass of people and an associated 
doctrine. It is important to distinguish these aspects so 
that we can explore the relationship between them. One of 
the major elements of the general thesis is that there is a 
trade-off between the strength of belief in the movement - 
roughly indicated by number and turnover of adherents - and 
doctrinal integrity. The two principles, Darwinian evolution 
and situational logic, together explain the trade-off 
between the perpetuation of the movement and the integrity 
of the message. When a doctrine suffers from criticism, 
adherents are often lost if the doctrine is not changed 
because of (i) to (vi). The general consequence is that the 
intellectual leaders of the movement make marginal revisions 
in the doctrine in order to keep up the numbers of 
propagandists while keeping as much of the original network 
intact.4 This may occur as a planned process, but may also 
occur as a result of a filtering Darwinian-like process
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whereby variants (themselves designed or accidental) of the 
original doctrine are subject to criticism, the strongest 
surviving and being reproduced. Contrary to C R Hallpike 
[1988], both conscious and "blind" selection processes may 
occur. 5 I am arguing that "strength" here be defined 
specifically in terms of the above rational filters (i) to 
(vi). Because of the insuperable problem of achieving 
conformity in the interpretation and defence of an ideology, 
different propagandists will be disposed to employ different 
presentations of the ideology (sections 1.3, 4.3, & 4.4.). 
Some of these will be better at passing the rational filters 
than others, and this will be the case independently of 
whether the variants are deliberately constructed to evade 
criticism by hoodwinking the critic or constitute 
misinterpretations of the original position. The important 
point here is that an accumulation of marginal revisions can 
make a large difference, just as in biological evolution an 
accumulation of numerous successive slight variations can 
make the difference between a virus-like entity and a human 
being. But though these changes are taking place, they may 
be masked by the more conspicuous trappings of the movement: 
the name and slogans etc., remain the same, and the absolute 
number of adherents may even increase.
Closer investigation of apparently unchanging ideological 
movements reveals that their membership is in great flux, 
with people joining and others leaving the movement. Eileen 
Barker reports that in her study of the Unification Church 
she found that at least 61% of those who joined the movement 
during a four month period in 1978 had left within two and a 
half years. (Barker, [1988], page 167.) Others have found 
very similar voluntary defection rates.6
This data leaves room for a proportion of life-long 
adherents, who simply do not change their point of view in 
the face of the counter-arguments or other forces at work
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that might be pressuring them to leave. We must also note 
that those who left the movements may have left for reasons 
unconnected with arguments against the relevant doctrine. I 
point to these facts to clear the way for a recognition of 
the great flexibility of what are normally taken as rigid 
ideological movements.
In Popper's work Darwinian evolution and situational logic 
play central roles. Using these principles to answer our 
propagandist's problem we are led to view man as a rational 
animal in ways which undermine the idea that he can be 
completely insulated against criticism.
The principle of situational logic implies that the 
propagandist cannot ignore counter-argument but must 
cultivate an interest in it; and he cannot control the 
evolution of the ideology because of certain logical 
properties of theories and the necessarily inventive process 
of defending a doctrine against criticism.. The principle 
of Darwinian evolution implies that having encountered 
counter-argument the propagandist cannot insulate himself 
from it psychologically. (Often the propagandist will think 
he has successfully insulated himself and the doctrine from 
criticism through what is called an immunizing stratagem, 
but it will be shown in a later chapter that this is often 
an illusion.)
The principle of Darwinian evolution can be used to 
reinforce the view that man is rational in respect to truth 
in important ways, (i) - (vi), that can be seen in the 
standards of scientific, commonsensical, religious and 
political explanations. The same fundamental standards of 
truth which explain the rise of science also partly explain 
the rise and demise of other systems of ideas. (Section 
1.1.)
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4. Psychology, Sociology and Logic
The concept of openness to criticism admits of 
psychological, sociological and logical/methodological 
interpretations. There may be distinctly psychological, 
sociological and logical barriers to criticism. One may 
also distinguish methodological or epistemological 
guarantees from criticism.
For example, wishful thinking, universally thought to be a 
barrier to criticism, is clearly a psychological barrier; 
group hostility to criticism and rules and traditions 
against dissent are obviously sociological. One may try to 
reject the legitimacy or relevance of logic, which would - 
if successful - be a barrier to criticism. Using immunizing 
stratagems is a methodological barrier.
I fully accept that one can specify rules which if 
scrupulously followed would make an ideology unresponsive to 
argument. One could simply stipulate that criticism be 
ignored: if one encounters criticism, maintain one's 
position. One must also note that there are ways or methods 
of dealing with criticism which exclude taking account of 
criticism not as a conscious aim but as an unintended 
logical consequence. The evasion of criticism in such a case 
would not count as a stratagem, but as a systematic 
consequence of the way or method of responding to criticism. 
If a Christian invariably responds to criticism simply by 
maintaining that one cannot understand God until one 
believes in his existence, then the Christian's position 
would appear to be secure against criticism. After all, if 
the critic becomes a believer he is no longer a critic. 
Similarly, if an extreme follower of Georg Lukacs always 
insists that his critics cannot understand the proletarian 
point of view until one joins their struggle, then
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(providing this is all he does) his position is secure 
against criticism (section 2.4.3.)• The question, however, 
is whether a propagandist with the goal of propagating his 
doctrine and subject to certain evolutionary and current 
situational constraints could maintain such methods in the 
face of all potential criticism, and still have a good 
chance of satisfying his goals. My thesis is that this is 
not possible. Evasion of criticism is not so easy. Even if 
the atheist is converted, new puzzles and questions may 
arise about the nature of God; for example, how is it 
possible for God to consist of three persons as seems to be 
implied in the notion of the Trinity? Believers who have 
only just embraced one another as belonging to the same 
flock may be shocked to find their common ground disappear 
before them. Hence the frequency with which Church councils 
have been convened to settle points of doctrine, to 
determine what constitutes real belief. Similarly, Lukacs' 
epigone may be embarrassed to find newly converted members 
of the proletarian movement quarrelling among themselves, or 
that he is alone in his own interpretation of the class 
struggle. I was told by an ex-member of the Socialist Party 
of Great Britain that one of his fellow members would 
occasionally express his concern that "the members do not 
understand the case". (Section 4.4.)
An extreme version of this sort of criticism-deflecting 
stance would be the theory that all argument is illusory, 
that the notions of validity and logical truth etc are 
unreal. However, one might ask, if this position is very 
effective in protecting an ideology, why is it not simply 
incorporated by every aspiring ideology? My answer is that 
the potential converts of an ideology are subject to (i) to 
(vi). Such a mystical adjunct to an ideology would deprive 
it of its power to explain new circumstances and also of its 
power to defend itself against competing ideologies that 
happen to address themselves to (i) to (vi). Even such
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mystical ideologies as astrology and tarot pay some respect 
to logic in their systematic nature. Moreover, an ideology 
that rejects or belittles logic runs the risk of not being 
able to police heresy and prevent the strains of internal 
dissension, for it will not be able to say systematically 
what is and what is not part of the doctrine. Indeed, 
without some respect for logic it is impossible to learn a 
language, let alone a particular doctrine. For these reasons 
the rejection of logic is often mere bluff or confusion.
Obviously, a doctrine whose descriptive elements are true 
and solves all the problems for which it was produced better 
than its rivals is guaranteed against sound criticism in a 
logical sense. A true and practically optimum doctrine 
cannot be refuted or shown to be futile. However, 
epistemologically, no one could guarantee either (a) that a 
doctrine is flawless or (b) that the methodological rules 
that explicitly or implicitly exclude taking account of 
sound criticism will be followed. This point is in accord 
with an internal criticism of Popper and Bartley, since they 
argue that all positions are conjectural and cannot be given 
any kind of justification let alone a guaranteed foundation.
In the light of these distinctions the statement that all 
false positions are criticizable admits then of at least two 
interpretations: (a) Any person can be persuaded to give up 
any position failing (i) to (vi) using only true assumptions 
and valid inferences; and (b) Any position failing (i) to 
(vi) can be tested. (a) presupposes (b), but (b) does not 
presuppose (a). Given that my general thesis implies (b) I 
need to examine this purely logical/methodological thesis. 
This enquiry will bring us into the debate over 
comprehensively critical rationalism, a doctrine developed 
by Bartley (section 1.2.). We will see that (b) is easily 
satisfied since in fact all positions (true, false or 
neither) can be criticized in a methodological sense.
23
I am arguing that if humans are rational then there will be 
limits on the spread of ideologies failing (i) to (vi). But 
even if all humans were very intelligent rational beings, 
there are limits on how quickly they could eliminate error. 
It is possible for everyone to be rational in sense (a) and 
yet for irrational ideologies to persist for centuries or 
longer? Remember, large movements may have a high turn-over 
rate. If a movement gains new members at least as fast as 
it loses them to sound argument, the movements' doctrine may 
persist for thousands of years even though no one was ever 
convinced for more than a year. I have already remarked that 
the Church of Scientology has a 100% per 5 years turn-over 
rate. Perhaps the many long-lived false, or futile, or 
uneconomic, or inconsistent ideologies put forward in 
support of the theory that humans are closed to argument are 
like the Church of Scientology. Tarot, astrology, ufology, 
may be systems of ideas that people adopt for a while, 
partly out of playfulness and curiosity, partly out of 
belief, only to abandon several years later. Even if people 
chose infallibly between correct and erroneous doctrines 
given several years to decide, we would still expect to see 
a great number of erroneous doctrines being perpetuated.
5. Testability of the General Thesis
My general thesis is metaphysical in Popper's sense, in that 
it is not open to direct empirical refutation. But in this 
respect it is no worse than my opponents' position: that 
there are systems of ideas that are completely insulated 
from criticism. No matter how many systems of ideas are 
shown to be open to criticism, it is always possible for my 
opponents to reassert the existence of some, perhaps as yet 
undiscovered, system of ideas that is completely insulated 
from criticism. I am forced by my opponents to examine each 
of their supposed examples of absolutely reinforced
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dogmatisms and criticise their reasons for taking them as 
such.
In discussing openness to criticism it is easy to confuse 
two positions:
(1) that the reproduction of no system of ideas failing any 
of (i) to (v$ can be guaranteed from sound criticism, and
(2) that the reproduction of any system of ideas failing any 
of (i) to (vj will eventually be undermined by sound 
criticism.
(1), my general thesis, follows from (2) but is not 
equivalent. Hence my thesis is not disturbed by the 
perpetuation of error over thousands of years.
Popper, as well as Watkins and Agassi among others, have 
argued that even metaphysical theories are rationally 
arguable and criticizable despite their not being open to 
direct refutation by the falsification of their empirical 
implications (since by definition they do not have any that 
can contradict a basic statement - a statement describing an 
event at a spatio-temporally restricted location). One can 
argue, for instance, that they fail to solve the problem 
they were supposed to solve, or that they are inconsistent 
with another theory of higher informative content, or one 
that is regarded as unproblematic at the time. (cf. Popper. 
Chapter 8 of [1963]. I have more to say on this problem in 
chapter 4 on the immunizing stratagem.) This I believe is 
the case with my opponents' position: it is inconsistent 
with Darwinian theory and with an analysis of the 
situational logic of the propagandist.
My argument will be subject to any criticism that shows that 
Darwinian evolution can be expected to develop organisms
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that thrive on error. I shall have more to say on this 
problem in the introduction to chapter 2, where I propound 
the argument from Darwinian evolution.
6. The Special Thesis
The special thesis will concern itself with two 
propagandistic systems of ideas: Marxism and Freudianism.
If I am to argue my case properly, I must show that Popper's 
examples of immunized theories are not examples of theories 
that have been saved from criticism. As argued in section 5 
I am obliged by the nature of the positions involved to 
examine each of Popper's and Bartley's examples of 
ideologies.
I do not think any one would take issue with the assumption 
that Marxism is propagandistic, that its adherents wish its 
ideas to propagate through the population. At first sight, 
it may seem that unlike Marxism Freudianism is not 
propagandistic, but simply a scholarly and therapeutic 
occupation. But Freud was explicit in his desire that 
psychoanalysis become a successful "movement", and wrote a 
book called On the History of the Psychoanalytic Movement, 
in which he describes how the spread of his ideas was 
carefully planned. At the second Congress of Psychoanalysts 
in Nuremberg, March 1910, the International Psychoanalytic 
Association was founded. Its declared aim was:
To foster and further the science of 
psychoanalysis founded by Freud, both as pure 
psychology and in its application to medicine and 
the mental sciences; and to promote mutual support 
among members in all endeavours to acquire and 
spread psychoanalytic knowledge. (Freud, [1914], 
pages 50-51.)
Freud was aware early on of the difficulties of keeping the 
adherents of a doctrine from straying from the true path.
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The I.A.P. was intended to give new members a "guarantee" of 
proper understanding and to monitor publications for heresy:
There should be some headquarters whose business 
would be to declare: "All this nonsense is nothing 
to do with psychoanalysis; this is not 
psychoanalysis." (Freud, [1914], page 50.)
Adler, representing the Vienna group, feared that 
"censorship and restriction of scientific freedom" were 
intended. (Quoted by Freud, [1914], page 51.)
Gellner ([1985], page 8.) has pointed out that Freud 
justified Jung's rapid elevation within the movement against 
the anger of Freud's older followers by arguing that 
favouring Gentile entrants was politically essential for the 
successful expansion of the movement.
Freud, therefore, was interested in the propagation of his 
ideas and, at least initially, under the impression that 
this could be guaranteed by proper planning and instruction 
etc. Freudianism is thus certainly within the scope of this 
thesis.
I suspect that not just the adherents of any scholarly or 
therapeutic system of ideas, but most people desire greater 
public knowledge and acceptance of their ideas. This quite 
harmless fact is obscured by our habit of putting the 
academic and the propagandistic into exclusive categories.
Of course, there are more or less scientific, more or less 
civilized, more or less violent, and more or less devious 
ways of propagating one's ideas; but this should not blind 
us to the fact that everyone is disposed to spread his word.
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The special thesis will focus on Popper's notion of the 
immunising stratagem as a supposed way in which a 
propagandistic network of ideas may guarantee or insulate 
itself against criticism and spread. Chapter 4 is intended 
to reinforce my special thesis on immunising stratagems by 
examining in detail whether they have served to perpetuate 
Freudianism and Marxism either in a logical or sociological 
sense.
7. A Tentative Definition of Ideology
Having stated the problem we may now adopt a provisional 
definition of the word "Ideology" for the purposes of this 
work. The main guide here is to define our terms so as to 
make the theory as testable as possible. We may say that 
the word "Ideology" is used as shorthand for the much more 
cumbersome expression: "an erroneous, propagandistic network 
of assumptions embodied in both books and subjective 
beliefs".
In the use of the notion of falsity and truth I take for 
granted Alfred Tarski's definition of truth [1943-4]. 
Tarski's account is a development and correction of the old 
Aristotelian conception of truth defined in the following 
way: to say of what is that it is, or of what is not that it 
is not is to speak the truth; to say of what is that it is 
not, or of what is not that it is, is to speak falsely.
Thus truth is understood as correspondence with reality.
If I am to argue that truth gives a network of ideas an 
advantage in competition with other ideas and in reproducing 
and spreading, it makes sense to pit truth against what is 
false. However, we must bear in mind that classifying 
theories as simply either true or false overlooks the fact 
that a false theory may contain some truth. (Newton's theory 
of gravitational attraction is false, but nonetheless has
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many true non tautological implications.) This is why 
Boudon's approach is too crude for he begins with the 
question:
...why do people adhere so readily to false or
dubious ideas. (Boudon. [1989], page 11.)
Boudon thus prejudices the issue in favour of the 
irrationalist thesis. In any case, if Boudon is comparing 
scientific with nonscientific beliefs, then he is going to 
be embarrassed by the, by now, common observation that 
nearly all scientific theories are false. In the 
competition between ideas, what may be important is the 
relative truthlikeness (verisimilitude) and information 
content of the ideas. For example, it may be true that the 
human population of Bolton is exactly 300,000. But this idea 
has less promotional value than Galileo's false, but more 
informative and truthlike theory that the acceleration due 
to gravity is a constant, g, independent of the mass of the 
falling body, where g = 9.8 meters per second squared.
(Since Newton the force and hence the acceleration between 
any two massive bodies has been taken to be proportional to 
the masses.)
My assertion that people prefer to adopt theories that are 
closer to the truth is a psychological version of Popper's 
methodological requirement that scientists search for 
theories that are ever closer to the truth, and his 
conjecture that the history of science is a history of 
increasingly truthlike theories. There is, however, a 
problem with the definition of verisimilitude even for 
scientific theories. Popper argues that definitions are 
only useful if they clarify a theory or increase its 
strength. It was with the hope of strengthening his theory 
of science that Popper originally defined verisimilitude, 
but no adequate definition has yet been constructed.
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Popper first defines truth-content and falsity-content. The 
truth-content of a statement A is the class of all the true 
logical consequences of A; the falsity-content of A is the 
class of all and only the false consequences of A. Popper 
then says that a theory Y has greater verisimilitude than a 
theory X if and only if either
(1) the truth-content but not the falsity-content of Y 
exceeds that of X; or
(2) the falsity-content but not the truth content of X 
exceeds that of Y. (Popper, [1963], page 233.]
Important criticisms of this original formulation are due to 
Miller and Tichy. They show that false theories cannot be 
compared for verisimilitude by this proposal; one of the 
theories has to be true. Nevertheless, the idea of 
verisimilitude is no more undermined by this failure to 
develop a formal definition than the notion of a natural 
number was undermined by Frege's failure to develop a 
formally correct definition. It still makes sense to say, 
for example, that the theory that the Earth is flat is 
further from the truth than the false theory that the Earth 
is a perfect sphere. 7
By "propagandistic" I mean a network of ideas that someone 
has a passionate interest in propagating, someone who may 
even resort to deception and force to achieve his aim.
Again, my purpose is to deal with the most difficult case.
An idea that everyone found unworthy of propagating would 
hardly be a test of my thesis.
By speaking of a network of assumptions I am alluding to the 
unifying principles that make various logically distinct 
assumptions into a single doctrine. The unifying principle 
may simply be the intention or belief of the adherent that 
the elements co-operate in the solution of a problem. But I
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argue that people prefer networks of assumptions that are 
systematically organised, rather than a hotchpotch of 
loosely related assumptions. The ideal to which the mind 
tends is an axiomatized theory in which a rich content is 
derivable from a relatively small set of premises that have 
what Watkins ([1984], page 205) calls "organic fertility" - 
the content of their conjunction is greater than the sum of 
their contents taken separately. (Watkins' notion, I should 
point out, is for him a purely normative/methodological 
prescription for science.) This sort of principle is 
helpful in individuating doctrines. We will see that in the 
principles of coherence of a set of assumptions lies several 
avenues for the influence of truth.
The networks of assumptions that I am dealing with have a 
subjective and objective aspect. It is important to 
distinguish them since their interaction is crucial to 
understanding the impact of criticism on an ideology. All 
the great ideologies, including Marxism and Freudianism, are 
embodied in both books and subjective beliefs. Popper has 
advocated as a heuristic that ideologies be treated as 
things that people adopt for one reason or another, rather 
than things that people believe. To some extent I have 
followed this. But although a network of ideas may be 
propagated for reasons other than belief, it would appear 
that belief is one of the factors that makes people adopt 
and propagate ideologies. (Belief is not regarded as a 
necessary and sufficient condition for someone's adopting or 
propagating an ideology. It is regarded as increasing a 
person's propensity to do so.) Ignoring belief would also 
have unnecessarily restricted my investigation into how 
Darwinian evolution could have produced humans who are 
responsive to the truth in the ways I have specified.
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Chapter 1
The Logic of the Propagandist's Situation
1.1. Importance of truth in criticism and the propagation of ideas.
1.1.1. The propagandistic power of informative explanation.
1.2. Karl Popper and W.W.Bartley III. Their positions on ideologies.
1.2.1. An Element of Residual dogmatism in Bartley's position.
1.2.2. An Element of Residual dogmatism in Popper's position.
1.3 Situational Logic.
1.3.1. The propagandist and situational logic.
1.4. Bartley's test case: Protestant Liberalism.
1.5. Exception to the General Thesis under extreme forms of Ideological 
Control.
Introduction.
In this chapter I explore the situational logic of the 
propagandist whose two goals are (1) to guarantee the 
propagation of his doctrine and (2) to guarantee it from 
criticism. I first show how the truth content of an 
ideology contributes to its chances of being propagated and 
its falsity content diminishes its chances of being 
propagated.
In The Retreat to Commitment Bartley argues that the 
intellectual reaction to the collapse of Protestant 
Liberalism is an ideology in his general sense: a network of 
ideas "that is retained regardless of the facts" (Bartley. 
[1962], page xviii.) Since this thesis is an internal 
criticism of the work of Bartley and Popper, it is 
appropriate that I illustrate my general case with an 
examination of the relative propagational success of
32
Christianity and Science (1.1. & 1.1.1.). The conclusions 
are applied to Marxism and Freudianism as the argument 
develops (1.1) In this connection I examine the work of 
Gellner and Monod (1.1), and Shils and Manning (1.1.1.) who 
argue that the truth content of an ideology bears no 
relation to its "promotion value", to use Monod's phrase. I 
argue that Meyerson's principle of identity can help us to 
explain the rise of Christianity and the subsequent 
relative propagational success of Christianity and Science, 
and by the same token that of Marxism and Freudianism. But 
the same facts can be better explained in terms of Popper's 
notion of information content and closeness to the truth. 
Meyerson's principle often leads to greater information 
content, but can conflict with this, and the conflicts have 
decided in favour of information content. Sections 1.1. &
1.1.2. illustrate how truth and validity can act as 
Darwinian-like filters on the evolution of ideologies 
because humans prefer ideologies with greater truth content.
I expound those views of Bartley's and Popper's on 
ideologies that are of concern to this thesis (1.2). I then 
show how Popper's notion of situational logic applies to the 
propagandist (1.3.1.). I argue that in order best to 
propagate his doctrine he has to expose it to potential new 
adherents and practise the skills of argument and 
persuasion, both of which oblige him to cultivate an 
interest in criticism. But this means that he exposes his 
doctrine to criticisms that are in principle unforeseeable.
I explore the extent to which the logical properties of 
theories allow a propagandist to prepare defences against 
this criticism.
One such possible defence is confining the thought of 
adherents within the conceptual structure of the ideology, a 
form of "Newspeak", which Gellner seems to think is 
possible. This is analysed in terms of Hattiangadi's theory
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of language acquisition which sees innovation as necessary 
in the acquisition of a language. In order to perpetuate the 
conceptual structure at all, therefore, the propagandist 
would have to leave room for divergences from it.
These conclusions are then applied to Bartley's own test 
case: Protestant Liberalism (1.4.). Bartley's general 
account of ideologies is also criticized.
In the final section I look at the limits of my general 
thesis (1.5.). I construct a better example of an ideology 
in Bartley's sense, one that requires an extreme form of 
mind control which suppresses criticism by suppressing all 
ability to innovate. Here we take to the limit the notion of 
a mendacious and repressive propagandist. I conclude that 
even if such mind-control were possible, there are still 
limits to which the propagandist can safeguard his ideology 
and satisfy both of his goals (1) & (2) above. He cannot 
guarantee in an epistemological sense against physical 
catastrophes that require innovations to cope with. In such 
a circumstance, to maintain the ideology the propagandist 
would have to maintain the society, but this would require 
the freedom to innovate. It cannot be determined in advance 
which lines of innovative work will produce ideas that have 
a critical bearing on the established ideology. Even when 
produced, it cannot be determined which ideas that when 
combined logically with other ideas, new and old, will have 
a critical bearing on the established ideology.
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1.1. The Importance of Truth in Criticism 
and the Propagation of Ideas
This general thesis is inspired by my judgement that truth 
has more strength in argument than is generally assumed. I 
will argue that truth has at least two underestimated 
effects. It acts as a Darwinian-like filter on ideas 
through criticism; and it satisfies an innate curiosity 
which desires more rather than less truth in our ideas. 
Intellectual history, particularly a comparison between 
science and religion, seems to bear this out. Religion is a 
very useful illustration, for religion is often held to be 
the most stubborn of all ideologies. If I can show that 
even religion can offer no guarantee against criticism, then 
I will also have shown as a corollary that even if Marxism 
and Freudianism assume the form of a religion, they will 
still be open to criticism. This approach is particularly 
appropriate, not only because Bartley's example of an 
ideology in his sense is a religion (some branches of 
modern Protestantism) but also because Freudianism and 
Marxism have often been described as religions, the 
implication being that argument and rationality no longer 
apply.
Making an early contribution to the theory of memetic 
evolution, Monod attributes the spreading power of an idea 
to its "performance" and certain innate structures in the 
mind. The sort of performance Monod has in mind is the 
power of an idea to give greater coherence and confidence to 
a society. He seems to conclude from this that the:
promotion value (of an idea) bears no relation to 
the amount of objective truth the idea may 
contain. The might of the powerful armament 
provided by a religious ideology for a society 
does not lie in its structure, but in the fact 
that this structure is accepted. (Jacques Monod,
[1970], page 155.)
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But this does not follow. It may be true that a coherence 
and confidence giving idea will be spread by its 
beneficiaries, but Monod does not stop to examine the 
possibility that performance may be facilitated by truth. To 
put my point in general terms, a false theory may be useful, 
and spread because of its usefulness. However, the theory 
may be useful because of the little truth it does have. 
Therefore, while we might be able to imagine cases in which 
the usefulness (or "performance") of an idea may be 
independent of its truth content, we cannot accept the 
validity of Monod's argument.
Usefulness and truth content are logically distinct notions. 
However, I find it difficult to think of examples of useful 
theories completely devoid of truth content. Of course, a 
false theory may be useful on account of its falsehood for 
someone who has a theoretical interest in false theories.
For example, in a criticism by reductio ad absurdum the 
critic takes a false premise of his opponent's position and 
uses it to infer an absurd conclusion. In such a case the 
premise remains useful no matter how low its truth content. 
But this is an artificial example. An example that might 
fit Monod's purpose is the Jewish idea that they are 
specially chosen by God. Without disputing the truth of 
this idea, it must be granted that the idea that they are 
the chosen people would give the Jews greater confidence and 
coherence, even if it were completely false. On the other 
hand, this itself is an artificial example, since this idea 
does not have an independent existence; it is embedded in a 
much larger doctrine consisting of moral injunctions and 
historical theories etc. Is this vast doctrine completely 
devoid of truth? This seems hardly likely.
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It can be argued that the Jewish idea that they are the 
chosen people has given them coherence and confidence at the 
expense of the "promotion value" of their religion. As 
Gibbon argues in the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire.
The descendants of Abraham were flattered by the 
opinion that they alone were the heirs of the 
covenant, and they were apprehensive of 
diminishing the value of their inheritance by 
sharing it too easily with the strangers of the 
Earth. (Gibbon, [1776], page 146.)
Curiously, having eliminated truth (and even verisimilitude) 
and structure, Monod is left with a tautology: that the 
spreading power of an idea lies in its being accepted.
Monod also overlooks the possibility that a system of ideas 
may unintentionally give greater coherence and confidence to 
a society. Newton, Faraday, Maxwell, Einstein etc, may not 
have intended their theories and arguments to promote a 
confident and coherent society, but it would appear that 
through technology (telecommunications, transport, 
manufacturing, medicine) they have done just that. If we 
attribute this technological success to the truth-likeness 
of their theories, then we must conclude, contrary to Monod, 
that the truthlikeness of our ideas may promote confidence 
and coherence and thus their spreading power.
Equally dismissive of the power of truth is Ernest Gellner:
It is worth noting and stressing here that truth 
is not an advantage in producing a burning faith - 
contrary to Gibbon's highly ironic observations. 
(Gellner, [1985], page 204.)
Gellner7s assertion leaves a number of possibilities open. 
Even if truth is no advantage it may not be a disadvantage 
either. Alternatively, truth may not be necessary to 
engender a burning faith; but falsehood may be the reason 
for its elimination or abatement. Even burning faiths
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would then be subject to a Darwinian-like selection through 
falsification. To maintain this I do not have to argue that 
all false ideas are eliminated. My position is tenable even 
if only glaringly false doctrines are eliminated.
There is an interesting sophistication to Gellner's position 
which brings it much closer to my position than the above 
quotation would suggest. Gellner actually says that if 
psychoanalysis were true and cured 80% of its patients, then 
it would spread throughout the world. But he thinks that 
its very truth and success would mean that a burning faith 
in it would be impossible. Gellner asks us to consider to 
techniques A and B. A cures 80% of patients by a publicly 
testable procedure, and B cure 20% by an esoteric and 
invisible unspecifiable method which is accompanied by 
intense emotion. A would spread like wild fire, but will not 
have any magic attached to it and would generate no offence. 
B on the other hand will spread just as much as A.
Opposition to B will come from the 60% of patients who 
remain uncured. However, those lucky to be cured by it will 
be bound by faith to their therapists, and they will be 
bound by faith just because B is untestable, invisible and 
unspecifiable. If they spread the word and another 20% are 
cured who in turn spread the word, then we will have an 
exponential growth of the movement.
Gellner does not explicitly speculate as to what the outcome 
of a competition between the two techniques would be. But 
any system of ideas must come into competition with other 
ideas if it is to have any chance of spreading throughout 
the world. In that case Gellner's hypothetical argument 
loses its strength, for even on Gellner's assumptions A, 
being closer to the truth, would have the advantage over B. 
Under these realistic circumstances, B would not spread as 
much as A, contrary to Gellner's thesis. An unintended 
implication of Gellner's position is that the conditions
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favourable for the generation of burning faiths are a 
positive disadvantage to their propagation.
Gellner's definition of B seems to denude it of all content. 
If a system is invisible and unspecifiable, it is hard to 
see how it could be of any use or guidance, let alone work 
in 20% of cases. Let us see if we can provide a possible 
interpretation that would serve Gellner's point. Such a 
definition would be satisfied by a book so sacred that only 
a certain select group of priests could inspect it for 
counsel on various matters. The rank and file faithful would 
accept the advice ostensibly taken directly or by inference 
from the book by the priests. But all along the book has 
nothing but blank pages. Such an invisible and 
unspecifiable system of ideas would be no system at all, 
merely the pretence of a system, and could not therefore be 
perpetuated. What Gellner could have said, but fails to 
bring out clearly is that what is being perpetuated in a 
case like this is the idea that a certain group of 
individuals has privileged access to knowledge or wisdom.
But this is checkable since the advise of the priests can be 
searched for inconsistencies over time. An example of this 
is M. James Penton's [1985]. Penton, originally a Jehovah's 
witness, shows how the so-called authoritative 
interpretations of the Bible by the "Elders" were 
inconsistent over time, producing much disaffection among 
followers. Perhaps the same kind of criticism can be 
applied to Psycho-analysis.
Monod's and Gellner's positions each imply that truth does 
not add persuasive strength to criticism or aid the 
propagation of an idea. (As we saw, in Gellner's case, it is 
burning .faiths that are extinguished by truth). But if this 
is so, why is it that science has had such an impact on 
religion? So great is this impact that new religions feel 
obliged to adopt the name of science: for example, Christian
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Science or Scientology. (One is reminded of the Freudian 
notion of identification with the aggressor, though, of 
course, criticism works quite differently in other respects 
from aggression.)
The rise of science as the pursuit of truth for its own sake 
in the 16th and 17th centuries with parallel developments in 
philosophy has made it very difficult to maintain the old 
religions with their old interpretations. Scientists such 
as Isaac Newton produced better explanations of the world 
than those contained in the Bible or other canonical texts. 
Newton's explanations had greater information content and 
were closer to the truth. Newton may have maintained his 
theistic views on the creation of the world, but his 
scientific theories are autonomous objects with unintended 
ramifications and implications. Despite Newton's 
intentions, his scientific theories undermined the dominant 
Christian cosmology. Moreover, philosophers such as David 
Hume and Voltaire exposed the fallacious reasoning and 
inconsistencies in the Bible and the arguments of its 
supporters. The so-called argument from design and the 
ontological argument, not contained in the Bible as such but 
propounded by St Thomas Aquinas in Summa Theologica and St 
Anselm (1033-1109) in Proslogion respectively, were two of 
the most prominent intellectual supports of Christianity. 
Hume refuted the argument from design in his Dialogues 
Concerning Natural Religion, and undermined the principle of 
the ontological argument in his Enquiries, [1748], XII,
(iii). Kant elaborated the latter in his Critigue of Pure 
Reason. Interestingly, the ontological argument was 
immediately attacked on its publication from within the 
Christian community by a monk, Gaunilo, and by Aquinus, both 
using sophisticated argunents. I think that this shows that 
far from reason being irrelevant to Christian commitment, 
the maintenance of commitment has involved quite subtle 
reasoning.
40
The design argument is that just as one can infer the 
existence of a designer from the order in human artifacts, 
one can by analogy infer the existence of a designer of the 
universe from its order. Hume pointed out that the two 
cases are quite distinct. In the case of humans and their 
artifacts, we have two genera whose members we have 
experienced to be in a certain relation. We have seen 
watch-makers making watches. Moreover, we have not seen 
watches simply emerge without a watch-maker. But in the 
other case, we have two unique things: the theistic God and 
the Universe. We have not seen Gods making Universes; 
indeed, this is logically impossible. Darwin [1859] further 
undermined the argument from design, by proposing that the 
obvious imperfections in the way an organ was adapted to its 
function was better explained by natural variation and 
selection than by divine design. Voltaire pointed to 
inconsistencies and empirical absurdities in Genesis; for 
example, the assertion that God first created light, and 
only later the Sun and the stars. (Voltaire, [1764], page 
218.)
Anselm's ontological argument attempts to show that denying 
God's existence involves a contradiction. He begins by 
assuming that God is a being than which nothing greater can 
be conceived. If we grant this, which seems harmless, then 
we grant that we can conceive a being than which nothing 
greater can be conceived. But, Anselm says, if this concept 
exists only in our mind, then there is a being greater than 
this mere mental entity: one that actually exists. Thus we 
would contradict ourselves if we were to deny existence to 
what corresponded to this conception. Kant's reply is his 
famous dictum that "Whatever, therefore, and however much, 
our concept of an object may contain, we must go outside it, 
if we are to ascribe existence to the object". Adapting 
Kant's argument, suppose one had a concept of an X that
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included existence. One could deny the existence of Xs 
without contradiction. Suppose, for example, that one had 
the concept of a centauroid: a centaur that exists. If one 
then asserted that there are no centauroids one would not 
contradict oneself. Therefore, to assert or imply the 
existence of an X it is not sufficient to grant the 
possibility of conceiving an X: one must actually assert or 
imply the existence of an X.
The resulting damage to the doctrinal integrity of 
Christianity is not easy to see. What we find is that the 
original texts and ceremony are retained but radically 
different interpretations are placed on them. The result is 
that the power of argument is underestimated by onlookers. 
For example, the Jehovah's Witnesses, ostensibly a 
fundamentalist Christian sect, have virtually abandoned the 
original interpretation of Genesis. The creation of the 
world is taken to mean the creation merely of the Earth and 
the Solar system, and each of the seven days of the creation 
is taken to be ’thousands of years long. These are attempts 
to make a now absurd account of creation more plausible in 
the light of the triumph of science. This is typical of 
Christianity as a whole. As the Claremont theologian John 
Hicks puts it:
The pressure upon Christianity is as strong as 
ever to go on adapting to something which can be 
believed. (As quoted by Wells in [1988], page 
66. )8
Such examples will help us to see how it is that Marxism and 
Freudianism can seem to be insulated from criticism, yet to 
have actually changed quite considerably in response to 
criticism.
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The move away from the older literal interpretation of the 
Bible can be seen in the works of prominent theologians. 
Earlier this century theologians such as Karl Barth were 
asserting complete freedom in the interpretation of the word 
of God (with the proviso that whatever the proper 
interpretation is it be thought of as true). Today the most 
popular theologians are those like Paul Tillich, who argue 
that only metaphorical interpretations can be placed on the 
Bible. It is significant that these are Protestant 
theologians, theologians who have had more exposure to 
science (see section 1.4.). Perhaps other religions such 
as Islam are more intact because they have had less 
exposure to science. We may conjecture that with a similar 
degree of contact, these religions would also crumble and 
resort to apologetics similar to those to be seen in 
Protestantism.
No serious attempt to determine the extent to which a system 
of ideas can insulate itself from the truth can ignore this 
general development in intellectual history. It must lead 
us to suspect views such as Monod's and Gellner's. But also 
we must answer the question: in what fundamental respect 
were scientific explanations of the world better at 
spreading than those supplied by Christianity?
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1.1.2. The Propagandistic Power of Informative Explanation
Science has succeeded in spreading its ideas because it 
promotes the values of truth and criticism. But let me be 
more specific. Science has a greater chance of surviving in 
competition with rival systems of ideas because it supplies 
theories of the world that are: general and precise (i.e., 
have high information content), relatively simple or 
unified, open to public scrutiny and testing, and often 
closer to the truth. Why should these characteristics give 
ideas a better chance of spreading? Because, as I intend to 
argue contrary to Gellner, Monod and others, man is a 
rational animal and is substantially interested in the 
truth. (In chapter 2 I will expand on what I mean by man's 
substantial interest in the truth, and why this should 
follow from Popper's evolutionary view of man.) But let us 
first see how one might begin to explain in these terms the 
rise of Christianity and its subsequent loss of authority.
Christianity was successful partly because it satisfied a 
universal interest in an explanation of the world. But not 
any sort of explanation would have done. It had to be 
general, precise, relatively simple, and close to the truth. 
These do not amount exactly to the criteria of good 
scientific explanations, for they leave out at least the 
highly important criterion of falsifiability as advocated by 
Popper. Nevertheless, let us see were this idea takes us.
We can develop a more sophisticated conception of a good 
scientific explanation in the course of exploring the 
overlap in the standards of explanation embodied on the one 
hand in religion, and those embodied in legitimate science. 
The extraordinary growth of Christianity and Islam can be 
attributed in part to their monotheism: they reduced the 
apparent diversity of causes to one divine source. One God 
satisfies the demand for simplicity and generality. Many
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pluralistic religions posit a supreme god who at least sets 
limits to the behaviour of the other gods.
But has not Christianity avoided giving definite 
information? A cynic might think that the last thing an 
adherent wants in a religion are definite claims that can 
clash with reality. However, the history of Christianity, 
at least, is replete with predictions of various kinds. The 
Old Testament scholar H.P. Smith listed 27 different dates 
which were fixed as the end of the world and of the second 
coming between the years 557 and 1734. (Essays in Biblical 
Interpretation. London. Allen and Unwin (and Boston:
Marshall Jones). 1921. page 180.) This accords with a 
comment made by George Santayana:
What would make the preaching of the gospel 
utterly impossible would be the admission that it 
had no authority to proclaim what has happened or 
what is going to happen, either in this world or 
in another. (As quoted by Bartley, [1984], page 
38.)
It is almost ubiquitous among new religious movements to 
make predictions about the end of the world etc. But these 
prophecies can be falsified. People become dissatisfied with 
the vacuous "explanations" of moribund religions because, 
emptied of much of their content in an attempt to deal with 
these falsified predictions - among other criticism - they 
are very uninformative. If the appeal of religions were 
unconnected to their informative content, such predictions 
that can clash with reality would not be so common. (And 
neither would the content-decreasing modifications to 
systems whose predictions have suffered falsification.) We 
may conclude that falsification by actual events can act as 
a selective filter on the form of religions, tending to 
eliminate those with little or dwindling content. Objective 
truth, therefore, is relevant to an idea's promotion value. 
It may not be the only selective filter on the propagation
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of ideas, but I do not have to maintain that in order to 
refute Monod's denial of any relationship between truth and 
promotion value. (The chapter on the immunizing stratagem 
will explain how doctrines can become emptied of content in 
response to criticism, not strictly through an explicit 
refutation, but through a surreptitious or unwitting 
abandonment of the theory in response to criticism.)
It is fairly commonplace to describe science as guided by 
the principles of simplicity, precision, generality. It 
would be interesting if we could reduce these principles to 
a single principle. Owing to work in philosophy this does 
seem to be possible. The human mind desires information 
from its ideologies. However, it is not just information 
that is demanded. One idea that is worth examining in this 
respect is Meyerson's theory that what the mind desires are 
explanations that reduce diversity. Meyerson is responsible 
for the application of this idea, called the principle of 
identity, to scientific methodology. Zahar has developed 
Meyerson's idea in his book Einstein's Revolution.
Meyerson argues that the same desire for such explanations 
is a basic property of the mind and determines what we 
regard as good explanation in both science and common sense. 
The identity principle shows itself in different forms. We 
may quote from Zahar's presentation of Meyerson's idea:
According to Meyerson, the whole of science is 
informed by the identity principle, which consists 
in denying the diversity of the phenomena, or 
rather, in deriving this diversity from one fixed 
set of laws. This is the so-called legal form of 
the identity principle. According to the causal 
version, nature consists of substances governed by 
strict conservation laws. The human mind has an 
irresistible tendency to hypostasize natural 
processes, thus turning them into things whose 
total quantity remains constant. This is an 
innate propensity, which already leads the child 
to a belief in the persistence of material 
objects. (Zahar, [1989], pages 23-24.)
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This principle seems to be in operation in science's 
preference for universal as opposed to particular facts, and 
theories with few premises (Zahar gives as an example the 
search for the unified theory in physics).
Zahar agrees with Meyerson's conjecture that this innate 
propensity evolved by a Darwinian process. The legal form of 
this propensity enables animals to anticipate facts.
Meyerson denies any survival value to the causal version of 
the identity principle, but Zahar points out that the 
postulation of objects that persist in time also helps an 
animal anticipate facts. However, Zahar is quick to 
maintain that even though the emergence of these principles 
can be explained in Darwinian terms, once they exist their 
application in science is strictly Lamarkian. Zahar 
therefore neglects to ask whether these principles act as 
Darwinian-like filters of ideas spontaneously produced 
partly independent of heuristics or receptions. Zahar takes 
it for granted that Darwinian-like and Lamarkian-like 
processes are incompatible, but many processes embody both: 
for example, the breeding of dogs, which is directed in 
certain respects in accord with a plan, does not eliminate 
Darwinian processes completely.
Meyerson's idea can be generalised to religions. A religious 
conversion may be rather like seeing a good scientific 
explanation. Meyerson's theory accounts for the propagation 
of monotheistic religions and it also accounts for the 
spread of Marxism which claims to offer a comprehensive 
explanation of at least the social world, using relatively 
few premises, and the success of Freudianism, which - at 
least in the beginning - reduced all psychological phenomena 
to sexual impulses.
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Surprisingly, Monod takes a similar line, attributing the 
immense influence of Marxism to
its ontogenic structure, the explanation which it 
provides, both sweeping and detailed, of past, 
present, and future history. (Monod, [1970], page 
157.)
Monod, therefore, attributes Marxism's success to the values 
of exactitude and generality. This contradicts his earlier 
assertion that the structure of an idea is irrelevant to 
explaining its spread. Although these criteria of a good 
explanation are not necessarily connected with a search for 
truth, it is hard for Monod to maintain the relevance of an 
ideas' exactitude and generality in the light of his 
assertion that the propagation of an idea bears no 
relationship at all to its objective truth content. Marxism 
may contain false generalizations or spurious details. But 
the search for generality and exactitude is hardly likely to 
lead away from truth in a systematic way. Moreover, Monod 
does not show that Marxism is completely false. The appeal 
of Marxism's generality and exactitude may well depend on 
Marxism's being successful within fairly large areas, on its 
having at least some objective truth content.
Some would argue that Marxism claims to provide a 
metaphysical theory of the whole world that all true 
theories must presuppose (or at least not contradict). As 
Minogue points out in Alien Powers [1984], Marxism 
overreaches itself in this respect for it even tries to 
explain all theory creation and debate, including itself.
Religions are not, of course, concerned with exactly the 
same set of problems as science, but there is an overlap. 
Religions are, like science, concerned with the structure 
of reality, but they also deal with ethical questions which 
lie outside the scope of science. But even here they may
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come into contradiction since at least some ethical 
questions, whether for instance one should pray to God, are 
dependent on the actual state of the world, in this case on 
whether there is in fact a God, and if so, how many? At 
this point Meyerson's principle would come into play.
There is a problem with Meyerson's principle that helps to 
explain why scientific method has out-competed Christianity. 
An even stronger innate principle than Meyerson's principle 
is the demand for greater information, for a growth in 
knowledge. As Popper argues, science has progressed most 
when it has striven for an increase in the information 
content of its theories. Now, some ways of reducing 
diversity may also reduce information content, (or 
truthlikeness?) Obviously, an unrestrained application of 
Meyerson's principle would lead to Parmenides' theory of a 
block universe, in which everything is one. But truth lies 
somewhere between the theories of Heraclitus and Parmenides. 
Meyerson was actually aware of this and consequently 
asserted only that the human mind struggles to impose its 
denial of diversity on the world, which resists the 
straight-jacket. Historically, when there has been a choice 
science has preferred increased information content to 
reduced diversity. (The Greeks thought there were but four 
elements; today there are thought to be 109. Carnot's 
principle may be another example.) Also we know from Godel's 
work that there are limits on the axiomatizability of 
theories, a result that may preclude a unified field theory: 
physics may be ineradicably incomplete. Therefore, while 
Meyerson's principle helps us to see that monotheistic 
religion and science appeal to some of the same standards, 
its occasional conflict with the search for increasing 
verisimilitude and information content helps us to explain 
why science out-competed monotheistic religion.
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In the above comparison between science and Christianity, I 
neglected to point to an important difference between them 
that might seem to undermine my point. To say that science 
has out-competed Christianity in the competition for 
credibility on matters of empirical fact is a little 
misleading. "Science" is a term that refers both to a 
collection of particular theories and/or to a collection of 
methods and attitudes. More scientific theories have been 
falsified and discarded than religious theories. This is 
hardly surprising since science (as a method) does generally 
encourage the severe testing and retesting of theories and 
the generation of competing theories. Thus a more accurate 
description would be that the methods and attitudes of 
science have survived and out-competed religious methods and 
attitudes, but at the price of refuting a great many 
scientific theories. (To be even more precise, we should 
also say that the various refuted scientific theories have 
lost out not to Christianity, but to other scientific 
theories. Even refuted and scientifically discarded 
theories are still far superior in terms of survival value 
than Christian theories, and this is due to their greater 
truth-likeness and information content.)
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Having seen how science and Christianity have competed to 
satisfy similar (or overlapping) standards, those theories 
that put a great gulf between science and ideology, and 
therefore make the latter seem more closed to argument, now 
seem less plausible. For example, Edward Shils has 
expressed the opinion that:
...science is not and never has been part of an 
ideological culture. (Shils, [1968], page 74.)
Manning goes further, asserting that
Ideological talk, unlike legal talk, does not give 
us information about the world in which we live.
It cannot carry the appropriate descriptive 
content. (Manning, [1980], "The Place of Ideology 
in Political Life." page 75.) 9
But even if one regards science as non-ideological, one must 
admit that the paradigm examples of ideologies may 
incorporate and use the propositions of science. For 
example, classical liberalism used theorems of economics, 
such as the law of comparative advantage, in its arguments 
for the general value of freedom within a market. Marxism 
used a modified version of Ricardo's Labour Theory of Value 
to argue against this ideology. (I subsequently found that 
Boudon makes a similar criticism of Shils in [1986], pages 
26-27.) Human beings desire an informative, general 
explanation of the world and their place within it. The more 
any system of ideas satisfies this desire, therefore, the 
greater will be its chances of propagation. This accounts 
for the relative propagandistic success of both Marxism and 
classical liberalism.
It is not being argued that truth always wins out in the 
long run. That would seem to be false. What I am arguing 
is that there are no fool-proof methods of saving a network 
from the impact of truth. But I also want to argue that
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truth adds strength .to a position's ability to spread, and 
that if pressed truth has the advantage in argument. A true 
or valid position is rather like the number which is 
favoured in a loaded die: it does not always win, but it has 
a certain propensity to do so.10 Thus this thesis is not 
refuted by examples of false doctrines that have survived 
over the centuries. My argument is that their position can 
never be made secure.
1.2. Popper and Bartley
Since this thesis is an immanent criticism of Popper's and 
Bartley's position on ideologies, I will expound their 
positions and then point to the central principles in their 
work that undermine their pessimistic position on the power 
of argument.
Popper and Bartley have been central figures in the attempt 
to make the distinction between open and closed systems of 
thought; between critical and dogmatic beliefs, attitudes 
and methods. In many ways they have weakened the 
philosophical case for absolutely closed systems of thought, 
showing how diverse sorts of ideas can be subject to 
criticism of different sorts. They have thus contributed to 
a more critical ethos. But they have also made a case for 
asserting that some ideologies and their proponents are 
immune from empirical or non-empirical criticism.
My criticism of Popper and Bartley is heavily dependent on 
their achievements in extending the notion of 
criticizability. Their major achievements have been in 
extending the logical/methodological notion of 
criticizability, though even this extension remains to be 
completed. Their view that all (or nearly all) positions 
are logically open to criticism has not been generalised
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sufficiently to the psychological and sociological domain.
I will explore the move from Popper's early conception of 
critical rationalism to Bartley's extremely important 
generalisation. We will also cover the latest extension to 
the logical notion of openness to criticism, propounded by 
Miller. We will then show how Popper's and Bartley's 
principles of situational logic and Darwinism can be used to 
show that there are no absolute barriers to criticism even 
in the psychological or sociological domain.
As I argued in the introduction, it is important to 
distinguish logical, psychological and sociological openness 
to criticism so that one can show how they are related and 
interact.
It might be thought that questions of psychology and 
sociology should be dealt with in the psychology and 
sociology departments. However, problems cannot always be 
neatly slotted in to particular departments. One could 
argue, as Popper has, that there are no subject matters as 
such but only problems, (cf. Popper, [1983], page 5.) It 
follows that in trying to solve a problem, one should not be 
shy to use theoretical and conceptual tools independent of 
their origin. In following this advice I am able to explore 
very important relationships that exist between the 
psychological, sociological and logical domains, 
relationships that have received only scant attention, 
perhaps because of a too departmental attitude to this 
problem. Again, this is consistent with an immanent 
criticism.
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1.2.1. An Element of Residual Dogmatism in Popper's Work
Bartley's major contribution is his theory of 
comprehensively critical rationalism, which was meant to 
resolve some internal problems of Popper's position on 
openness to criticism. Popper had championed the critical 
attitude, but there were unintentional dogmatic elements in 
Popper's presentation that Bartley successfully showed to be 
unnecessary. Henceforth all positions were open to 
criticism. Bartley had made the notion of criticism 
comprehensive. It is my task to eliminate the remaining 
dogmatic elements in Bartley's and Popper's system. Let us 
first see how Popper allows a dogmatic element into his 
theory.
Popper has asserted that
..no rational argument will have a rational effect 
on a man who does not want to adopt a rational 
attitude. (Popper, [1945], page 231.)
Popper arrives at this pessimistic position through a 
discussion of the relative merits of uncritical (or 
comprehensive) rationalism, critical rationalism, and 
irrationalism. Uncritical rationalism is the doctrine that 
all and only those positions that can be supported by 
argument or evidence should be accepted, the rest rejected. 
Popper points out that uncritical rationalism is in fact 
self undermining, since it cannot itself be defended by 
argument or evidence.11 Moreover, uncritical rationalism 
can be defeated by its own weapon, argument.
Popper generalises the argument. Since every argument makes 
an inference from assumptions, it is impossible that all 
assumptions be based on argument. The impossibility arises 
because we would be involved in an infinite regress: each
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argument for an assumption would have to have an argument 
for each of its own assumptions.
The demand raised by many philosophers that we 
should start with no assumption whatever and never 
assume anything without 'sufficient reason', and 
even the weaker demand that we should start with a 
very small set of assumptions ('categories'), are 
both in this form inconsistent. For they 
themselves rest upon the truly colossal assumption 
that it is possible to start without, or with only 
a few assumptions, and still to obtain results 
that are worthwhile. (Ibid. p. 230.)
How does this argument lead to Popper's pessimistic position 
on argument against someone who does not want to be 
influenced by argument? Popper applies this general point 
to the problem of adopting a rational attitude.
The rationalist attitude is characterised by the 
importance it attaches to argument and experience.
But neither logical argument nor experience can 
establish the rationalist attitude; for only those 
who are ready to consider argument or experience, 
and who have therefore adopted this attitude 
already, will be impressed by them. That is to 
say a rationalist attitude must first be adopted 
if any argument or experience is to be effective, 
and it cannot therefore be based on argument or 
experience. (And this is quite independent of the 
question whether or not there exist any convincing 
arguments which favour the adoption of the 
rationalist attitude.) We have to conclude from 
this that no rational argument will have a 
rational effect on a man who does not want to 
adopt a rational attitude. (Ibid. p. 230.)
The adoption of the critical attitude then must be an 
"irrational faith in reason".
From the above quotations it can be seen that there are two 
aspects to the dogmatic residue in Popper's account: a 
logical/methodological aspect, and
psychological/sociological aspect. However, Popper does not 
consistently separate the two. Clearly, one can specify a
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methodological rule to the effect that one maintain one's 
position in the face of all argument. Such a rule is 
logically consistent, and if scrupulously applied would mean 
that all criticism is ineffective. But Popper seems to 
think that if irrationalism is logically tenable then it 
must be psychologically tenable. Popper first says that the 
rationalist attitude must be adopted to make criticism 
effective, but then immediately retracts this implicitly by 
saying that this is independent of whether there are any 
convincing arguments for adopting rationalism. Is Popper 
saying that a convincing argument can fail to convince? If 
there are arguments that can persuade one to adopt the 
rationalist attitude in general, then one can be affected by 
rational argument without having first adopted the 
rationalist attitude. Popper could mean that there might be 
arguments in favour of the rationalist attitude that can 
strengthen this attitude only after one has made the 
faithful leap in adopting rationalism. But this is unclear.
Bartley wanted to develop a methodology that kept Popper's 
emphasis on the critical attitude, but which did not have to 
rely on Popper's "irrational faith" in reason. More 
generally, Bartley wanted a critical rationalism that 
avoided Fries's trilemma: (1) infinite regress; (2) vicious 
circularity; (3) dogmatism. Bartley successfully solved 
this logical/methodological problem by his arguments for 
comprehensively critical rationalism. Bartley's solution 
was to clearly distinguish between justificationism and 
criticism. Traditionally, criticism had been defined 
implicitly as an attempt to show that some position was 
unjustified. But, Bartley says, if justification is 
impossible and our primary interest is, and always has been, 
truth then it would make sense to define criticism with 
respect to the truth, not justification. We can then go on 
to define the rational attitude in a coherent manner that 
avoids (1) to (3). We may not be able to prove or justify
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our positions or our methodology itself, but we can 
nonetheless diligently search for the truth by keeping our 
positions as much open to criticism as possible. In 
response, Popper rejected his call for an "irrational faith" 
in reason. This was no longer necessary. (Popper's 
acceptance of Bartley's argument is recorded in his [1983].) 
Thus, methodologically there was then no dogmatism in 
Popper's position. However, both Bartley and Popper have 
retained the psychological/sociological aspect of their 
residual dogmatism.
1.2.2. An Element of Residual Dogmatism in Bartley's Work.
The problem as presented by Bartley is an unresolved crisis 
of identity in contemporary rationalism which can be clearly 
analysed in terms of contemporary Protestant theological 
thought. Bartley argues that the Christian intellectual 
reaction to the failure of Protestant Liberalism is able to 
defend its retreat to commitment, its use of unargued faith, 
only because rationalism, with which it identifies itself, 
has admitted that it must itself appeal to unargued, 
unjustified assumptions. Bartley pictures the Christian 
saying to his conventional rationalist critic: why should I 
be moved by your demonstration that my faith cannot be 
justified; afterall, you yourself must dogmatically accept 
some starting point. The fault as Bartley sees it, lies in 
the ubiquitous adherence to what he calls a justificationist 
metacontext. Argument and even criticism itself is 
generally understood as dependent on justifying some 
position. A criticism in this context is an attempt to show 
that a position cannot be justified. Bartley's proposed 
solution is to separate criticism from justification. In 
this way Fries's trilemma is avoided. All we need for 
rational argument is a willingness to keep our positions, 
all our positions, open to criticism. This method, of
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course, applies to itself. But this self applicability does 
not suffer the same problems that Popper attributes to 
uncritical rationalism. Neither does it suffer, like 
critical rationalism, from the need to rely on an ultimate 
terminus in argument. I would not want to suggest that 
Bartley's comprehensively critical rationalism is without 
its critics; it is in fact the subject of considerable 
debate, in which the principle figures have been Watkins and 
Post. 12
Bartley' analysis of the reaction to the failure of 
Protestant Liberalism serves to illustrate his answer to the 
main problem of his book:
...what can be done to (systems of ideas), how 
can one tinker with them, to enhance or reduce 
their criticizability. In particular, the book is 
concerned with how men use ideas to protect ideas 
from competition, to remove them from the 
selective process that is the heart of criticism. 
(Bartley, [1984], page xix.)
Bartley's general position on psychological/sociological 
openness to criticism is that
ideologies are retained regardless of the facts; 
they are not abandoned when they clash with the 
facts; rather they die out or are eliminated, if 
at all, together with their carriers... (Ibid. 
pxvii.)
The claim is that there are networks of theories making 
certain claims about the world whose proponents continue to 
maintain and propagate them whatever facts are presented 
against them. This view is reminiscent of Planck's view of 
science. Planck held that new theories in science become 
accepted only because the proponents of the old theories die 
off, leaving it to the young generation of scientists to 
adopt and develop the new theories.
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Bartley takes this as a rough and ready distinction that can 
easily be expanded to treat the main case study of his book, 
Protestantism and its successors. But this qualification 
does not repudiate the implication that humans are 
irrational. Indeed, Bartley begins with the assumption that 
humans are irrational:
I do not for a moment believe that man is a 
rational animal, let alone that men are born with 
a 'faculty' of reason. Rather, rationality, like 
consciousness itself, is a comparatively late, and 
still rather rare, and, where it exists, fragile 
development. Most individuals exist in a 
troubled, slumbering fantasy world, and, when most 
awake, are bound by rigid habits and unconscious 
patterns of behaviour. Comparatively few persons 
enjoy the give and take of criticism or think to 
any purpose other than to dominate. (Ibid. page 
xxi.)
The rise of science on this view is a puzzle. Bartley 
recognizes this and attributes it to the influence of 
competition and imitation through the rise of open markets. 
It paid individuals to copy the exploratory, entrepreneurial 
behaviour of their more successful competitors in the 
provision of commodities. Reflecting critically on one's own 
behaviour to eliminate unsuccessful trials also allowed one 
to shift one's energies more quickly to meet consumer 
demand. These attitudes of exploration and self criticism 
became generalised, making science possible. This is what 
Popper and Bartley would call a situational analysis of the 
market and the rise of science. Bartley does not consider 
the possibility that the situational logic of the market may 
have been part of the genetic selection pressure acting on 
our ancestors; if he had he may not have dismissed so 
quickly the existence of a rational faculty. In any case, 
the same sort of analysis that Bartley applies to the 
emergence of rationality can be applied to ideologies to 
show that they are more open to criticism than Bartley or 
Popper suppose.
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1.3. Situational Logic 
This section addresses itself to two main questions:
(1) Can the propagandist simply avoid criticism, refusing to 
listen to or read counterarguments?
(2) Can he control the more subtle defenses of the doctrine 
and build up membership? (For example, through the often 
supposed monopoly of interpretation that the Catholic Church 
has on the Bible.)
My answer will be that due to the logic of the 
propagandist's situation, neither of these strategies are 
available to those propagandists who are keen to propagate 
their ideas. First we must explore Popper's notion of the 
logic of the situation.
Popper explains that in situational logic what we do is to 
construct a model of the situation in which an agent acts. 
The situation will be made up of his knowledge and his aims 
plus the constraints on his action, constraint understood in 
a very general sense. We then assume that the agent acts 
appropriately to the situation as we have modelled it. What 
we learn is how and why the agent saw his action as 
appropriate to the situation as he saw it. But the model is 
not confined to how he sees it: for it must include 
information that describes their limited experience, their 
limited or overblown aims, their limited or over-excited 
imagination etc. We thus learn how their action was 
adequate for their inadequate view of the situational 
structure.
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Popper points out that we can use the rationality principle 
even to explain the actions of the madman:
We try to explain a madman's actions, as far as 
possible, by his aims (which may be monomaniac) 
and by the 'information' on which he acts, that is 
to say, by his convictions ( which may be 
obsessions, that is, false theories so tenaciously 
held that they become incorrigible). In so 
explaining the actions of a madman we explain them 
in terms of our wider knowledge of a problem 
situation which comprises his own, narrower, view 
of his problem situation; and understanding his 
actions means seeing their adequacy according to 
his view - his madly mistaken view - of the 
problem situation. (Popper, [1967], page 363.)
Popper's view overlaps with my own, since I argue that all 
people are rational, but there is a considerable difference 
between his view and mine, since I will be arguing that no 
beliefs are incorrigible. In this chapter I will be arguing 
that the logic of the propagandist's situation impels him on 
pain of failure to spread his ideas, to be - among other 
things - corrigible. In chapter 2 I will argue that 
Darwinian theory suggests that no person is incorrigible in 
their beliefs.
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1.3.1. The Propagandist and Situational Logic
Both Popper and Bartley regard Marxism and Freudianism as 
examples of irrational ideologies: their proponents have 
made them closed to argument. However, if we view these 
systems from the point of view of the propagandist's 
situation, there are important pressures and constraints 
that render them more open to criticism than one might at 
first suspect.
Marxism and Freudianism are propagandistic sets of 
assumptions that are subject to a situational logic peculiar 
to evangelism. Think of the logic of the situation facing 
the ideologue who wants his ideas to catch on, to propagate, 
but also wants to protect them from criticism. When he 
first contrives the ideas he could decide there and then 
never to utter them or write them down. They will be safe 
from outside criticism, but certainly will not spread far 
and may well be forgotten. Suppose he decides to speak them 
but not to write them down, thinking that if he comes across 
a strong counterargument, he can more easily deny having 
asserted the theory in this vulnerable form. The costs here 
are quite high: even if his ideas do spread by word of 
mouth, they are likely to be distorted and changed 
significantly without reference to a canonical text, perhaps 
even spawning new ideas that come into competition with the 
original idea. It is a matter of common observation that 
rumour distorts initially innocent tales, often contravening 
the purpose of their originator. It also becomes clear 
that, contrary to popular opinion, pride may actually work 
against the survival of an ideology, since in avoiding the 
shame of error the ideologue abandons it by denying he even 
asserted it.
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The propagandist could write the text for a new creed and 
then promptly lock it away in a safe. It would then be free 
from possibly damaging criticism, but it would also be safe 
from propagation. Gibbon attributes the propagational 
success of Christianity partly to the fact that it threw off 
the fetters of the Jewish religion, which kept the teachings
and promise of salvation confined to the descendants of
Abraham, (cf.Gibbon, [1776], page 147.) The Gnostic heretics 
of early Christianity claimed to possess secret knowledge 
that was only given to those few they deemed spiritually 
mature. One could argue that this practise was partly 
responsible for the ease with which Gnosticism was 
suppressed by the orthodox church. (On the Gnostics's claim 
to secret knowledge see Pagels [1979], pages 44-47.)
The propagandist who restricts his propagandistic efforts 
has to bear a number of costs:
(a) A loss in his skills of argument and persuasion. If the
doctrine is unearthed one day, he would be less able to 
defend it against criticism.
(b) A loss in memory and understanding of the ideology.
There is nothing as efficient as criticism to maintain and 
improve the memory and understanding of an idea.
(c) A failure to take account of competing ideas. In the 
modern world in which many ideas are easily available 
through T.V., radio, and literature any idea aiming at 
maximum spread is likely to have more critics than 
defenders. To combat competing ideas, one needs to 
understand them and the attitude that their adherents have 
toward them. Without such knowledge intrinsically very 
subtle and excellent arguments may be wasted because they do 
not address the adherent's premises, problem and styles (or 
methods) of thinking.
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Thus we see that the logic of the propagandist's situation 
involves an implicit trade-off between the reproducibility 
and fidelity of his message and protection from criticism. 
His situation forces him, as it were, to make his message 
into some sort of publicly inspectable record: to write it 
down in a book or to make a tape recording etc. The message 
is then in competition with other networks of ideas. To 
propagate the ideology, its adherents need to present it to 
others who may criticise it. Those who will agree and pass 
the message on and those who will criticize cannot be 
determined in advance, so the avoidance of criticism cannot 
be guaranteed. The logic of the situation is that the 
propagandist must meet counter-argument.
The propagandist may not be able simply to avoid encounters 
with criticism without cost, but perhaps there are subtler 
defences of the ideology. The problem is that the defences 
cannot be controlled.
The propagandist's message, then, is no longer a changing 
and vague subjective idea but an object open to public 
criticism. This much is fairly obvious, but there are 
unforeseeable consequences of giving the message an 
objective form, and these flow from the logical character of 
any theory. It might be thought that the propagandist could 
prepare his message in advance to protect it from criticism. 
Perhaps by engendering a monopoly on the interpretation of 
the doctrine, as the Catholic Church is commonly supposed to 
have done. However, there are certain properties of the 
message that cannot be fully surveyed or known to the 
propagator and therefore cannot be controlled by him in such 
a way as to anticipate and avoid all or even most criticism. 
These properties are called the informative content and the 
logical content of a theory. They correspond roughly to 
what one might call the implications of a theory.
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When one questions a theory one questions its implications. 
But there happen to be an infinite number of non trivial 
implications of any theory, and therefore an infinite number 
of possible criticisms. Clearly, the propagandist cannot 
prepare his theory or his recruits for an infinite number of 
possible criticisms. For example, the Marxists were not 
prepared for the Marginalist revolution in economics. If 
Marx had tried to prepare a defence in advance his chances 
of predicting this development would have been precisely 
zero. For any explicandum, there are an infinite number of 
logically possible explanations. Therefore, even though 
Marx was aware of the explicanda that other economists were 
working on, we may say that, other things being equal, no 
matter how many finite possible theories n he prepared for, 
the probability of his anticipating the marginalist theory 
would have been equal to n divided by an infinite number of 
possibilities: that is, zero. One might object that such an 
argument does not explain why multiple discoveries in 
science are so frequent as reported by Robert Merton.
Indeed, this much higher than zero probability for multiple 
discoveries seems to be due to the fact that scientists in 
any field share a great number of assumptions, techniques, 
one might even say styles of thought. These common 
characteristics constrain the range of theories that may be 
discovered. But even if one admits this, the chances of 
consistently keeping even just ahead of the competition 
would seem to be vanishingly small. Only general defences, 
therefore, can be prepared in advance: that predicated on 
criticism in itself, for example the Marxist's tendency to 
dismiss any adverse criticism as bourgeois, or the Catholic 
Churches tendency to establish a monopoly on interpretation. 
Criticism itself has to be branded as treachery or heresy. 
However, as I intend to argue from these logical 
characteristics of theories, this has much less strength as 
a defence than is commonly thought.
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If movements are so good at protecting themselves from 
criticism, why is it that they have a tendency to split? An 
important factor is that different individuals faced by the 
same criticism must improvise a defence there and then. As 
I have argued, criticism cannot be completely predicted and 
prepared for in advance, and since no two people understand 
a theory in exactly the same way, these improvised defences 
are almost bound to be different. It follows therefore that 
differences of opinion must arise both about (a) the 
interpretation of the doctrine and (b) how it is best 
defended. I include interpretation here because 
interpretation is partly a matter of seeing the implications 
of a doctrine relative to criticism. In understanding some 
criticism one is seeing some of the implications of the 
doctrine being criticised. It follows that the supposed 
monopoly of interpretation of the Catholic Church may well 
impede the search for truth, but it cannot guarantee its 
doctrine from criticism.
What about the general strategy to dub all criticism of 
Marxism as bourgeois or class treachery, or criticism of the 
Church as evil heresy? It is not always obvious what counts 
as criticism. It is often a difficult task to determine 
whether a statement follows from or contradicts or is 
compatible with a complex web of assumptions. A new 
doctrine seemingly supportive to an orthodox position may be 
taken on board and only later discovered after protracted 
chains of argument to be incompatible with it. This 
vulnerability exists even if all members understand the 
orthodox theory in the same way. But I have just pointed 
out that no two people understand the same theory in exactly 
the same way. Even if their understanding of a theory 
overlaps exactly to begin with, when they start to examine 
different unforeseen criticisms this overlap must begin to 
diminish. For as I have said, in understanding a criticism
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one is seeing how it relates logically to some of the, 
perhaps unsuspected, implications of the theory.
There is a strong counterargument that is worth examining. 
The above argument depends on the assumption that different 
propagandists improvise defences of the doctrine 
independently. But suppose each new criticism is presented 
to a leader (either individual or committee) who decides on 
what defence to use, or perhaps it is discussed at a 
conference and a vote is taken. This, one might argue, would 
eliminate unintentional differences in defensive responses.
I will ignore the fact that the costs of such a strategy 
would become prohibitive when the number of propagandists 
reaches a certain size. We will also ignore the 
implausibility of assuming that the propagandists simply 
become silent when confronted by new criticism: such a 
response would lower credibility. Instead we will focus on 
the problem of achieving conformity in the interpretation of 
the doctrine that such a defensive strategy involves.
There is another more subtle and extreme form of defense 
that might be thought to obviate the problem of spontaneous 
differences in interpretation of the doctrine and its 
defence. The idea is embodied in Orwellian Newspeak, a 
language that so embraces the thought of people that it is 
impossible to think outside its framework. Gellner, for 
example, thinks that economic liberalism is a perfect 
example of Newspeak:
Within this system, the notions which carry and 
imply this vision allow no alternatives, and those 
who have internalised these notions generally 
simply cannot conceive any alternatives to them. 
(Gellner, [1979], pages 282-283.)
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It must be noted here that Gellner's position on this issue 
is not without ambiguity. 13 However, both sorts of defence 
succumb to a general characteristic of copying processes, 
independently of the problem presented by the unfathomable 
content of any doctrine. Reflecting on the learning of 
language, Hattiangadi argues that strict conformity is 
extremely difficult to achieve. When people learn a 
language they make conjectures about word meanings. If the 
guesses overlap sufficiently then communication is feasible. 
But there is at the same time a degree of unintentional and 
unforeseeable innovation in the language, simply because the 
overlap is not perfect. (Hattiangadi, [1987].) We may infer 
that the same imperfection would hamper any attempt to 
achieve conformity in the interpretation and use of 
defensive responses. The prescribed defences might be 
copied with devotion by the "faithful", but copying errors 
would be almost inevitable. For the same reason, any 
attempt to impose a form of Newspeak would founder because 
of the unintentional innovations introduced into the 
language when different people learn it. Darwin argued that 
new species emerged from earlier species by numerous, 
successive, slight modifications. One can easily see how 
copying errors in the interpretation of the doctrine and its 
defences can lead in a similar way either to a drift in the 
whole movement from the original doctrine, or (which is more 
likely) to the emergence of factions, each claiming to be 
the carrier of the true message. In either case, the 
defences would have failed to guarantee the doctrine against 
criticism.
Given such an analysis of the propagandist's situation it 
becomes less plausible, for example, for all Marxists to 
stick rigidly to the evasive tactic of dubbing all criticism 
of Marx as bourgeois. And so it is not surprising to find 
that there are Marxists who do not use this rhetorical 
tactic, and would argue against its validity and use. And
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there is nothing like criticism from within the ranks to 
undermine morale. Of course, each splinter group may adopt 
the habit of calling all other splinter groups bourgeois or 
class traitors, but as the number of splinter groups grows, 
this rhetorical trick wears thin.
A similar phenomenon occurred in regard to the belief in 
miracles. G A Wells points out that when rivalry between 
different religions happens, the miracles of the rival have 
somehow to be discredited:
The Protestants in Europe denied the reality of 
the Catholic miracles, and the Catholic enemies of 
the Jansenist Port- Royal refused to credit the 
miracle of the Holy Thorn. Mutual criticism on 
the part of rival faiths tended to undermine and 
discredit the whole system of miracles. Attention 
was more and more directed to the possibility of 
error and fraud. (Wells, [1988], page 133.)
So we may conclude that due to the unforeseeable depths and 
ramifications of any theory and copying errors in the 
interpretation of the doctrine, it follows that 
sociologically an ideology cannot be guaranteed against 
criticism; and moreover, it will have a strong tendency to 
split both logically and sociologically.
The propagandist cannot simply conceal his message and avoid 
criticism, since he sacrifices potential new adherents. He 
must give it a permanent public ^ forrn, open to competition 
from other ideas. However, having done that he can no 
longer control the evolution of the ideology through 
centralized control or through the imposition of a special 
language that excludes innovation, because different 
propagandists will interpret the doctrine differently and 
improvise different defences to unforeseeable criticism.
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1.4. Protestant Liberalism
We are now in a position to apply these considerations to 
Bartley's own test case: Protestant liberalism. Is 
Protestant liberalism or its successors ideologies in 
Bartley's sense? Are they being retained regardless of the 
facts? On Bartley's own account it would appear that 
Protestant liberalism was abandoned in response to 
criticism. But more importantly, it was replaced by systems 
of thought that, although less openly critical, are 
systematically but unintentionally more vulnerable to 
propagandistic failure. They have jeopardized the 
propagation of their message by allowing too much room for 
variation in its interpretation.
In the introduction to The Retreat to Commitment. Bartley 
had provided a general definition of ideology and contrasted 
this with science. At best this introductory classification 
of types of networks of ideas is highly misleading. To 
recapitulate somewhat, Bartley implies that there are only 
two ways in which ideas can be eliminated:
(1) Elimination of inadequate ideas through deliberate 
criticism. This is the attitude of the scientist, whose 
success in at least approximating the truth, depends on his 
deliberately seeking error in his theories by deliberately 
subjecting them to the severest criticism.
(2) Elimination of inadequate ideas through the death of the 
carrier. Bartley illustrates this with Popper's example of 
the Indian community that died with its belief in the 
sanctity of tigers. Another example might be the 
extermination of the Albigensian heretics in the 11th 
Centuries.
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This contrast is reminiscent of Edward Shils' inadequate 
contrast between ideologies and science, criticised above. 
Despite Bartley's extensive and insightful application of 
Popper's notion of the unfathomable content and 
ramifications of our ideas, he neglects to incorporate this 
approach into his general account of ideologies. He 
overlooks an extremely important third possibility: the 
unintended and unforeseeable encounter with effective 
critical argument. This criticism can come from either 
outside or from inside the movement. It is especially 
interesting when the criticism comes from its own 
propagandists. As I made clear above, however circumspect 
are the rules of study (in general, thought) the leaders of 
a movement enforce on its propagandists, they cannot 
determine which paths of study or argument will be free of 
awkward or ineluctable conclusions. Even the most innocent 
route to the aggrandizement of an ideology may lead to its 
destruction and shame. Protestant liberalism is one such 
ideology.
Bartley's suggestion also overlooks the possibility that an 
idea may lead simply to a lowered reproduction of the 
carriers, not necessarily their death. As I pointed out in 
the introduction one has to look at the rates of loss and 
gain in adherents. Even if members of a community are dying 
because of there belief in the sanctity of tigers, this 
belief may survive them if they pass it on quickly enough. 
However as Trigg has pointed out, is surprising how quickly 
even primitive people will abandon myths in the presence of 
counterevidence, as witness the success of missionaries in 
the nineteenth century. South Sea islanders discovered after 
the arrival of missionaries that taboos and rituals 
connected with sailing and fishing could be given up without 
anything terrible happening. (Trigg, [1985], pages 97-98.) 
Perhaps the sanctity of tigers is part of a larger belief
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system that assumes that even more horrible things may 
happen if tigers are killed.
Early this century Albert Schweitzer, the principal critic 
of the liberal picture of Jesus, wrote:
Therefore there is hopeful significance in the 
fact that modern theology with its study of the 
life of Jesus, however long it might resist by the 
invention of fresh shifts and expedients, must in 
the end find itself deluded in its manufactured 
history, overcome by real history and by the 
facts. (History of the Life of Jesus. New 
Edition.)
It is interesting that Schweitzer was acutely aware of the 
possibility of what Popper would call immunizing stratagems: 
the "shifts" and "expedients". It was not long before 
Schweitzer's hope was fulfilled. As Bartley says himself:
Thousands of Protestant liberals soberly abandoned 
their Christian affiliations because they could 
not accept what appeared really to have been the 
'Christian Ethic' as objectively determined by 
biblical scholarship. (Bartley, [1962], page 65.)
Bartley goes on to show how various Protestant theologians 
reacted to the collapse of the liberal picture of Jesus. 
Very importantly, Bartley points to the degeneration of the 
critical spirit in these theologians: Paul Tillich, Karl 
Barth, R. B. Braithwaite, Reinhold Niebuhr. However, none 
of them exemplify Bartley's general definition of an 
ideology, for everyone of them in fact espouses a doctrine 
that is tantamount to an abandonment of orthodox Protestant 
Christianity in response to criticism. To be accurate, none 
of them represent an explicit, forthright acknowledgment of 
error, but rather an unintended and confused abandonment.
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Bartley sees a pattern in these differing attempts to 
reconcile Christianity and reason: any statement of the 
essence of the Christian message is revisable, but whatever 
the message turns out to be assent or commitment to Jesus is 
required. Recall that Bartley's general characterization of 
an ideology is a system of ideas that is retained regardless 
of the facts. It is this commitment to Jesus that 
constitutes for Bartley the non-critical constraint on the 
fluidity of this new protestant liberalism. Now Bartley's 
original characterization of the collapse of protestant 
liberalism is consistent with this. Protestant liberalism, 
says Bartley, began as a self critical system of ideas, but 
then in response to its own critical findings it became an 
ideology, closed to critical argument, and therefore able to 
be retained come what may. However, far from the system of 
ideas being saved and perpetuated regardless of the facts 
the strategy of the new protestant thought can only amount 
to a face-saving exercise at the price of propagandistic 
success. For the commitment to Jesus itself, being vague 
and arbitrary, cannot operate as an effective constraint on 
interpretation. The symbol system is retained but the range 
of interpretation has become even more flexible to accept 
diverse viewpoints and thus maintain membership of the 
movement. The movement is then defined as all those who 
adopt the same symbol system, whatever the meaning they 
attribute to it.
The unintended consequence of this strategy is that there is 
more room for undetectable dissent and fluctuation in 
interpretation of the symbol system. The various 
interpretations may be safer from explicit analysis and 
criticism and the explicit acknowledgement of error, but 
this may be bought at the price of propagational failure. 
Trigg makes a similar point, but on the assumption that the 
system becomes totally empty of meaning, which is not
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necessary for my argument. (Trigg, [1973], pages 58-59.) An 
accumulation of numerous successive slight deviations may 
leave very little of the earlier interpretations left for 
propagation. The Protestant propagandist would then have 
failed.
Before the complete abandonment of Protestant liberalism 
through accumulated slight deviations, there is a reduction 
in the information and moral content of the system. If 
information is related to the number of possibilities closed 
by a message, then increasing the range of possible 
interpretations of Christianity decreases information. Neo- 
Protestant liberalism is then less able to offer adequate 
cosmological explanation and moral guidance. To say that 
one is committed to whatever Jesus happens to have said is 
not only to abjure any specific and explicit moral position, 
but is also to run a profound risk of immorality.
The thought of two of the most prominent neo-Protestant
liberal theologians, Barth and Tillich, will serve to 
illustrate the general characteristics of this movement.
1.4.1. Karl Barth.
Barth rejects the methods of traditional apologetic theology 
as useless and irreverent. To argue for the Word of God is 
useless if one has already made the commitment to it and 
doubly so if the gift of faith is entirely in Gods hands, 
not dependent on argument. It is irreverent because one 
ought to be awed, trusting and obedient, rather than subject 
the Word of God to critical test against mere human 
standards.
The theologian should rather limit himself to the
description of the Word of God and the critical discussion
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of the supposed content of the word of God. But argument 
about whether the Word of God is true is forbidden.
This is quite different to fundamentalism since the Bible, 
and indeed all theological statements, are explicitly 
treated as fallible conjectures. The only theological 
statement that is treated dogmatically is the statement that 
the Word of God is true, whatever that happens to be.
Barth's proposal that assent to God be unconditional became 
the price of admission to many ecumenical organisations. 
Bartley conjectures that its popularity lay in the fact that 
it offered an island of stability and definiteness in a sea 
of tempestuous confusion about the essence of being a 
Christian. It allowed theologians of diverse opinion to be 
at least definite about their common ground.
However, even Bartley sees that the ostensible definiteness 
is merely ostensible:
Barth's formula was not of course without its own 
dangers, ones with which he never satisfactorily 
dealt; if the character of the Jesus or the Word 
of God to whom assent was required was indefinite, 
and if such commitment was required no matter what 
Jesus was and did, at best the subjective 
commitment itself would be definite. Its object 
would be an (I know not what and I care not what)
- perhaps a less satisfactory object of worship. 
(Bartley, [1962], page 48.)
Barth was scornful of the protestant liberals for their use 
of argument and critical discussion in the search for the 
historical Jesus cast in the mould of social reformer. 
Barth's method amounts to an exclusion of certain sorts of 
questions and critical discussions while allowing others.
But it is not altogether obvious that such a method will not 
become just a weak gesture of defiance toward the 
encroachment of argument. The licence for certain sorts of
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argument may well function as a Trojan horse for other 
unintentional, unforeseeable and more damaging arguments, 
just like the methods of historical study of the protestant 
liberals.
1.4.1. Tillich
Tillich creates a theology more open to an accumulation of 
interpretative deviations by re-defining many Christian 
concepts in such a way as to deprive them of specific 
content, defining God in an extremely abstract, almost 
contentless way, repudiating the Bible as historical report, 
and his habit of creating an impression of profundity by 
using prepositions and abstract nouns uninterpreted by 
context.
Tillich rejects the traditional Christian definition of God 
as a unique, all knowing, all powerful, benevolent being, 
who makes personal contact with the believer. This 
conception, Tillich says, is far too abstract. One wonders 
what Tillich means by "abstract" for he himself defines God 
in an even more abstract way as the ground of all being. 
Actually, Wells discovered that Tillich has a number of 
definitions of God, nearly every one of which I think is 
more abstract than the traditional conception:
(1) The infinite and inexhaustible depth and ground of all
being.
(2) Depth.
(3) The depths of your life.
(4) The source of your being.
(5) Your ultimate concern.
(6) What you take seriously without reservation.
(7) The infinite and inexhaustible ground of history.
(8) The depth of history.
(9) The ground and aim of your social life.
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(10) What you take seriously without reservation in your 
moral and political activities.
(11) Hope. (Quoted by Wells, [1988], page 80, from a sermon 
entitled "The Depth of Existence”, from The Shaking of the 
Foundations. 1949, pages 52-63.)
Although Tillich rejects the traditional conception of God, 
none of these definitions rules it out as such, so Tillich's 
conception can easily accommodate a traditional Christian. 
But whereas the traditional conception was very definite, 
applying to a single unique being, Tillich's various 
conceptions are so indefinite and abstract that nearly 
everyone can find an application of at least one of them to 
something they think important or real. Even benevolence 
and justice, or any other virtue, is not required by these 
definitions. One could be a murderer, a liar and a thief 
and still be committed to "God": for these could be things 
you take seriously without reservation. So broad are these 
definitions that one critic desparagingly characterised 
Tillich's method as conversion by definition.
From Tillich's writings it is unclear what it is a Christian 
is committing himself too by committing himself too Jesus.
Tillich seems to be aware of this need for ones commitments
to have content and creates an impression that the 
commitment is profoundly meaningful by a liberal use of 
prepositions and abstract nouns. For example, he says the 
yoke of Jesus:
is not a new demand, a new doctrine, or new
morals, but rather a new reality, a new being, and
a new power of transforming life...it is a being, 
power, reality, conquering the anxiety and 
despair, the fear and restlessness of our 
existence. (Quoted by Wells [1988], page 90 from 
Tillich [1949], page 99.)
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What being? What power? What reality? The definite reference 
is left open for the reader to supply.
Having repudiated the Bible as a historical report, any 
particular interpretation is less subject to criticism. One 
might think that this would be ideal for retaining and 
propagating a particular interpretation. However, the gain 
from a diminution of criticism may be offset by the greater 
difficulty of policing interpretations: the bible plus 
historical research can no longer be used as a constraint on 
interpretation.
In conclusion it might be argued that the intellectual 
reaction to the failure of Protestant liberalism was not a 
system that is retained despite the facts, but rather a 
symbol system open to more diverse interpretations. To some 
degree these interpretations are less open to criticism, for 
they are poorly expressed, if at all. Thus the resultant 
system is less open to explicit criticism and debate, but 
more prone to schism.
I do not want to suggest in this analysis of Protestant 
Liberalism that the move from the literal and specific to 
the vague and metaphorical is the only evolutionary path in 
response to criticism. The Catholic Church, for example 
seems to have become more and more specific. The early 
Catholic Church regarded the infallibility of the Pope and 
the immaculate conception as questions that should be left 
to the believer's own conscience. It was only in 1850 that 
the Vatican Council laid these down as explicit requirements 
of faith. An earlier issue was the interpretation of the 
Eucharist. Early Christians interpreted this custom quite 
freely, most of them regarding it as a memorial ritual. 
Later, Church Councils ruled that the bread and wine were 
literally the flesh and blood of Christ. There are three 
things to note about this. Firstly, that since Christians
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are rational people and certainly not blind, the literal 
interpretation could only be maintained by the distinction 
between the manifest (or accidental) features of the 
sacramental bread and wine and its essence (or substance); 
the sacramental offering was the flesh and blood of Jesus 
only in substance. Secondly, despite its apparent safeguard 
against criticism, this literal interpretation was rejected 
by the Eastern Church, for example the Russian Church.
(Ware, [1963]) Catholic Modernism seems to have triumphed 
and to have hightened the urgency of the problem what makes 
one a Catholic. Pope Paul VI remarked: "Today we Catholics 
have doubts about who we are. We no longer teach catechism 
or church history.". (National Catholic Reporter, October 
22, 1976, page 6.)
1.5. Possible Exception to the General Thesis under 
Extreme Forms of Ideological Control
To recapitulate, the problem of this thesis is whether it is 
possible for a propagandist to guarantee the propagation of 
his doctrine, perhaps by guaranteeing it against 
encountering any criticism or simply being maintained in the 
presence of any criticism. I have considered Bartley's 
examples and found them wanting. But in order to test a 
theory in the severest way it is sometimes necessary to 
provide stronger examples than one's opponent. I intend to 
construct such an example in this section, and examine the 
logic of the situation that the propagandist would then find 
himself in.
Suppose a world government has discovered a method by which 
to make everyone incapable of innovative thought. Perhaps a 
drug or brain surgery would bring about this effect. I do 
not rule out the possibility of such a nightmarish world in 
which everyone is, if not in complete conformity, at least
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something disturbingly like a docile mental clone. The 
people in this world would be more like Bartley's view of 
people in our world: slumbering fantasizers, only under this 
mental despotism they would all have the same fantasy, day 
after day, night after night.
Criticism depends on the ability to produce a new thought or 
apply an old one in a new way. Therefore the citizens of 
this world would be incapable of criticizing the approved 
ideology. They might be given perfect memories so that they 
would simply repeat the ideology unchanged even by copying 
errors. In this hypothetical world assume that the world 
government has complete control over societal processes to 
rule out deliberate or accidental deviations from the 
approved ideology. Is the propagandist's doctrine 
guaranteed against criticism and guaranteed in its 
perpetuation?
Providing no physical catastrophes occur, it has to be 
admitted that the propagandist's doctrine is safeguarded 
against criticism. But there is no guarantee against 
physical disasters that put the society in peril, and 
therefore the perpetuation of the ideology. Coping with a 
physical disaster may, and often does, require innovation.
By definition, innovations are unforeseeable. They cannot 
be specified in advance, except sometimes in outline or in 
terms of the need they are to satisfy and the means 
available for their creation (and even here innovative 
thought is sometimes required to properly assess needs and 
means). The situational logic facing the world government, 
therefore, would require that it at least temporarily 
suspend the suppression of innovation. But innovative 
thought allows the creation of criticisms of the approved 
ideology. What might the government do to prevent this? It 
might be thought that the world government could guarantee 
against that by restricting the areas or subject matters in
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which innovations would be allowed by a discriminatory use 
of drugs or brain surgery. However, even if one has a 
definite description of the problem that the innovative 
theories are to solve and even an outline description of the 
innovation, one cannot derive from this all and only the 
problems on which it might have a bearing. To do this one 
would have to survey the information and logical content of 
the theory, and this we have seen is impossible. One 
cannot therefore exclude its critical bearing on the 
approved ideology. To have any chance of perpetuating the 
ideology the government would have to take the risk that the 
innovation required to maintain the society may produce a 
competing ideology and/or the means of combating the 
government's repressive use of drugs or brain surgery.
Horrible despotisms that attempt to perpetuate a doctrine by 
school-indoctrination, T.V. and radio advertising, violence, 
censorship, spying, encouraging family betrayal, border- 
guards, death-squads, etc., are possible and have occurred 
frequently. My point is that the perpetuation of a doctrine 
against criticism is an extremely hard, delicate, costly and 
uncertain project. The extremes that some governments have 
gone to in their attempts to achieve this goal and their 
failure ever to impose perfect conformity only testifies to 
the difficulty of completely taming the voice of doubt, 
which eel-like has a tendency to slip out of the policeman's 
grasp when he least expects it to do.
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2.1. Darwinian Evolution and Human Rationality
The problem of this thesis is a problem in evolutionary 
epistemology applied to ideology. The traditional 
epistemological question is: how can we know? My approach 
starts with the question: how can we avoid knowing? In 
particular, how can the propagandist avoid the filtering 
affects of man's rationality? Can we argue that because of 
man's origin as a creature of Darwinian evolution man can 
always correct his errors? The question is not so much why 
people get things wrong, for any system capable of knowing 
is fallible. But rather having fallen into the pit of error 
by accident or foul play, can he in principle, alone or with 
help, always climb out? My answer will be that he can. I 
will argue that there are no evolved mechanisms in our 
psychology that perpetuate error come what may, but there 
are (fallible) mechanisms or dispositions for correcting 
error. I am not arguing, as some have, that because of our 
evolutionary history we must necessarily make progress in 
the growth of knowledge. Science may degenerate into a stale 
perpetuation of sacred texts, or it may, unintentionally, 
produce a society in which any one can easily construct 
weapons of mass destruction and destroy itself. But, short 
of destruction, man can always reverse regressions in the 
search for truth, or at the very least continue correcting 
error, even if we will not succeed thereby in getting closer 
to the truth.
This thesis is partly an internal criticism of the work of 
Popper and Bartley. If they accept Darwinian theory then, if 
they are consistent, they must reject their assertion that 
there are ideologies that are absolutely closed to argument.
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I must first establish that they accept Darwinian 
evolutionary theory and that it plays a central role in 
their philosophy. Thus Popper says:
I do conjecture that Darwinism is right, even on 
the level of scientific discovery; and that it is 
right even beyond this level: that it is right 
even on the level of artistic creation. (Popper,
[1981], pages 89-90.)
By "Darwinism" here Popper means something inclusive of 
Darwin's theory but more abstract. Any explanation of the 
evolution of a population of entities by a combination of 
their blind variation and selection or, more accurately, 
their differential elimination.
In a later paper, Popper argues for a much more general 
application of Darwinism, following Darwin's own assertions 
(in his Essay of 1844, The Origin of Species and his Natural 
Selection.) that the mental powers of animals and man are 
products of natural selection. Popper advocates that if 
conscious states exist then we should, according to 
Darwinism, look for their adaptive function. ( Popper, 
"Natural Selection and the Emergence of Mind." in Bartley 
[1987], pages 148 - 149.) Popper reinforces this general 
approach when at the conclusion of his article he says:
...the process of variation followed by selection 
which Darwin discovered does not merely offer an 
explanation of biological evolution...but also 
of... "the entire range of phenomena connected 
with the evolution of life and mind, and also of 
the products of the human mind... (Ibid. pp. 152 - 
153.)
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Donald T. Campbell has clearly stated Popper's position on 
the relevance of evolution to a philosophical treatment of 
man:
An evolutionary epistemology would be at minimum 
an epistemology taking cognizance of and 
compatible with man's status as a product of 
biological...evolution. (Campbell, in Popper 
[1974], page 413.)
It is specifically Darwinian evolution that Campbell has in 
mind, which has the following form:
(1) Blind variations in heritable characteristics.
(2) Elimination of unadapted variations.
(3) Reproduction of selected variations.
The word "blind" is used here instead of the word "random" 
for a number of reasons. The variations may be far from 
random: equiprobability is absent in organic evolution and 
creative thought; statistical independence of variations is 
also unnecessary. On the latter point, certain systematic 
sweep scanning mechanisms are recognized as blind in so far 
as variations are produced without any knowledge of which 
ones, if any, will produce a select-worthy discovery. There 
are three important connotations of the word "Blind": (a) 
Variations are independent of the occasion of their 
occurrence; (b) variations are uncorrelated with the 
solution, in that neither specific correct or incorrect
trials are more likely to occur at any one point in a series
of variations than at any other; (c) variation do not make 
use of the direction of error of previous variations. (Such 
feedback processes are themselves regarded as higher level 
blind variations.) Popper endorses Campbell's suggested use 
of "blind" rather than "random" in his reply to Campbell in
(Popper, [1974], pages 1059 - 65.)
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If Popper and Bartley are consistent, then their theory of 
ideology must be consistent with Darwinian theory. I regard 
the theory of ideology as part of an evolutionary 
epistemology. (It might be regarded as that part that 
focuses on the question of how knowledge may be avoided.) 
Popper's and Bartley's theory of ideology, therefore, must 
be consistent with both a selectionist account of our 
biological evolution and with a selectionist account of our 
ideational creations. Even though Popper does not 
explicitly mention ideology, he does see how a selectionist 
account is applicable on both biological and ideational 
levels. However, Popper has overlooked certain relationships 
between these levels that I explore in this chapter.
I intend to argue that on a selectionist approach to our 
biological evolution we should expect humans to be rational 
in ways that undermine the plausibility of Popper's and 
Bartley's pessimistic position on the power of argument to 
undermine ideologies. For convenience of exposition, the 
relevant ways in which humans are rational can be classified 
into: (i) economic, (ii) instrumental, (iii) exploratory, 
(iv) wishful, and (v) logical, rationality. They are 
examples of man's responsiveness to truth, and once in 
place, as it were, act as Darwinian-like filters in the 
ideational or "memetic" evolution of ideologies. Thus the 
three processes (1), (2) and (3) work through human 
biological evolution to produce certain rational 
dispositions that tend to eliminate unadapted variations in 
ideational, and therefore ideological, creations.
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This relationship can be displayed in the following schema:
Memetic evolution:
(X,Y & Z indicate non deterministic influences.)
Human evolution might influence the character of the 
processes at (la), (2a) & (3a). X might influence how 
imaginative humans are in the ideas they produce. Z might 
influence how efficient attention, learning and memory etc. 
are in perpetuating an ideology. But my main concern here is 
with how stage (2a) is furnished with dispositions that act 
to eliminate ideologies.
We cannot directly refute the idea that there are 
ideologists that are completely guaranteed from criticism.
No matter how many supposed examples of such ideologists are 
shown to be spurious, the advocate of the irrationalist 
thesis can always maintain that we have not looked hard 
enough for an example. However, we can apply what Bartley 
has called a theoretical refutation. If Darwinian evolution 
is taken as background knowledge, then we are obliged to 
reject the irrationalist thesis on pain of inconsistency. 
Bartley himself has used Darwinian theory in this way to 
undermine anti-realist positions in the philosophy of 
science. (Bartley, [1987], pages 7-45.)
Biological evolution:
(1) Blind variation in heritable 
organs and behavioural characteristics.
(2) Elimination of organs and behavioural 
dispositions that cause a relative decline 
in genetic reproducibility.
(3) Reproduction of "selected" variations.
reproduction
variations.
(la) Partly blind, partly designed 
variations in ideas.
(2a) Partly blind, partly designed 
elimination of ideologies 
failing (i) to (v).
(3a) Partly blind, partly designed 
 of non-el iminated
There is a strong criticism of this method that deserves a 
hearing. It might be said that such an approach is unfair 
since Darwinian theory itself has problems in explaining all
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the facts within its domain. Here one might refer to the 
rattlesnake's rattle, or the electric eel's electric shock. 
Any rudimentary development of these characters would have 
been detrimental to the possessors and so eliminated.
Stephen Jay Gould and others have pointed to other problems 
with Darwinism.
My response to this line of defence is to refer to an 
analogous situation in biology. If someone returned from a 
pioneering trip to a previously unexplored land in deepest 
Africa with tales of animals similar to ants in all respects 
but the size of elephants, the biologist would easily refute 
such a tale. As J S Haldane pointed out , animals are the 
size they are in accord with certain constraints imposed by 
physical, chemical and geometric considerations. Despite 
the implications of such Science fiction films as Them in 
which ants the size of houses terrorize the inhabitants of 
Los Angeles, ants that large would overheat and die. As an 
object increases in size its volume increases at a faster 
rate than its surface area. But the rate at which a body 
loses heat is proportional to its surface area. Thus there 
must come a point in the hypothetical expansion of an 
animal's body when the rate at which it looses heat is lower 
than its heat production. At that point and beyond the 
animal will heat up to the point where its biochemistry 
malfunctions and the creature dies. Biology is very far 
from solving all its problems, but the tale of the giant 
ants would remain roundly refuted. I contend that the 
absolutely stubborn ideologist is just as non-existent as 
the elephant-sized ant.
It must be said that even Darwinism's major critics such as 
Stephen Jay Gould maintain Darwinism's adaptationist 
element, rejecting only certain types of gradualism. They 
still rely on the idea of natural variation and natural 
selection. On the other hand, even if Darwinism is false,
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may argument still carries through since it is an immanent 
criticism of Bartley and Popper.
I will briefly define each kind of rationality and then 
elaborate my argument in connection with each type of 
rationality. "Economic rationality" is short hand for 
"disposition to act in accordance with the laws of 
economics". "Instrumental rationality" is short hand for 
"disposition to abandon goals that seem unattainable". 
"Exploratory rationality" is short hand for "disposition to 
search for and value truth". The terms "wishful 
rationality" and "fearful rationality" are short hand for 
"disposition to generate and sustain beliefs in important 
issues even in the face of some counterevidence (which can 
then be thoroughly tested)".
After explaining and arguing for the existence of these 
various aspects of human rationality I will show how they 
fit into an evolutionary explanation of the development of 
ideas under criticism (2.8. & 2.9.). Thus, I intend to 
connect two levels of Darwinian-type evolution: the 
biological and the ideational. In this connection I will 
deal with some important theorists whose position disagrees 
with mine: Florian Von Schilcher & Neil Tennant, Jaques 
Monod, Ghiselin, Richard Dawkins and Ernest Gellner. I will 
argue that these various aspects of rationality furnish 
mechanism for the elimination of maladaptive variations in 
ideologies.
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2.1.1. Economic Rationality
Humans weigh up costs and benefits. Here I allude to the 
postulates of Austrian economic theory, which has made a 
powerful case for the view that economic laws apply to all 
action, not only to financial contexts, but even to 
supposedly mindless or inexplicable or fanatical behaviour - 
hunger strikers, kamikaze pilots etc.
If economic postulates are true of all organisms then we 
have a strong indication that there is at least a general 
tendency for Darwinian evolution to produce economising 
organisms. This indeed seems to be true. Recent work has 
shown that even very simple organisms are economisers in 
this sense. There are recent moves to connect economics, 
behavioural biology and evolution.
The impetus for this comes from experiments with animals, in 
some cases extremely simple animals, that have severely 
tested the idea that economising behaviour is a product of 
Darwinian evolution. David Rapport, for example, has 
investigated a microscopic animal, Stentor coeruleus, and 
found its behaviour simple-minded but rational. When its 
food was hard to get, the Stentor made do with second rate 
food. However, when the cost of the "better" food was 
lowered, the Stentor would spit out the less-preferred food 
and concentrate on the more preferred. David Rapport 
concludes with the following observation:
The use of optimising principles has been implicit 
in much theoretical biology. As Rosen points out,
"the idea that nature pursues economy in all her 
workings is one of the oldest principles of 
theoretical science" (Rosen, 1967.). The 
assumption of optimizing food selection behaviour 
appears valid provided natural selection is 
efficient in weeding out species or individuals 
which failed to make optimum food choices. (David 
Rapport, [1971], pages 757-87.)
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One might ask, why should humans be any the less rational 
than a microscopic animal? If our capacity for argument 
has been tailored by evolution to serve economising, we may 
infer that humans will be open to arguments about the 
economic implications of their ideologies. (An obvious 
example is the fall of the ideology of the Soviet Empire and 
with it the Empire itself. The example is only obvious in 
retrospect for those who hold that argument is impotent, as 
illustrated by my quotation from Kolakowski.)
The evolutionary pressure to economise may be responsible 
for the economy of thought represented by the preference for 
systematically organised networks of assumptions of high 
information content that are axiomatizable with organic 
fertility. The axiomatization of a theory undoubtedly often 
presents formidable difficulty, but once achieved gives the 
theory great "promotion value", to use Monod's phrase. It 
would be hard to argue that the highly systematic character 
of Euclid's Elements had little to do with its reproductive 
success. However, here I wish to concentrate on the economic 
implications
2.1.2. Max Weber
The most influential and comprehensive opposition to the 
view propounded here is perhaps that contained in Max 
Weber's theory and classification of human action. Weber 
classifies action into the following classes: Instrumentally 
rational; value rational; affectual; and traditional. It is 
worth quoting Weber at length to anticipate any charge that 
I am misrepresenting his views by misinterpreting hyperbole 
as a serious position. My two main contentions are that (a) 
by implication the terms "value-rational action", "affectual 
action", and "traditional action" connote action which lies 
outside the influence of criticism; (b) the classification
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breaks down, as Ludwig Von Mises has shown, since plausible 
examples of each class involves Weber's "instrumental 
rationality" (or more accurately, actions subject to 
marginal theory).
Weber defines "value-rational" action as that which is
determined by a conscious belief in the value for 
its own sake of some ethical, aesthetic, 
religious, or other form of behaviour, 
independently of its prospects of success.
(Weber, [1968], pages 24 - 25.)
Humans try to effect actions independently of their success. 
This could mean either (a) Humans strive to engage in 
actions that they believe to be impossible, or (b) humans 
strive to engage in impossible actions to approximate an 
ideal. Remember that according to Weber value-rational 
action is not action as a means to an end, so Weber could 
not say that the striving is an attempt to approximate an 
ideal. Hence Weber must be asserting that value-rational 
action chooses unattainable ends. This implies that value- 
rational action cannot be criticized on the basis of its 
practicability. The other clause does not present a 
problem, for this thesis does not deny that humans value 
some behaviours for their own sake.
*
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But before criticizing Weber's position, I must make it even 
clearer that I am attacking no straw man. Weber goes on to 
claim much more.
Examples of pure value-rational orientation would 
be the actions of persons who, regardless of 
possible cost to themselves, act to put into 
practice their convictions of what seems to them 
to be required by duty, honour, the pursuit of 
beauty, a religious call, personal loyalty, or the 
importance of some 'cause' no matter in what it 
consists. In our terminology, value-rational 
action always involves 'commands' or 'demands' 
which, in the actor's opinion, are binding on 
him...On the other hand, the actor may, instead of 
deciding between alternative and conflicting ends 
in terms of a rational orientation to a system of 
values, simply take them as given subjective wants 
and arrange them in a scale of consciously 
assessed relative urgency. He may then orient his 
action to this scale in such a way that they are 
satisfied as far as possible in order of urgency, 
as formulated in the principle of 'marginal 
utility'... from the latter point of view, however, 
value rationality is always irrational. Indeed, 
the more the value to which action is oriented is 
elevated to the status of an absolute, the more 
'irrational' in this sense the corresponding 
action is. For the more the actor devotes himself 
to this value for its own sake, to pure sentiment 
or beauty, to absolute goodness or devotion to 
duty, the less is he influenced by considerations 
of the consequences of his action. (Ibid. page 
25.)
Weber is making the following claims:
(1) there are forms of behaviour which are engaged in 
whatever the cost (whatever the forsaken valued 
opportunities may be). But an important basis for criticism 
of a network of ideas is often its costliness, what other 
values have to be forsaken to implement the injunctions or 
plans contained therein. Value-rational action precludes 
this, thus restricting the types of relevant and effective 
criticism.
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(2) That value-rational, affectual and traditional 
behaviour are incompatible with instrumentally rational 
behaviour (and thus not subject to marginal analysis). The 
same point about the narrowing of the range of criticism 
applies to Weber's traditional and affectual behaviour.
(4) That devotion to a form of action for its own sake 
implies a lack of consideration of the costs and benefits in 
doing so and not doing so.
I will deal with the notion of absolute ideals or commands 
etc in the section on absolute values. But for now I would 
like to make the following criticisms of Weber's position.
Economics analyses all action which involves a choice 
between scarce means to satisfy given ends. Weber 
erroneously restricts the range of economics. As already 
pointed out neither the means nor the ends need involve 
money.
Deliberation about consequences (marginal costs and 
benefits) itself involves increasing marginal costs because 
it consumes the scarce resource of thought power, which 
generally can serve different but incompatible projects.
Thus cutting down on deliberation in the pursuit of 
important ends is subject to marginal analysis and is not 
irrational from this perspective.
Devotion to an end for its own sake may well be the result 
of a protracted consideration of the consequences of doing 
so.
The most fundamental criticism of Weber's position was 
propounded by Mises in [1933]. He showed that Weber's 
classes of action are not in the slightest degree
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incompatible and that nothing that Weber says undermines the 
idea that marginal theory is applicable to them all.
Mises considers the following example of value-rational 
action:
If someone not only wants to earn his livelihood 
in general, but also in a way which is 
"respectable" and "in accordance with his station 
in life" - let us say as a Prussian Junker of the 
older camp, who preferred a government career to 
the bar - or if someone forgos the advantages that 
a Civil Service career offers because he does not 
want to renounce his political convictions, this 
is in no way an action that could be termed non- 
rational. Adherence to received views of life or 
to political convictions is an end like any other, 
and like any other it enters into the rank order 
of values. (Ibid. page 84.)
Mises suggests that a more accurate way of describing 
behaviour devoted to ideals
is to say that there are men who place the value 
of duty, honour, beauty, and the like so high that 
they set aside other goals and ends for their 
sake. (Ibid. page 84.)
That is, the consequences (more accurately, the opportunity 
costs) have been considered, but are not high enough to make 
the man renounce his pursuit of these goals.
Mises maintains that the same point applies to traditional 
behaviour:
When an aristocratic landowner rejects the 
proposal of his steward to use his name, title, 
and coat of arms as a trade mark on the packages 
of butter going to the retail market from his 
estate, basing his refusal on the argument that 
such a practice does not conform to aristocratic 
tradition, he means: I will forgo an increase in 
my income that I could attain only by the 
sacrifice of a part of my dignity. In the one 
case, the custom of the family is retained because
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- whether it is warranted or not is of no 
importance for us - it is considered more 
"rational”; in the other case, because a value is 
attached to it which is placed above the value 
that could be realized through its sacrifice. 
(Ibid. page 85.)
Again, Mises points out that the opportunity costs are 
considered and not ignored as Weber would suggest.
The same is true of affectual action:
He who endangers his own life in rushing to the
aid of a drowning man is able to do so because he
yields to the momentary impulse to help, or
because he feels it his duty to prove himself a 
hero under the circumstances, or because he wants 
to earn a reward for saving the man's life. In 
each case, his action is contingent upon the fact 
that he momentarily places the value of coming to 
the man's aid so high that other considerations - 
his own life, the fate of his family - fall into 
the background. (Ibid. page 85.)
Mises makes the general point that all these forms of 
action are the same in that they all
...choose between given possibilities in order to 
attain the most ardently desired goal. (Ibid. page 
85.)
Mises speculates that Weber's fundamental error which has 
led him astray in his classifications is his failure to 
understand the universality of the propositions of sociology 
(here Mises takes economics as a subset of sociology).
Weber continually falls into the mistake of restricting the 
applicability of the laws of economics, seeing them only 
from the point of view of the business man. Thus:
The theory of marginal utility treats...human 
action as if it took place from A to Z under the 
control of a business-like calculation: 
calculation based on all the relevant conditions.
(As quoted by Mises, Ibid page 93.)
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Thus where money is involved Weber is constantly thinking in 
terms of the businessman's maxim "buy cheap, sell dear"
(this for Weber is the quintessence of rational action). 
Classical economics adopted this procedure, but it is not 
true of modern economics (post Menger, Jevons and Walrus, 
1870), which adopts the point of view of the consumer, that 
is, everyone. Thus modern economics is not troubled by the 
fact that a buyer of soap may deliberately pay slightly more 
for it from an invalid veteran than he could buy it from the 
regular store; or by the sale by stores of goods specially 
reduced in price to attract customers.
This digression into the logic of modern economics is 
necessary to understand the confusions and errors that 
writers on ideology (that is, openness to argument) have 
fallen into. More importantly, it is clear that Weber's 
work cannot be used to restrict the range of potential 
criticism, without also rejecting fundamental postulates of 
modern economics, a theory of great information content, and 
also rejecting the fruitful application of economics to the 
evolutionary explanation of animal behaviour.
2.1.3. The Fanatic
Is the fanatic open to criticism? I argue that although 
impervious to some extent, he is nevertheless open to both 
self-criticism and external criticism. Fanatical 
terrorists, revolutionaries, Kami Kazi pilots, hunger 
strikers etc, are put forward as examples of violent 
ideological emotion completely devoid of reason. (Weber 
might put this sort of behaviour in the class of "value- 
rational action" or "affectual behaviour".) If this were 
admitted, then the associated ideologies would be beyond 
effective criticism.
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Gustave Le Bon and Walter Laqueur
Gustave Le Bon, an influential writer on ideology and 
argument, held just such a view. Speaking of terrorists he 
says:
The mentality of martyrs of every kind is 
identical, whether political, religious or social. 
Hypnotised by the fixity of their dream, they 
joyfully sacrifice themselves to the triumph of an 
idea without any hope of recompense in this world 
or another...Persecution of them is powerless and 
only renders their example contagious...These 
facts and all those of the same order are very 
instructive. They prove the power of the mystical 
mind which is capable of triumphing over pain and 
dominating feelings considered to be the very 
basis of our existence. What could reason do 
against it? (Le Bon, [1895], pages 214 - 215.)
Le Bon's position confirms the soundness of the present 
approach, for he generalises his point to political, 
religious and social martyrs. Le Bon is indeed an important 
influence, which can be traced through prominent figures 
such as Adolf Hitler, whose views on propaganda are 
similar to Le Bons.
An echo of this sort of theory can be heard in recent work.
Laqueur in The Age of Terrorism maintains that
The main difficulty is not that the rational model 
is useless with regard to people engaging in 
suicide missions (of which there are only few), 
but that it tends to ignore factors such as 
frustration, anger, fanaticism, aggression, etc., 
which are very frequent in terrorism. Above all, 
economic man is a rational being wishing to 
maximize beneficial returns; few people would go 
into a business in which the chances of success 
are as dim as they are in terrorism. (p. 153.)
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The fanatic, who wittingly sacrifices everything he values 
to a single cause, who is unmoved by the perceived 
effectiveness and cost of his actions, is a myth. It has
always been acceptable to romanticize and mystify the
fanatic, either to portray him as subject to otherworldly 
laws or as unintelligibly crazy. But the fanatic is as 
subject to the laws of economics as Adam Smith's 
greengrocer. The hunger striker in the Maze prison or the 
Kamikaze pilot, both fighting for what they believed to be 
justice, were acting under a rational assessment of their 
goal and the price they thought they would have to pay in 
terms of forsaken opportunities. That price could have been 
too high. In fact for some potential recruits to the IRA
the price was too high, as is evident in declining
recruitment at the time of the hunger strikes.14 Le Bon's 
contagion evidently has its limitations. Laqueur, himself, 
seems dimly aware that skilful negotiation with terrorists 
has had some successes, but he does not draw the conclusion 
that this must be so because they are not zombies but 
rational beings who act in the light of what they perceive 
to be effective and economical means. The fact that their 
beliefs and values may be wildly at odds with our own does 
not place them outside of the field of economic analysis, 
and likewise does not make them immune to argument and 
criticism. This position of Laqueur's is odd considering 
that in his introduction he points out that increased 
repression decreases terrorism: terrorist incidents were 
more frequent in Spain only after Franco died, while 
terrorism in West Germany and Turkey grew under a movement 
to more social democratic or left-of-centre governments. 
(Ibid. page 6.)
The fact that few would go into a business with as little 
success as there is in terrorism does not mean that those 
few would not. Laqueur's argument here is like saying that 
since only a small percentage of the population become
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directors of the international banks, economic theory cannot 
apply to them. The chances of becoming a world champion 
boxer are exceedingly slim for most men; does that mean that 
world champion boxers pay no heed to such things as the 
sacrifices involved and the financial incentives held before 
their eyes? Just as there is natural variation in height, 
weight, hair colour, there is natural variation in 
personality traits and values. Economic theory is not 
tailored to one personality type or even the average man, 
nor confined to certain sorts of values and the means for 
their attainment; economic theory applies to all values and 
all scarce means. Mises [1949] argues that marginalist 
economic theory, properly interpreted, implies that wherever 
there is action there are subjective costs and benefits and 
marginal theory applies just as strictly in non-financial as 
in financial contexts.
Are the chances of success in terrorism very thin? If the 
objective is to terrorize, it would seem that anyone can be 
a terrorist. If Laqueur responds by denying that terrorism 
is that simple, but rather involves delicate planning and 
has complex ulterior motives, then he must then view 
terrorism as rational action.
Laqueur's suggestion that terrorists are involved in suicide 
missions is misleading and false. The terrorist simply 
reasons that the attainment of his end will involve his 
death and is prepared to sacrifice his life for this end. 
Costs that would deflect others from their path fail to 
deflect the terrorist. If the terrorist could achieve his 
objective without sacrificing his life, he would do so.
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2.1.4. Absolute values
Values are often urged by ideologists as absolute, 
unconditional etc. The fanatic, impelled by irrational 
emotion to sacrifice everything to some ideal end, 
personifies this. But it follows from economic theory that 
ideological values (however one delimits them) cannot in 
practice be categorically binding on anyone, not even the 
ideologist who peddles them.
An individual will sacrifice some of any value for a 
sufficient increment in any other value. And as values Y 
are sacrificed for increments in X, the value of an 
additional increment in X decreases and the value of an 
additional increment in Y increases. Eventually, an 
increment in X is worth less than an increment in Y, and 
therefore no more of X is sought. Most choices are of this 
incremental kind, not categorical. To take an example from 
political philosophy, Rawls ([1972], pages 3-4.) depicts 
justice as categorically binding: it is not incrementally 
inferior to any other value. It is allowed that some 
aspects of justice may be sacrificed for some other aspects 
of justice, but not in the slightest degree for any amount 
of any other value. Adam Smith held that some justice is 
necessary for any of the other desirable features of a 
society, but that not all increments of justice invariably 
outweigh increments of other things, and that the attempt to 
carry through into practice the categorical conception is 
doctrinaire and counter-productive. I would add that it 
never is carried in to action. An individual can choose to 
violate the laws of economics but he cannot succeed in doing 
so. Not even Rawls, I suspect, would hold fast to his 
principles if he thought that the attempt to fulfil them 
would result in mass starvation. If we are to countenance 
absolute values then we must reject marginal (that is,
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orthodox) economics, a theory that has had much explanatory 
success.
We may grant that economic theory denies the absolute 
character of values, but how do we explain the fact that 
some values do at least appear to be held in an absolute 
way? I think a possible explanation is that some value 
systems can simulate absolute values. For example, some 
people may find murder so loathsome that the incentives 
required for them to violate that value simply cannot be 
physically realized, either because of natural laws or 
because of technical obstacles. It may be that our world 
rarely tests our adherence to some of our values to an 
extreme extent: rarely are people called upon, for example, 
to choose between murdering 2 people to save 10 or murdering 
4 to save 20. (This hypothetical choice is formulated to 
exclude the option of not murdering anyone.)
2.2. Instrumental Rationality
Humans only pursue those ends they think attainable and use 
only those means they think effective. A person's use of 
tools and other means in the pursuit of goals is based on 
his theory of the world. It may be unconscious in the sense 
that he has never articulated it in language or in self- 
conscious thought. But even such inarticulate theories can 
be revealed when one is surprised when a tool, machine, or 
scheme of action breaks down. It might be objected that 
people use herbal medicines without any theory about how 
they work. But they do have a theory that they do work, a 
claim that may happen to be false.
Arguing that everyone operates with a theory about the use 
of an instrument or means may not be necessary for my point. 
It may be sufficient that the use of any means can be
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brought under theoretical control so that the person can 
abandon its use under criticism.
One might apparently pursue what one thinks is unattainable 
as a means of approximating it or as a means of achieving 
some other end as a by-product. However it is clear that 
here one's goal is not the ideal but the approximation or 
some other end. If one thought that neither end were 
attainable one would desist. (For example, one might 
playfully strive for a goal one knew to be impossible to 
achieve; but then the goal would be playfulness, which if 
one came to think were also impossible would be abandoned.)
Humans abandon what they see as futile. Now, seeing 
something as futile is often (at least partly) caused by 
its very futility. It is instructive to note that one 
cannot say that often one believes something successful 
because it is unsuccessful. Here there is a clear advantage 
to truth.
Organisms that persist come what may with futile actions 
tend to be eliminated, while organisms that can abandon the 
futile tend to reproduce the genes responsible for that 
ability. Of course, as explained below, an ideal strategy 
would not be overly sensitive to signs of futility: the 
organism must not be discouraged too easily. Nevertheless, 
the organism must be capable of correcting its mistakes.
2.2.1 Possible Objection
A sceptic might question whether humans are interested in 
the truth or reality when they act. He might grant that 
humans abandon what seems to be futile, but, he insists, it 
is the experience of futility as such and not futility that 
matters to humans. As long as they seem to be doing what 
they want to do, they are unconcerned. Without this concern
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there is no disposition to adapt to reality as such. Indeed 
on this theory, it might pay people who adhere to an 
ideology to avoid contact with counter arguments and 
evidence, since, they might reason, as long as we believe 
our ideology, that is all that matters. To rebut this 
possible objection I would like to use a thought experiment 
devised by Robert Nozick. Nozick actually uses the thought 
experiment to undermine eudemonistic utilitarianism, the 
idea that people simply want the pleasurable experiences in 
life; but the argument can be generalised.
Nozick poses the question: "what matters other than how 
people's experiences feel from inside"? To help answer this 
question he supposes
that there is an experience machine that would 
give you any experience you desired. Superduper 
neuropsychologists could stimulate your brain so 
that you would think and feel you were writing a 
great novel, or making a friend, or reading an 
interesting book. All the time you would be 
floating in a tank with electrodes attached to 
your brain. (Nozick, [1974], page 42.)
(The idea forms the basis of the film Total Recall, adapted 
from the book by Philip K Dick, We Dream for you Wholesale.) 
Would anyone plug in to such a machine? Nozick adduces a 
number of reasons why people would not : people want to do 
things, not simply have the experience of doing them; people 
also want to be a certain way; and, being plugged into the 
machine would limit us to a man-made reality, to a world no 
deeper or more important than that which people can 
construct. Nozick concludes that "Perhaps what we desire is 
to live (an active verb) ourselves, in contact with reality. 
And this machines cannot do for us." (Ibid. page 45.)
This argument harmonises quite well with my thesis. It 
implies that people want to use real means to achieve their
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ends, and want to abandon really futile means or ends: the 
means and ends of fantasy are not enough.
The implication here is that to the extent that an ideology 
has practical implications it is subject to instrumental 
rationality and therefore open to criticism. Let us explore 
this in connection with rhetoric.
2.2.2. Rhetoric versus Theory
D J Manning maintains a position similar to that of 
Bartley's on ideologies:
An ideology can not be challenged by either facts
or rival theories. (Manning, [1976], page 142.)
Manning's position differs from Bartley's in that Manning 
portrays ideas like Marxism as non-theoretical, but rather 
rhetorical devices to inspire people to do certain things or 
express commitment to a group. In so far as an ideology 
describes the world, Manning says, the world has no 
existence independent of the "practical understanding 
prescribed" (Ibid. page 142.) The implication is that (1) 
ideologies cannot be undermined by sound criticism because 
they do not actually make any factual claims, and this 
follows from their being rhetorical or expressive and (2) 
even if they did, the ideologists would be closed to sound 
criticism because the ideology acts as irremovable blinkers: 
the ideologist cannot conceive anything outside his 
ideology, let alone deal with criticism. In analysing 
Manning's position, an inconsistency over the descriptive 
import of ideologies should be noted. 15
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Professor Minogue made it clear to me that there is a 
middle-ground: the point of theories like Freudianism and 
Marxism is not merely locutionary (to explain, to describe) 
but also practical, their point being revolution or therapy 
at least as much as finding out the truth. This important 
observation must be faced by any theory that gives an 
important role to truth in the elimination of ideologies. 
Does this practical or rhetorical element exclude truth?
What precisely is the relationship between rhetoric and 
theory and truth? We will also examine the role of lying in 
rhetoric. It will become apparent that the mendacious 
propagandist is constrained by certain logical properties of 
theories, specifically the way in which his lies combine 
logically with his other assertions.
We must begin by noting that even rhetoricians are guided by 
a theory as to the most effective way to motivate and direct 
peoples' action, and thus we have an instance of 
instrumental rationality, and hence an avenue for a 
challenge from facts or rival theories. Manning's claim 
that the expressive or in general rhetorical function of 
ideologies rules out the logical and hence the psychological 
relevance of truth can be examined more thoroughly by 
referece to the work of Austin.
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2.2.2.1. J L Austin
The theory of rhetoric has in recent years belittled the 
role of truth in persuasion, forgetting important 
contributions from Socrates. This development can be traced 
to the work of Austin, though perhaps more precisely to a 
misunderstanding of Austin's later thought. Austin's 
earlier work made a very strong distinction between 
utterances that do things (which have no connection with 
truth) and others that can be evaluated with respect to 
truth. Austin's later work rejected this analysis, but it 
is his earlier work that is remembered.
Austin's most acclaimed work is his contribution to a 
symposium on "Other Minds" [1946]. In this article he uses 
an analogy between "knowing" and "promising". Knowing was 
usually thought of as a special mental state, and to assert 
that "I know that S is P" is to report that I am in that 
state in relation to "S is P". This false dogma rested, 
Austin thought, on the descriptive fallacy, the supposition 
that words are only used to describe. On the contrary, 
Austin argued, to assert that I know is not to describe my 
state, but to give others my word, my authority, for saying 
that S is P, just as to promise is to give others my word 
that I will do X. This reasoning lead Austin to distinguish 
between performatives and descriptives, the former being 
utterances that do certain things, the latter being 
utterances that describe. In this early work the two 
categories were taken to be exclusive.
In [1962] Austin raised profound doubts about the hard and 
fast distinction. First he restates the distinction more 
precisely. The word "descriptive" is abandoned as having 
too narrow a scope. Performative utterances, he suggests, 
are 'happy' or 'unhappy' but they cannot be true; it is
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'constatives' that can be true or false. For example, "I 
name this ship Queen Elizabeth" cannot be false. It is 
'unhappy' if I am not entitled to name ships or if it is not 
the right time to do it. "He named the ship Queen 
Elizabeth" is on the other hand, true or false, not happy or 
unhappy.
Austin then shows that the idea of putting particular 
sentences exclusively into one or the other of these 
categories has to be given up. Happiness and the question 
of truth apply to both performatives and constatives. The 
happiness of a sentence always depends on something's being 
true: that the formula is the correct one, that the
circumstances are the right ones etc. Happiness and truth 
also interact in the case of constatives. For example, the 
sentence "John's children are bald" is unhappy if it refers 
to John when John has no children.
Those who would put ideological language outside the scope 
of an evaluation in terms of truth have a more difficult 
task in the light of Austin's findings. Austin shows that 
an attempt to separate the "practical" from the 
"theoretical" in the use of language is logically 
impossible. It would seem that in all uses of language man 
is concerned about what is true. (Notice, it is not being 
denied that language users have other concerns.) Arguably, 
this is due to two things.
Having evolved under the pressure of tailoring our plans of 
action (whether in deed or word) to reality to avoid 
frustrating our needs, we make conjectures, theoretical 
guesses, about the possible effectiveness of our actions in 
advance. In this way our ancestors could eliminate some 
incipient futile actions before they caused any damage or 
opportunity cost to the organism (and thus reduce its 
genetic reproducibility.) Language, considered as a
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form of action, has evolved to fit this need, making a 
ubiquitous connection between the concern over the truth and 
"happiness" of our utterances.
2.2 .2 . 2 . Socrates
This last point connects well with a neglected insight of 
Socrates. In the Phaedrus Socrates poses the question:
Well, if a speech is to classed as excellent, does 
not that presuppose knowledge of the truth about 
the subject of the speech in the mind of the 
speaker? (1988, Penguin, page 71.)
Phaedrus answers with what is now the common view:
But I have been told, my dear Socrates, that what 
a budding orator needs to know is not what is 
really right, but what is likely to seem right in 
the eyes of the mass of people who are going to 
pass judgement: not what is really good or fine 
but what will seem so; and that it is this rather 
than truth that produces conviction. (Ibid. page 
71.)
Socrates' position is that even a speaker who wishes to 
mislead will be successful in so far as he is not mislead 
himself. Socrates's argument for this is that misleading 
someone about reality requires small steps away from reality 
for it is slight differences between things which mislead.
It then follows that the deceiver must know the true state 
of affairs in order to know that he is proceeding by small 
steps from reality to the false position. Thus the logic of 
the propagandist's situation would seem to demand that he 
cultivate an interest in the truth. However, Socrates's 
argument may have limited scope.
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This argument covers the case of substituting a false 
position for an originally true position, but it does not 
cover the case in which the deceiver is trying to substitute 
one false position for another false position. It might be 
said that deceivers are not so much concerned simply to 
mislead but rather to mislead to a definite view; so it does 
not matter what the original position was. Hence it might 
be maintained that what the deceiver is normally concerned 
to know is what will seem true to his audience.
Nevertheless, notice that the logic of a mendacious 
propagandist demands that he cultivate a healthy interest at 
least in his opponents' theories, in order to judge their 
distance apart. We then have another pressure on the 
propagandist to learn the criticism of his position, for an 
opponent's criticism provides excellent clues about how he 
sees his own theory, what he would regard as a large 
distance and what a small distance between theories.
2.2.2.3. Unfathomable Lies
As we saw in chapter 1, all theories have an infinite number 
of implications in conjunction with other theories. To be 
precise, a theory's logical content and its informative 
content are each of infinite size. This has an interesting 
bearing on the old rhetorical trick, discussed by Socrates, 
of telling a small lie, L, in conjunction with a larger 
amount of truth, T. Our hypothetical propagandist reasons 
that glaring falsehoods are liable to detection and 
elimination; but if he surrounds his small lie with truth, 
it will escape detection and be propagated throughout the 
community. This is another and more formal way of putting 
Socrates's assertion that it is slight differences between 
things that mislead.
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Now the propagandist is faced by the following problem.
Since all theories have infinite logical and informative 
content, the propagandist cannot survey the whole content of 
his doctrine. It follows that he cannot survey the changes 
to the content he has committed himself to by conjoining T 
and L. As Gellner points out, all propagandists operate 
with a vast amount of opinion that they take for granted. 
(Gellner, [1979], page 124.) This may include a great deal 
of knowledge that they accept without at the time 
understanding, as when we accept the contents of a chemistry 
text book that we have not even read. Call this G. Assuming 
that propagandists do learn new things over time, there will 
be statements that they will accept in the future that they 
cannot now be aware of. Call this set S. Even though T and 
L may be consistent, certain unfathomable elements of T, L 
and G may be inconsistent.
Now from an inconsistency any conclusion whatsoever follows. 
This can be demonstrated by the application of just two 
logical rules of inference. We have already assumed that 
some statements are glaring falsehoods that cannot be 
sustained and propagated. Therefore, if "T & L & G & S” is 
inconsistent then the propagandist is committed to glaring, 
unsustainable falsehoods.
The propagandist cannot forestall this possibility by 
performing a consistency proof on the conjunction "T & L & G 
& S'* since G is far too large, and S does not even exist 
yet.
We may conclude, therefore, that there are profound 
constraints on the use of deception by a propagandist to aid 
the propagation of his doctrine. It may very well back-fire 
because of the unfathomable depths of the theoretical 
changes he is committed to in combining a small lie with a 
large amount to truth. Thus we see that even deception,
Ill
perhaps the oldest rhetorical trick, offers no guaranteed 
net advantage to a false doctrine in the competition of 
ideas.
2.3. Exploratory Rationality
Humans, more than perhaps any other animal, have a strong 
instinct of curiosity. They are substantially interested in 
and responsive to the truth, to what the world really is 
like. Humans vary in their desire to explore. Of course, 
the value of exploration is not absolute; curiosity can be 
encouraged or discouraged. But there is in every human an 
instinct to discover, to know.
Popper himself has argued that we should expect humans as 
creatures of evolution to have a drive for exploration:
So far as the knowledge is not, somehow, 
genetically built in to them, animals and men can 
only gain knowledge if they have a drive or 
instinct for exploration - for finding out more 
about their world. Their very existence, to be 
sure, presupposes a world which is to some extent 
'knowable' or 'explorable', but it also 
presupposes an innate disposition to know and to 
explore: we are active explorers (explorers by 
trial and error) rather than passive recipients of 
information impressed upon us from outside 
(Lamarkism, inductivism). (Popper [1974], page 
1060.)
Such a view is hardly compatible with Bartley's picture of 
the average human existing in a "slumbering fantasy world".
Exploration can be undertaken by movement or sensory 
scanning (which itself consists of small movements).16 But 
it may also be done mentally. It can be done efficiently if 
our beliefs have some tendency to change spontaneously. Thus 
Popper also argues that natural selection will favour those 
organisms that are able to explore the world vicariously,
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with the help of internal models of the world. This 
vicarious process of trial and error allows fatal projects 
to be eliminated before they are executed. (Popper, [1977], 
pages 151 - 152.)
It follows that our beliefs are never completely stable and 
from time to time admit of doubt. This makes sense if we 
see humans as actively discovering things about their 
environment by continually making hypotheses and testing 
them. Organisms that try out (or at least think of) 
different possibilities, if only momentarily, are surely 
better able to take advantage of new opportunities and thus 
enhance their genetic reproducibility. As in the case of 
wishful thinking, we have to admit that different sorts of 
belief will be differently weighted with respect to doubt: 
some beliefs may admit of only momentary doubt, others would 
be more stable. Every Marxist and every Christian has had 
doubts about their creed; that is exactly why doubt is given 
the stigma of heresy or unfaithfulness. Faithfulness 
requires a great deal of effort in the way of constant 
revision of the doctrine. But even if our memory were 
perfect we would never quite achieve faith because of these 
fundamental characteristics of our psychology.
Belief, then is like a search-light, continually scanning 
possibility space. To continue the metaphor, our beliefs 
(or better our attitudes to issues) differ in their range of 
scanning, some with a narrow scan, others with a wide 
scan.17
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2.4. Wishful and Fearful Rationality
Many agree with Popper that if an ideologist does not want 
to be affected by rational argument, then even if he has to 
face it as a consequence of the logic of his situation, he 
can resolve to keep his cherished beliefs come what may. A 
variation on this thought is that wishes are a barrier to 
argument. An ideology is often said to be based on wishful 
thinking and hence closed to rational argument. Bertrand 
Russell held a similar position:
The cause of belief, here, is not, as in science, 
the evidence of fact, but the pleasant feelings 
derived from belief. (Russell, [1938], page 144.)
Many other influential thinkers have held the same view. 
Feuerbach, for example, held that religion was the result of 
a projection of the essence of man onto a supernatural 
being, the projection being caused by a wish:
it is not human misery in itself that creates the
Gods, but the satisfaction this misery finds in 
the imagination, as the instrument of wish 
fulfilment, which creates and appropriates the 
objects of these wishes and desires; which in 
effect, objectifies them, so that they can be 
appropriated. (Quoted by M Wartofsky in his book 
Feuerbach, Cambridge University Press, 1977, page 
216.)
However, to be accurate, it is not clear if Feuerbach 
regarded wishful thinking as a barrier to argument.
Focusing on wishful thinking overlooks the fact that people
I Q  , ,
often believe what they fear. ■LO But it is true that both
wishful and fearful thinking are almost ubiquitous in the 
systems of ideas that have enchanted large fractions of 
mankind. Christianity is a good example with its heaven and 
hell, eliciting wishful and fearful thinking respectively.
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Marxism with its promise of superabundance also enlists 
wishful thinking. Freudianism is a less obvious case, but 
nevertheless conforms. Freudianism promises a liberation 
from unnecessary repression of urgent desires plus a deep 
understanding of other people's minds, an understanding that 
surpasses their own. Now is thought guided by wishful 
thinking irrational, and is it closed to argument?
All writers agree that wishful thinking is irrational 
because it makes us impervious to counterevidence and 
impedes us in the pursuit of our goals. On the contrary, I 
intend to argue that wishful thinking is:
(1) an efficient way by which any organism may seek goals, 
because it generates and maintains beliefs that are relevant 
to goal attainment so that they can be tested to a degree 
proportionate to the urgency of the desired goal;
(2) open to argument, in the sense that beliefs sustained by 
it may be undermined.
(The initial insight that wishful thinking might allow 
beliefs to be tested I owe to Dr Lester who made this point 
in a private conversation on this issue in 1987. The rest is 
my own fault.)
I shall also argue that wishful thinking is thought to be 
irrational because of the ubiquitous assumption that only 
justified beliefs are rational. Justifying a belief requires 
a certain procedure. Since it is thought that coming to a 
belief via wishful thinking is not a process of 
justification, it is automatically concluded that such 
beliefs are irrational. Pears, Elster, Lukacs and Meyerson 
make this invalid leap. Using Popper's arguments I am able 
to show that such writers have been mislead by 
justificationism. The role of wishful thinking as a guide
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in goal attainment becomes clear, once justificationism is 
discarded.
Both wishful and fearful thinking are rational and open to 
criticism, and moreover, can be shown to be so from Popper's 
own principles. Wishful and fearful thinking have evolved 
through Darwinian biological processes because they 
facilitate the organism's exploration of reality in the 
pursuit of its goals. Failing to generate wishes relevant 
to one's desires and failing to persist in a wishful belief 
in the presence of some counterevidence is likely to place 
organisms at a disadvantage in survival and hence 
reproduction.
2.4.1. David Pears
The wish that something is true sustains the belief that it 
is in the face of evidence to the contrary. This is what is 
thought by many to be one reason for describing wishful 
thinking as irrational. David Pears in Motivated 
Irrationality is a typical example.
...reason itself has certain bad habits...For 
example...a person's first formulation of a theory 
is obstinately retained even when further evidence 
is telling heavily against it. (Pears, [1984], 
page 9.)
Pears asks us to consider the slightly different case of a 
driver who goes against evidence already in his possession:
...he judges it best that he should stop at two 
drinks in spite of the pleasure to be had from 
more. Nevertheless, when he is offered a third 
drink, which we may suppose is a double, he takes 
it...If the guest persuaded himself that doctors 
are just wrong about the amount of alcohol that 
can be taken without loss of judgement or slowing 
of reactions, he was going against the evidence in
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his possession and merely making a wishful guess 
at the facts. That would be a clear case of 
incorrect processing of information and so, by the 
suggested criterion, a clear case of 
irrationality. (Pears, [1984], page 13.)
This argument implies that retesting a hypothesis whose 
importance has increased is irrational. But this is not so. 
It is true, of course, that alcohol degrades performance and 
increases the risk in driving. But under the influence of 
alcohol the driver's values have changed, and the marginal 
cost of incurring increased risk is worth less than the 
marginal value of an extra drink. But as a consequence the 
value of testing the belief that three drinks is too risky 
has increased. The fact that the test involves increased 
risk to the life of the driver does not alter this fact.
The fact that a wish prompted the man to entertain a false 
proposition which he earlier had rejected does not make the 
man irrational, since being liable to error is something 
that only Gods can avoid. The relevant question is: is the 
driver now beyond persuasion by even stronger arguments?
A clearer case than the one Pears presents is that of the 
jealous lover who suspects there is a rival round every 
corner. This makes sense as a strategy for the rigourous 
testing of a very important hypothesis: that the lover is 
faithful. Rivals are more liable to detection and thwarting 
if the lover is always on the look out. This is a case of 
fearful thinking. A parallel case of wishful thinking is 
when a jilted lover thinks he sees his lover all over the 
place and finds himself running up to strangers only to be 
embarrassed. This example illustrates how wishful thinking 
might serve the interests of an individual. (Admittedly, 
this is not ideological thinking, but obviously can be 
easily generalized.)
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In Pears's argument we may discern a strong element of 
justificationism. For Pears, any rational belief or action 
must be based on evidence; mere guesses prompted by wish are 
irrational. But even a guess can be true, and one can act no
better then in the light of what is true. (cf. chapter 1 on
C.C.R.)
2.4.2. Jon Elster
Elster's arguments also illustrate how justificationism can 
be fundamentally misleading in discussions of this issue.
Jon Elster argues that there is no tendency for wishful 
thinking to promote goal seeking. Elster acknowledges 
that a wishful belief may happen to be true or efficient. 
However, this is a chance affair and irrational:
A belief about instrumental means-ends 
relationship, if true, is no less efficient 
because it is arrived at by wishful thinking. But 
of coarse, instrumental beliefs shaped by interest 
will serve interest only by fluke. (Elsters,
"Belief, Bias and Ideology", in [1985], editors:
Hollis and Lukes, page 142.)
Wishful thinking would be even more irrational 
than weakness of will" because "a desire could 
never rationalize a belief.
We may surmise that for Elster, the generation of a belief 
through a wish could never rationalize a belief because this 
is not a justificatory procedure. Elster is fairly subtle 
though, since he does point out that a wishful belief may 
happen to be justified on other grounds. So a wishful 
belief may happen to be a justified true belief: a piece of 
knowledge as traditionally defined. But this is pure 
coincidence.
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In general, Elster argues for the following proposition:
There is no reason to suppose that beliefs shaped 
by interests tend to serve these interests. (Ibid. 
page 143.)
On general grounds, distorted beliefs cannot be 
expected, any more than illusionary beliefs, to be 
very helpful for goal achievement. (Ibid. page 
141.)
The "general grounds" that Elster speaks of are not 
forthcoming. His arguments consist of envisioning 
hypothetical situations in which wishful thinking leads to 
erroneous beliefs or (detrimental consequences) in which the 
individual's interests are thwarted by the way others react 
to his wishful thoughts.
Consider this argument of Elster's:
If out of wishful thinking I form a belief that I 
am about to be promoted, my subsequent display of 
unwarranted self confidence may destroy once and 
for all my chances of promotion. (Ibid. page 141.)
Elster points to the Lysenko affair, the disastrous nature 
of which, Elster asserts, was brought about by scientific 
beliefs being formed by wishes. Quoting Paul Veyne, he 
points to the possibility that the "exploited and oppressed 
classes" may out of wishful thinking suppose that their fate 
is just and proper.
These examples show at most that wishful thinking can 
produce error and thwart interest and desire. But someone 
arguing that wishful thinking acts as a guide in the pursuit 
of goals is not committed to the view that wishful thinking 
is infallible. Nowhere does Elster show that wishful 
thinking leads either systematically or by tendency to 
erroneous beliefs or the thwarting of interest or desire.
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Elster is lead astray in his analysis of wishful thinking by 
his acceptance of justificationism. This is most clearly 
seen in his book Making Sense of Marx.
Summing up, the presumptions that a socially 
caused belief will not be rationally grounded, and 
that a belief which is not rationally grounded 
will be false, creates a case for the falsity of 
socially caused beliefs. To repeat, such beliefs 
may well be true, like the broken watch that tells 
the correct time once every twelve hours. The 
point is only that we cannot expect them to be 
true. (Elster, [1985], pages 474 - 475.)
Why, according to Elster, are socially caused beliefs 
irrational? Because
...a belief is rationally caused if (i) the causes 
of the belief are reasons for holding it and (ii) 
the reasons cause the belief qua reasons, not in 
some accidental manner. Conversely, they are 
shaped in the wrong way if irrelevant causes enter 
into their formation or they are irrelevantly 
shaped by relevant causes. Among such irrelevant 
causes we may cite the interest or position of the 
believer; hence socially caused beliefs are not 
rationally caused. (Ibid. page 474.)
Clearly, Elster accepts the traditional definition of 
knowledge as justified true belief. Elster points out that 
a justified belief may be false, because a justified belief 
is one that has the right relationship to the evidence, not 
the world. But, Elster continues, justificatory procedures 
are chosen because they are conducive to the goal of truth. 
Since wishful thinking is not a justificatory procedure we 
cannot expect it to help discover the truth.
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2.4.3. Georg Lukacs
Elster's position is fairly sophisticated and does not fall 
into the same error that many sociologists of knowledge 
since Karl Mannheim have: the self undermining idea that 
since all theories are socially caused they are all false, 
or at least a presumption of being false. Elster is right 
to reject the solution offered by Georg Lukacs and others 
that Marxism has a privileged character, but his own 
solution is really superfluous.
Georg Lukacs tried to defend the special character of 
Marxism, by arguing that Marxism is the theory of the 
proletariat, a class acting in the interest of humanity and 
not in its own narrow class interest. Georg Lukacs assumed 
that a class whose beliefs are shaped by its own peculiar 
interests must have a false consciousness: its understanding 
or theory of society must be false. Lukacs explanation for 
the systematic error of a narrow class is that it would be 
against its interest to have a true understanding of 
society. But a class whose interest coincided with that of 
humanity as a whole (i.e. the proletariat) must have a true 
consciousness: its theories of society must be true. Why 
did Lukacs think that the proletariat were infallible in 
this regard? Because, he assumed that for the proletariat, 
its self-understanding and its process of achieving 
humanities interest (i.e. communism) were identical.
Elster contests that social causation is social causation 
and rational causation is rational causation; and a belief 
caused by social position or interest is not made any more 
rational by the social position or interest being that of 
humanity as a whole rather than some sub-group. Marxism, 
Elster insists, needs another answer to this problem.
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Elster's answer begins by distinguishing between an ideology 
that arises spontaneously and independently in the minds of 
many individuals and a belief that arises in the mind of 
some individual and is then accepted by many others because 
it corresponds to their material interest or social 
position. In the latter case, Elster's argues, the belief 
will be socially caused for many but that will not create a 
presumption against its truth, because there is no reason to 
believe that the originators of ideas that subsequently end 
up as the ideas of the ruling class are similarly under the 
sway of irrational forces.
Elster applies this reasoning to the Mannheimian problem. 
Elster asserts that even if all widely accepted theories are 
socially grounded, this does not create a presumption 
against their truth if the social grounding operates via 
their diffusion and acceptance. Thus, on Elster's argument, 
Marxism is justified if Marx came to his theory via a 
justificatory procedure, i.e. if his beliefs were rationally 
caused.
Throughout his discussion Elster assumes that accepting a 
view because it corresponds to one's interest is irrational. 
But this may help in furthering the pursuit of one's goals, 
by allowing one to try out, to test a hypothesis relevant to 
one's goals; and this applies whether the view was generated 
by one's interest or accepted from another. The belief may 
not be understood as a hypothesis in the way a scientist 
views his hypotheses, but the belief will function as one 
nonetheless. Moreover, nowhere does Elster show that 
beliefs accepted on account of their conformity to one's 
interests are immune to change through argument. Surely, if 
a belief is open to argument then its origin (whether it is 
justified or not) is irrelevant.
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The terms of the whole debate between Lukacs and Elster are 
wrong. The concern over the origin of beliefs is 
misleading, for it ignores what is done with beliefs once 
acquired. I maintain that beliefs cannot be justified, but 
even a belief arrived at by the finest justificatory method 
may (logically) be held in an uncritical, dogmatic way. The 
belief that a belief has been justified may create a 
presumption that it is true, reducing the urgency of 
confronting criticism.
Elster's definition of a rationally caused belief is 
perilously close to absurdity. If, as Elster insists, a 
belief is rational if and only if its causes are reasons for 
holding it, then Elster must also assume that there are 
reasons that are not constituted by beliefs. Such non­
belief reasons would have to form the beginning of any chain 
of causes causing a rational belief if Elster is to avoid an 
infinite regress. If all reasons are rational beliefs, then 
according to Elster's definition any rational belief would 
have to have a rational belief for its cause and this belief 
in turn would have to have a belief for its cause and so on, 
ad infinitum. But Elster fails to hint what kind of non­
belief reasons these would be. Immediate experience cannot 
serve this role for all our experience is belief 
impregnated. The best tested theories in psychology imply 
that even apparently simple visual experiences involve 
complex beliefs.
Epistemologically it does not matter how a belief was 
produced. All that matters is whether it is open to 
criticism, and what is done with it in response to 
criticism. Mannheim and Lukacs fell into their insuperable 
problem by taking justificationism for granted.
Justificationism searches for authorities, whether in 
reason, experience, gods or intuition etc. Lukacs thought
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he had found an ultimate authority in the consciousness of 
the proletariat.
Accepting these points a defender of Lukacs position may 
well retort to Elster's argument by saying that it is the 
bourgeoisie's dogmatic stand on their ideology that is 
important: and it is their type of narrow class interest 
that maintains the ideology against argument and appeal from 
other classes. In fact this is what Lukacs seems to be 
saying when he says that the capitalist class cannot 
understand the proletarian viewpoint because it is against 
their interest. But then Elster could respond by pointing 
out that Lukacs does not show that the proletarian interest 
is any different: the proletarians may be just as dogmatic 
as the bourgeoisie. Lukacs failed to see this possibility 
for he had already concluded that the proletarians had a 
privileged epistemological position: they just could not be 
wrong, even in principle.
Lukacs position is possibly the most extreme statement of 
the irrationality engendered by interest (which we may gloss 
as wishes). Not only is the capitalist class prevented by 
their wishes from agreeing with the proletarian position, 
but their wishes prevent them from even understanding it. 
(Lukacs complicates this slightly by saying that one can 
only understand the proletarian position by being involved 
in their struggle for communism. So there are two barriers 
to criticism.) 19
It is apposite here to point out that we may deny the 
premise of Lukacs' argument. Commentators on positions such 
as Lukacs' take for granted his contention that the 
interests of the two classes, the working class and the 
capitalist class, are incompatible with respect to 
communism. However if, as suggested by Marx, everyone will 
have a higher standard of living in communism it would
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clearly be in the interests of the capitalist class to 
promote communism.
In assessing the presumption that wishful ideologies lead 
systematically away from truth, impede gaol attainment and 
are closed to argument let us return to an eagle's eye view 
of man as a creature of evolution. Let us construct the 
logic of the situation facing our ancestors (plus their 
close relatives who failed to cope with it).
2.4.4. Wishful Beliefs and Efficient Testing 
and Exploratory Behaviour.
In the efficient pursuit of any goal an organism must 
discover the possibilities open to it. Since it is fallible 
and mostly ignorant of the world, it must explore some 
hypotheses. Now its ignorance is literally infinite, so 
there are an infinite number of possible hypotheses to test. 
It would be inefficient to pick hypotheses without any 
constraints. Can it eliminate some (ie, some ranges) of 
these hypotheses? Clearly it can eliminate all those that 
are irrelevant to the pursuit of its goals. Already we have 
a tendency for the organism's beliefs to be related to its 
interests. Can this relationship be brought still closer?
In the following bear in mind Popper's view of man as a 
creature of Darwinian evolution. Very desirable or 
fearful possibilities are worth testing for. Organisms that 
do not test for very desirable or fearful possibilities 
would tend to be eliminated in favour of our more 
circumspect ancestors. (Here I assume that evolution has 
already made desires and fears fairly well correlated with 
reproductive needs, though I should add that the correlation 
need not be exact.) But in order for a possibility to be 
tested a relevant belief has first to be generated.
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Moreover, the more desirable or fearful the possibility the 
more testing it is worth; hence the belief has sometimes to 
be retained in the presence of (some) counterevidence. I 
assume here with Popper that all organisms - indeed, all 
knowledge acquiring systems - are fallible. That means that 
organisms can be wrong not only in their initial hypotheses 
but also in their interpretations of tests. Even the 
results of observational tests are provisional, and are 
sometimes worth retesting (Popper, [1934].). Beliefs that 
concern very valuable things are often for this reason 
difficult to dislodge (for example, "irrational" jealousy, 
beliefs in ghosts of lost relatives, belief in a world of 
superabundance etc,).
Thus we see that the action of natural selection working on 
organisms subject to certain properties of theories and 
methodological considerations can be expected to produce 
organisms that have a tendency to wishful and fearful 
thinking.
This analysis of wishful and fearful thinking by applying 
Popper's principles is necessary if we are to take account 
of the stubbornness of some systems of ideas. This is an 
important element of truth in Popper's and Bartley's idea 
that ideologies are unresponsive to criticism. However, by 
placing them in the context of an evolutionary view of man, 
we are also in a better position to see that wishful and 
fearful thinking are no guarantee against criticism, but in 
fact are ways of making the most of criticism. For the 
stubbornness with respect to criticism is not absolute, but 
proportional to the importance of the values at stake.
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2.4.5. Absolute versus Value-relative Stubbornness
But what prevents the propagandist making himself absolutely 
stubborn?
Eric Hoffer maintained that:
The readiness for self sacrifice is contingent on 
an imperviousness to the realities of 
life"...and..."Strength of faith, as Bergson 
pointed out, manifests itself not in moving 
mountains but in not seeing mountains to move. And 
it is the certitude of his infallible doctrine 
that renders the true believer impervious to the 
uncertainties, surprises and the unpleasant 
realities of the world around him. (Hoffer,
[1962], pages 75-76.)
Is it possible through argument, experience, or commitment 
to get into such a state? Are there evolutionary reasons 
why this is unlikely? In answering this question we need to 
understand the nature of belief in the context of evolution.
Popper describes the ideologist as if he had a choice 
whether to (a) resolve to adopt a belief in a position; and 
(b) resolve to continue believing in the position come what 
may:
Thus when those who praise commitment and 
irrational faith describe themselves as 
irrationalists (or post rationalists) I agree with 
them. They are irrationalists, even if they are 
capable of reasoning. For they take pride in 
rendering themselves incapable of breaking out of 
their shell; they make themselves prisoners of 
their manias. (Popper, [1967], page 365.)
However, neither (a) or (b) is possible, because belief is 
involuntary. This statement is easily misunderstood, so I 
shall expand on it. It does indeed derive from Locke's 
doctrine, but Locke put severe restrictions on its 
generality which are unnecessary. 20
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We can choose to listen to, read or participate in an 
argument. We can choose to follow a lifestyle that 
encourages or discourages seeking out views contrary to our 
own. We can also set out to argue ourselves into or out of 
certain beliefs. (Indeed, maintaining a belief requires 
maintaining the memory of the relevant information - 
revision - which itself is clearly a matter of choice).
This is another important element of truth in Popper's and 
Bartley's account. Indeed, it is this truth that makes the 
cultivation of the critical attitude and associated 
institutions of fundamental importance.
But at the end of an argument or after having heard or read 
a counterargument, we find that we have involuntarily 
retained or lost the belief. Believing is rather like 
seeing: we can choose to open our eyes but once open we will 
see something independent of our wishes or resolutions to 
the contrary. This is not meant to imply that sight is 
infallible, or that it is a completely passive process. 
Indeed, it involves many low and high level hypothesis 
testing active scanning mechanisms, (cf. Richard Gregory, 
[1966] ) All that is implied is that these mechanisms do 
not prevent the correction of error, that we can be 
surprised by what we see. By analogy, our beliefs regarding 
states of affairs not immediately inspectable by sense 
organs can be surprised by what we encounter in an argument.
In private correspondence, Popper pointed out that this 
might look like a deterministic account of belief, which 
would then raise the obvious problem: do we believe what we 
believe because of the truth or just because we were 
determined to do so. If this were the case, then my 
argument that truth is important would be vitiated.
However, involuntariness does not imply determination, 
though the two notions have often been confused. My
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position agrees with Popper's attitude to determinism as 
argued in his [1982] and more recently in his [1990]. I 
conjecture that the formation of beliefs is an
indeterministic process. I like to refer to indeterministic
• • • • 21 •patterns as exhibiting constrained randomness. Beliefs
are formed partly randomly, but there is a propensity for 
them to be about important issues, that is, wishful and 
fearful. There are other constraints on their formation, but 
these are irrelevant to this particular problem.
On evolutionary grounds why should we expect beliefs to be 
involuntary? The answer would seem to be that organisms that 
persist in beliefs come-what-may tend to be eliminated. We 
must expect there to be a limit, therefore, to the extent to 
which wishful and fearful thinking can sustain beliefs 
against contrary evidence, since any genes responsible for 
absolutely impervious wishful and fearful thinking would 
tend to be eliminated. Organisms that seek food simply on 
the basis of where they wish it to be, or try to escape 
predators by wishing them away leave few descendants. So 
from an evolutionary point of view we can expect even 
wishful and fearful thinking to be open to argument, albeit 
a long one.
It is interesting that Hoffer, like Kolakowski, picked the 
fanatical communist as an example of his claim:
The fanatical communist refuses to believe any 
unfavourable report or evidence about Russia, nor 
will he be disillusioned by seeing with his own 
eyes the cruel misery inside the Soviet promised 
land. (Hoffer, [1962], page 76.)
The emergence and success of perestroika undermines this 
claim. (The relapse back to a more Brezhnev style of 
government does not gainsay the fact that perestroika did 
emerge.) Of course, Hoffer could say that they must not
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have been really fanatical after all; but this defence would 
not carry much weight.
Hoffer and Kolakowski could have presented a more subtle 
argument. Following Popper, they could have pointed out 
that our experiences are interpreted by our theories about 
the world. As David Hume argued in more particular terms:
...as force is always on the side of the governed, 
the governors have nothing to support them but 
opinion. It is, therefore, on opinion only that 
government is founded; and this maxim extends to 
the most despotic and military governments...
(Hume, [1774], page 29.)
Thus if Soviet citizens are convinced that there is no 
alternative to their miserable existence, or that the other 
alternatives are worse, or that their misery is only a 
temporary and regrettably necessary step to profound 
happiness, it might not be surprising if they still thought 
Russia to be the best society in the world. This would be 
what Hume called an opinion of interest. It might also be an 
opinion difficult to criticize and thus undermine 
psychologically. However, as we have seen, argument against 
the economic mismanagement and moral outrages of the Soviet 
Union has penetrated the supposedly impenetrable barriers to 
criticism.
Wishful and fearful thinking engender stubbornness in our 
beliefs, but as in all organisms capable of belief it is a 
relative stubbornness proportionate to the importance of the 
belief to the organism. Wishful and fearful thinking is a 
way, perhaps a crude way, by which an organism makes the 
most of its hypotheses and the counterevidence within the 
constraints of the organism's fallibility and in the light 
of the varying urgency of its values.
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Meyerson is one writer who acknowledges the value of a 
degree of conservatism towards our beliefs in the face of 
counter-evidence, but who still thinks that ideological 
stubbornness is absolute. She fails to consider the 
possibility that the degree of conservatism may be 
proportionate to the degree of importance of the issue; 
stubbornness for Meyerson is either reasonable or absolute. 
Meyerson asserts that there is a difference between a 
scientist's "charitable" protective attitude to a theory's 
predictive failures and the digging-in that acceptance of an 
ideology involves, which is maintained "come-what-may". 
(Meyerson, [1991], page 61.) On my analysis it is not 
surprising that a scientist's defence of a possibly refuted 
theory whose truth or falsity has little emotional 
significance is relatively less stubborn than the 
ideologist's defence of a theory whose truth or falsity has 
great emotional significance. It does not follow that the 
defence of the latter is come-what-may, and Meyerson 
furnishes us with no general argument that this defence 
should be absolutely stubborn. Of course, methodologically 
one ought to positively look for sound criticism, and one 
might out of fearful thinking avoid what one suspects to be 
counter-evidence. Following Pears, Meyerson thinks that she 
has obviated the paradox of self deception, convincing 
oneself of a belief that one contradicts, by using the word 
"suspicion" rather than belief. (Meyerson, [1991], page 65.) 
One only suspects that there may be counterevidence, without 
actually believing that there is. But this seems to be a 
verbal slight of hand. Suspicion seems to be weak belief, 
rather than no belief at all. Now the strength of a belief 
may be indicated by how much a person is willing to 
sacrifice in action based on it, and all action is based on 
belief, whether weak or strong. Now it follows that 
Meyerson's fearful avoiders of counterevidence must be 
willing to make some sacrifice to avoid the possible 
counterevidence. But then it follows that their "suspicion"
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must amount to some belief, that they actually doubt their 
cherished belief. It is also worth noting that it is hard 
not to surmise that people who are fearful of the truth 
understand that belief may be involuntarily undermined by 
the evidence despite their wishes to the contrary.
But is this weakened belief at least guaranteed against 
undermining counterevidence? No, for even our most fervent 
desire or fear cannot act infallibly to exclude from our 
view all possible counterevidence. Thus according to my 
analysis the belief may still be discarded in response to 
the right argument, whether looked for or not.
The major weakness in Meyerson's case is that she overlooks 
the evolutionary origin of our psychological make-up. As a 
consequence she feels free to postulate absolutely stubborn 
beliefs generated by wishful thinking, just as a science- 
fiction writer unconstrained by physics feels free to 
postulate rockets that travel at the speed of light. Like 
most writers who ignore our evolutionary origins, Meyerson 
assumes that the way we deal with counterevidence is 
tailored to our desire for contentment or a life free from 
doubt and uncertainty. However, what serves the reproduction 
of our genes may not coincide with what serves contentment. 
In other words what maximizes the reproduction of genes may 
not maximize the attainment of contentment; our evolved 
mechanisms for registering error may wake us rather 
unpleasantly from Bartley's "slumbering fantasy world".
In the light of the involuntariness of belief in response to 
counterevidence, and the fallibility of fearful attempts to 
avoid counterevidence, we may reject Popper's conclusion 
that only those who have chosen the rationalist attitude can 
be impressed by an appeal to experience and logical 
argument. We may say this because every person begins life
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with a disposition to correct falsified beliefs, despite his 
wishes or dispositions to the contrary.
2.5. Logical Rationality
It might be accepted that it is very difficult and sometimes 
impossible to reject what one encounters in one's immediate 
sensible environment. Wishful thinking can be disappointed; 
fearful thinking can be relieved. The analogy with sight 
does have strength here. However, it may be objected that 
this applies only to beliefs concerning our immediate 
sensible environment. The strongest version of this line of 
argument is propounded by Wells, in his attempt to explain 
why religious ideas survive criticism:
Let me press this point concerning the correction 
of our ideas by experience. When our ideas about 
our immediate environment are very incomplete or 
erroneous, our behaviour is likely to be ill- 
adapted to our needs, so that we expose ourselves 
to some immediate unpleasantness. But in this way 
attention is called to our mistake, and we may be 
led to rectify it. If, for instance, we act on 
the belief that ether is a good fire extinguisher, 
we shall be in for a rude shock, and if we survive 
the experience, the belief will not survive with 
us. On the other hand, any ideas we may have 
formed about the nature of the universe, or about 
the distant future or past, are unlikely to lead 
to any noticeably inappropriate reactions on our 
part. Thus we may well persist in erroneous 
beliefs of these kinds all our lives without 
experiencing the smallest surprise or 
disappointment. (Wells, [1988], page 219.)
There are two responses to this challenge. The weaker of 
the two responses is that there is no reason to suppose that 
some types of belief use radically different brain 
mechanisms making them voluntary. Metaphorically speaking, 
evolution tends to work with mechanisms it finds to hand. 
There is no reason to suppose that the involuntariness of
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more sophisticated beliefs would have been a handicap to our 
ancestors. But it could have been an advantage. This is 
made clear in the second and stronger of the two defenses.
I conjecture that an adequate defence against this argument 
lies in the evolution of our appreciation of logical 
rules.22 My idea is that an appreciation of logic evolved 
because of its utility in handling problems presented by our 
ancestors' immediate environment. First perhaps in the 
avoidance of predators and the capture of prey; later in the 
construction of tools. This grants the element of strength 
in Wells' argument: deficiencies in coping with immediate 
practical problems is a great selection pressure. However, 
the appreciation of logic was not tied exclusively to 
thought about the immediate environment. There was no 
evolutionary reason for this ability to be tied to immediate 
problems, so a general ability to sort beliefs according to 
logical rules was not eliminated. Analogously, one may 
learn to count coloured beads, but then automatically also 
be able to count, as an incidental by-product, apples and 
oranges or cars and trees. Again, an opposable thumb was 
selected for its advantage in manipulating rudimentary 
tools: this does not hamper pilots turning dials on a Boeing 
747. General reasoning ability may have been a lucky 
advantageous by-product of the selection pressure on our 
ancestors to deal efficiently with their immediate 
environment.
Our ancestors were then able to compare alternative plans of 
action, whether short or long term. Their decisiveness 
would be enhanced by the very fact that they could see more 
readily which plans really were alternatives. And the more 
abstract their grasp of logic the longer the time span over 
which they could plan. More productive processes often 
require more time to put into effect: for example
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sacrificing today's fish caught by hand to make a net that 
will bring in more fish tomorrow.
In addition, they were able to discard those plans which 
were internally inconsistent or conflicted with a general 
theory about, say, the whereabouts of game. They were able 
to do this before they committed themselves to a hunt for 
instance, instead of having to test directly every promising 
plan. As Popper so aptly puts it, he could begin to let his 
ideas die in his stead. They would also be better able to 
fashion a tool whose manufacture required a sequence of
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actions of limited permutability.
A tendency to think in accord with the rules of logic: the
law of the excluded middle; the law of non contradiction;
modus ponens etc. would clearly have been an evolutionary 
advantage given our ancestors's niche. It is not surprising 
to learn, therefore, that all the world's logics are 
extremely similar. As Staal says:
Although it remains uninfluenced by Western logic 
and stems from an entirely different tradition,
Indian logic offers striking parallels to Western 
logic. (Staal, [1967], page 520.)
The same is true of Chinese logics.
In the light of the above defense it can be seen that Wells 
is misleading when he says in conclusion:
..beliefs which admitted of no practical 
demonstration and could be checked by no 
intelligible test could be entrusted only to words 
or to other equivocal ciphers and symbols which 
each generation had to interpret afresh according 
to its lights. (Ibid. page 219.)
This is misleading because it overlooks the check of 
consistency. Moreover, it overlooks the possibility that an
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appreciation of logic evolved in connection with immediate 
problems of the environment but whose scope transcended this 
parochial domain.
The various ways in which humans can be responsive to the 
truth are not incompatible. Indeed, every action is under 
the control of exploratory, economic, instrumental and 
logical rationality.
2.6. Objection: Imperfect Selection
Karl Popper (private correspondence) has objected that 
Darwinian theory does not imply that organisms are perfectly 
adapted to their environments. Darwin himself was well aware 
of this:
Natural selection tends only to make each organic being as 
perfect as, or slightly more perfect than, the other 
inhabitants of the same country with which it has to 
struggle for existence...Natural selection will not produce 
absolute perfection...The correction for the aberration of 
light is said, on high authority, not to be perfect even in 
that most perfect organ, the eye. (Darwin, [1859], pages 
229.)
Indeed, there are organs and behaviours that reduce the 
reproducibility of the relevant genotype. Maladaptive 
characteristics survive and are reproduced on the back of 
adaptive characteristics. I may add that if organisms were 
perfectly adapted it would be hard to understand extinction. 
The very fact that species become extinct implies that they 
were not perfectly adapted to whatever made them extinct. 
Therefore our inferences from the principle of Darwinian 
evolution have to be carefully qualified.
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We can only argue that there is a rough and ready tendency 
toward the evolution of economic, instrumental, exploratory, 
logical and wishful rationality.
However, it is interesting to compare Darwinian and 
Lamarkian evolution in this regard. Darwinian evolution has 
at least a tendency to produce rational organisms; Lamarkian 
evolution (on its own) could easily produce irrational 
organisms. Lamarkian evolution relies on the inheritance of 
acquired characteristics, but many acquired characteristics 
are injuries. Brain damage impairing reasoning abilities 
would be passed on to the next generation, and (without 
Darwinian selection) accumulated down the generations. 
Without extinction - that is, Darwinian selection - 
organisms would tend eventually to reproduce mindless heaps 
of poisoned, lacerated flesh and fractured bone.
Thus Popper points out that there is no general tendency in 
Darwinian evolution to produce flexibility; it may well 
issue in highly inflexible behaviour. Popper drew the 
implication that there is no general tendency in Darwinian 
evolution to produce flexibility of belief, which I argued 
was useful for exploring the world.
Popper's criticism can only be met by pointing to the 
importance of the kind of selection pressures to which 
humans have been subject. When we look at the evolutionary 
conditions from before the emergence of Homo sapiens sapiens 
to the present, it becomes clearer that being economic, 
abandoning the futile, thinking logically, exploring the 
unknown, wishful and fearful thinking, and being flexible 
in belief have been a reproductive advantage. Wasting 
resources, pursuing the futile, ignoring the unknown, 
flouting logical rules, failure to persist in beliefs of 
importance, and being utterly rigid in one's beliefs has 
been a reproductive disadvantage.
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More particularly, I pointed to Homo sapiens sapien's origin 
as a maker of tools, a hunter and a user of symbols. Both 
of these practises were part of the selection pressure 
acting, perhaps indirectly, on our ancestors' genes. This 
point of view is consistent with Popper's interesting theory 
of orthogenic trends in evolution. 24
To maintain the general thesis I only need to argue for a 
propensity to correct errors in the ways I have specified, 
so perfect adaptation is unnecessary. Thus O'Hear's 
criticism ([1988], page 85.) of Munz's argument [1985] for 
evolutionary epistemology is misplaced, for evolutionary 
epistemology is not committed to the idea that organisms 
together with their perceptions, skills and knowledge are 
perfectly, or even near-perfectly, adapted to the world.
The central point of evolutionary epistemology is that 
organisms can and have adapted to the world, that they can 
and have corrected errors. Perhaps all that is needed for a 
good adaptation, as for a good scientific theory, is 
verisimilitude; and if organisms can correct errors, then 
they can increase the verisimilitude of their beliefs plus 
the efficiency with which they eliminate error.
2.7. Irrelevant Forms of Irrationality
Someone might insist that people really are irrational in 
some ways. The word "irrational" has many meanings attached 
to it: it is no intention of this thesis to monopolize this 
word. The intention is to argue that any of the other ways 
in which humans can be called irrational place no absolute 
barrier to criticism, and do not give a net evolutionary 
advantage to false ideas. Humans may be called irrational 
because they are ignorant, make mistakes, or often entertain 
inconsistent beliefs. They have been called irrational 
because their values change with time. But none of these
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insulate an ideology from criticism, or give a net advantage 
to false ideas. Ignorance and mistakes are simply due to 
our less than omniscient and infallible nature.
2.8. General Schema for the Evolution of 
Ideologies under Criticism
The evolution of ideologies under criticism may be analysed 
with the help of a schema. We will make use of this schema 
later in the analysis of the immunising stratagem in chapter 
4. But it will help us to see how the biologically evolved 
forms of rationality (instrumental, economic, exploratory, 
wishful/fearful thinking, and logical) fit into the general 
pattern of the cultural, or memetic, evolution of an 
ideology. They in fact provide important mechanisms for the 
elimination of error or maladaptiveness in ideologies.
Bartley provides the following schema for the evolution of 
ideas which mirrors the evolution of genes:
(1) Blind, or unjustified variation.
(2) Systematic selection and elimination.
(3) Retention and duplication.
Bartley's and Popper's suggestion here may be taken as a 
contribution to the theory of what Dawkins has called 
memetic evolution, "memes" being the ideational equivalent 
of biological genes.
Writers who have noticed an analogy between genetic and 
memetic evolution have been keen to point to the 
disanalogies. Two often noted disanalogies are that genetic 
evolution is slower than memetic evolution and memetic 
evolution is Lamarkian (Ruse, [1986], ch.2). Schilcher and 
Tennant ([1984], pages 118 - 119.) and Hallpike ([1988], 
page 36.) supply many more. (Incidentally, Schilcher and
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Tennant wrongly suppose that genetic selection requires the 
death of the organism (7) , whereas in fact it only requires 
differential reproduction.) Most writers assume that 
cultural evolution must be completely Lamarkian or 
completely Darwinian, but they are not mutually exclusive. 
For example, in Brainstorming one deliberately applies a 
heuristic for the generation of ideas and for their 
elimination, but this heuristic, the Lamarkian aspect, is 
but a guide and does not determine the range of ideas or 
their elimination. Also one can imagine that Brainstorming 
will be used in slightly different ways and some of the 
variations will be unintended but will survive because they 
work.
How are memetic evolution and genetic evolution related? My 
answer is that an important mechanism of Bartley's stage (2) 
is supplied by the kinds of rationality I have argued for. 
The systematic selection and elimination of ideas is carried 
out by economic, instrumental, exploratory, wishful and 
fearful, and logical rationality. That is, ideas are 
eliminated by people generating beliefs about important 
possibilities, exploring the unknown, trying to avoid waste, 
trying to think logically and trying to abandon the futile.
I am not arguing that these genetically evolved traits are 
the only eliminators of error. Nor am I denying that truth 
may also be eliminated and false positions maintained by 
processes working against the elimination of error. All I 
need for my argument is man's capacity to correct his errors 
in the sorts of ways I have outlined above.
I will now deal with my potential critics. We will see that 
none of them attribute a rational element to stage (2), to 
the elimination of error. This stage is regarded by them as 
either irrational or as ineffective: memes are either 
eliminated by things other than truth and validity or not
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eliminated at all. However, they supply important insights 
that can be used to explore solutions to our problem.
2.8.1. Richard Dawkins
In The Selfish Gene Richard Dawkins developed the theory 
that with the emergence of the human brain a new type of 
replicator had come into existence. He called this the 
meme, a general term which includes ideas, theories, 
designs, tunes, fashions etc. Dawkins thinks it is 
worthwhile trying to explain culture in Darwinian terms, but 
that not all cultural phenomena can be reduced to genes and 
their evolution. The Darwinian process of selection is a 
much more general notion than that, and it can be applied to 
the evolution of memes. He makes it quite plain that 
memetic evolution can be quite independent of our genetic 
evolution. The meme for celibacy, for instance, Dawkins 
argues, is clearly independent of genetic evolution: it 
hardly increases the genetic reproducibility of those humans 
who replicate the meme.
The right conditions for a Darwinian evolutionary process 
seem to be present: variation in ideas; differential 
elimination of ideas; and ideas are reproducible.
Dawkins points out that the same three characteristics that 
make for high survivability in genes must be the same for 
memes: longevity, fecundity, and copying-fidelity. In
other words, the longer a meme exists the greater is the 
chance of its being copied; the higher the rate at which 
copies are made the greater is the chance that copies of the 
meme will exist in the future; and the higher the precision 
with which copies can be made the greater the chance that 
copies will exist in the future.
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(We can now make clearer the idea that a propagandistic 
advantage can be conferred on an ideology by insulating it 
from criticism. Any such insulation would have to operate 
by enhancing the ideology's longevity, or its fecundity, or 
its copying fidelity, or a combination of these.
We can also see here a partial explanation for the success 
of Marxism and Monotheistic religions which neatly 
harmonises with Meyerson's identity principle. A very 
general theory using only few premises clearly has more 
copying fidelity, since there are less distinct items to 
learn; and being general it has greater fecundity, since it 
lends itself to application on many problems. Less 
plausibly, it could be argued that it has greater longevity, 
as there is less danger of the parts being separated.)
Dawkins deals with two possible objections to his 
generalisation: the question of discreteness of the units of 
selection; and whether competition exists between memes. It 
is easy to see that memes are in a state of competition.
The main means of replication for a meme is a person's 
brain, but a brain has limited processing capacity - limited 
storage and recall etc. The other problem presents a 
slightly greater difficulty:
At first sight it looks as if memes are not high- 
fidelity replicators at all. Every time a 
scientist hears an idea and passes it on to 
somebody else, he is likely to change it 
somewhat...The memes are being passed on...in 
altered form. This looks quite unlike the 
particulate, all or nothing quality of gene 
transmission. It looks as though meme transmission 
is subject to continuous mutation, and also to 
blending. (Dawkins, [1976], pages 194 - 195.)
In chapter 3 of The Selfish Gene Dawkins defines the gene, 
not in a rigid all-or none manner, but as a length of 
chromosome with just sufficient copying-fidelity to be
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treated as a unit by natural selection. The same sort of 
definition, Dawkins argues, can be used to establish the 
particulateness of memetic evolution. Thus, an idea-meme is 
defined thus:
An entity that is capable of being transmitted 
from one brain to another. (Ibid. page 196.)
He illustrates this with Darwin's theory of evolution. 
Dawkins points out that different writers have their own way 
of interpreting Darwin's theory. However, we can say that:
the meme of Darwin's theory is that essential 
basis of the idea which is held in common by all 
brains that understand the theory. The differences 
in the way people represent the theory are then by 
definition not part of the meme. If Darwin's 
theory can be subdivided into components, such 
that some people believe component A but not 
component B, while others believe B but not A, 
then A and B should be regarded as separate memes.
If almost everybody who believes in A also 
believes in B - if the memes are closely "linked" 
to use the genetic term - then it is convenient to 
lump them together as one meme. (Ibid. page 196.)
Does this solve the problem? Yes it does, but in a way that 
requires an unnecessary detour. For we know that theories 
are built of discrete units. These units may be called 
atomic propositions. It is already clear that one can have 
a fraction of a proposition, namely a rational fraction of a 
compound proposition, where the denominator is the number of 
atomic propositions. But one cannot have any sort of 
fraction of a proposition. For example, consider the 
compound proposition: "It is raining and it is windy." One 
could have one half of the conjunction: "It is raining", but 
to divide further would reduce the proposition either to 
nonsense or simply words, which, though meaningful, would 
not express any proposition at all.
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Therefore Dawkins's worry about the discreteness of memetic 
evolution as applied to theories was unwarranted, and his 
solution is superfluous. Propositional and predicate logic 
have already discovered the ways in which propositions can 
be analysed into discrete units.
Dawkins's original intention, remember, is to argue that the 
evolution of memes cannot be completely explained in terms 
of their contribution to genetic survival:
We do not have to look for conventional biological 
survival values of traits like religion, music, 
and ritual dancing, though these may also be 
present. Once the genes have provided their 
survival machines with brains that are capable of 
rapid imitation, the memes will automatically take 
over. We do not even have to posit a genetic 
advantage in imitation, though that would 
certainly help. All that is necessary is that the 
brain should be capable of imitation: memes will 
then evolve that exploit the capability to the 
full. (Ibid. page 200.)
This general position is true, but in failing to look at the 
logic of the situation facing our ancestors (plus the 
variants that succumbed to it), Dawkins falls into the error 
of assuming that humans can be made immune (or impervious) 
to evidence and argument. It is therefore in his treatment 
of particular cases that Dawkins fails to carry through his 
programme.
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In applying his general position to religion, Dawkins 
attempts to show that the memes of heaven and hell are self- 
perpetuating, and also that blind faith is possible.
Dawkins' account portrays religion as more rigid than it is. 
It is worth quoting Dawkins's argument in full. First the 
argument that heaven and hell are self perpetuating:
The idea of hell fire is, quite simply, self 
perpetuating, because of its own deep 
psychological impact. It has become linked with 
the god meme because the two reinforce each other, 
and assist each other's survival in the meme pool.
(Ibid. page 198.)
Dawkins attributes the perpetuation of the hell fire meme to 
an unanalysed "psychological impact". This does not allow 
us to explore the degree to which it is open to argument.
Our analysis of wishful and fearful thinking, however, 
allows us to explain the "impact" of the hell fire and god 
meme. To recapitulate briefly, humans engage in fearful and 
wishful thinking about important possibilities. This 
tendency has evolved because it contributes to goal 
attainment. Admittedly, the hell fire and god meme as such 
did not evolve genetically, but they arouse tenacious 
beliefs because of genetically evolved wishful and fearful 
thinking.
Being without an evolutionary analysis of fearful and 
wishful thinking, Dawkins finds it easy to assume that blind 
faith exists:
Another member of the religious meme complex is 
called faith. It means blind trust, in the absence 
of evidence, even in the teeth of evidence...The 
meme for blind faith secures its own perpetuation 
by the simple unconscious expedient of 
discouraging rational enquiry. (Ibid. page 198.)
There are two interesting things here. Strictly, what 
Dawkins says is not incompatible with my thesis, but its
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inaccuracy makes it very misleading at best. In saying 
that beliefs are sustained in the presence of 
counterevidence Dawkins commits no error, but in failing to 
qualify this statement, one can only infer that his 
intention is to say that the beliefs would be sustained come 
what may. But as we saw, this would not make evolutionary 
sense. Evolutionary theory suggests that there must be some 
responsiveness to argument. Beliefs cannot be blind. 
Interestingly, Dawkins has confused two senses of being 
closed to argument. Clearly, one can follow a life-style 
that would reduce encounters with counterevidence to ones 
beliefs. This is one sense of being closed to argument.
But there still remains the question whether the human mind 
can be completely closed to evidence that has, as it were, 
got passed the dogmatic life-style. Dawkins supplies no 
argument to answer this question.
There is another problem with countenancing the existence of 
blind faith. As Dawkins says, the survivability of a meme 
depends, among other things, on its competition with other 
memes for embodiment in people's beliefs. If blind faith 
really existed, then the first meme to exploit it would soon 
have completely dominated all minds capable of it, providing 
it replicated quickly enough before any rival memes 
exploiting blind faith emerged and attached themselves to 
untouched minds. There would now be only one religion.
But even if there had been more than one, there would be no 
conversions from one to another. But since there are many 
religions, many conversions, and also continually developing 
factions in any one religion, it is hard to maintain the 
picture that Dawkins paints. The same points can be made 
about any sort of system of ideas: political, economic, 
social etc.
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Dawkins' account has many virtues, but it lacks an 
explanation of the interaction between logic, psychology and 
genetic evolution. In his enthusiasm to show how memetic 
evolution can be independent of genetic evolution, Dawkins 
has overlooked some relationships that can easily explain 
the fluidity of ideological organisations.
2.8.2. Florian von Schilcher and Neil Tennant
The selective filter through which memes must pass 
has both a rational and an emotional component.
And to a certain extent these interpenetrate: as 
Kuhn (1970) pointed out, scientists can become so 
emotionally committed to certain theories that 
they cannot abandon them when they are falsified; 
and almost every reader will have experienced the 
intense emotional and aesthetic pleasure that can 
be derived from artifacts that serve their 
functions perfectly. (Schilcher and Tennant,
[1984], pages 119 to 120.)
Schilcher and Tennant clearly wish to separate the two 
components they see making up the selective filter: the 
emotional and the rational. The large question of the 
irrationality of emotion in ideologies is covered in a 
chapter 3. But several comments are appropriate here.
One could argue that curiosity, the driving force behind 
science, is the emotional aspect of the preference for 
information-rich and truth-like ideas. Emotional and 
rational filters are then not mutually incompatible. Is the 
puzzle-solving that Kuhn emphasizes in science 
nonemotional?; and is the frustration of an attempt to solve 
a puzzle a non-rational filter? Stubbornness born of pride 
or aesthetic attachment to a theory may unintentionally goad 
its critics into producing a much more devastating criticism 
of the theory than they would if its defenders abandon it at 
the first hint of disagreement. A few die-hard theorists may
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be a spring-board for the launch of a very successful and 
popular rival theory.
Schilcher and Tennant allow some "interpenetration" between 
the emotional and the rational. However this may be 
interpreted, it suggests that there are irrational (or at 
least non rational) emotions. I maintain in chapter 3 that 
all emotion is cognitive and all cognition is emotional, and 
more importantly that all our emotions are under the control 
of our theory of the world and our place in it.
Interpreting Schilcher and Tennant sympathetically, one 
might say that emotions less conducive to the search for 
truth may become dominant. They could have mentioned 
Lysenkoism. However, the case of Lysenkoism does not show 
that curiosity, or the preference for information-rich and 
truth-like theories, was completely overwhelmed. I have 
argued that for evolutionary reasons we are creatures of 
curiosity and exploration. But we also tend to promote that 
which is instrumental in the attainment of our goals and 
abandon the futile or uneconmic. It is often thought that 
the two are incompatible, but as I argued in chapter 1, a 
theory is useful because it is close to the truth. The 
Soviet authorities genuinely believed that Lysenko's 
Lamarkism would promote Soviet agriculture. However, 
Mendelian genetics, on account of its greater 
verisimilitude, was also much more useful. Because of this 
and because it became apparent that Lysenkoism had held up 
the development of Soviet agriculture for 30 years, 
Lysenkoism was replaced by its "bourgeois" but much more 
useful, because truth-like, rival.
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2.9. Memetic Evolution of an Ideology
The memetic evolution of an ideology can be broken down into 
the following processes: the occasion, what prompts the 
idea; its emergence; its testing; and its propagation. This 
rough model will summarise our findings so far and help us 
later to analyse the use of immunizing stratagems to protect 
ideologies from criticism (chapter 4).
Occasion
(1) Perception of a problem. Some problems may be simply 
felt, but all problems seem to be capable of being 
formulated. This implies that proposed solutions can always 
be checked against the problem in a publicly inspectable 
way. It is the problem(s) to which a network of ideas is 
addressed that gives those ideas its semblance of a coherent 
whole. The assumptions, themselves quite distinct 
logically, are intended to cooperate in the solution of the 
Problem(s).
Emergence
(2) Half-baked, unjustified, spontaneously generated theory 
to solve problem. The attempted solution, like a variant in 
Darwinian evolution, is not determined by the problem, but 
merely prompted by it. Neither is the theory justified: 
which is not surprising, since no theory can be justified. 
The ideology may use earlier concepts and theories, as 
Marxism drew on French socialism, English economics and 
German philosophy. It may on the other hand, be radically 
new. But in both cases its emergence is beyond scientific 
prediction for both logical and ontological reasons. Popper 
[1957] has argued that it is logically impossible to predict 
new ideas in a scientific way. Popper's argument, roughly, 
is that we cannot predict now what we will only know 
tomorrow. For such a prediction requires that we state the
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knowledge now, so it would be known now and not only 
tomorrow. Popper regards this as a good argument but not 
quite a logical proof, which he supplies elsewhere (Popper, 
[1982], section 22.) Popper's argument can be generalized to 
all new ideas and creations of the human mind. Popper's 
argument, however, does leave room for the prediction of the 
general form of new ideas, or disjunctive predictions in 
which we can say that one of a range of possible ideas will 
emerge. In addition to this logical proof, there are also 
Popper's arguments for ontological indeterminacy (Popper, 
[1990] & [1982].). In this view the world has a chaotic 
element, even though the chaos may have certain constraints. 
In short an ideology has a non-deterministic origin, though 
it may be influenced by certain factors. The import of the 
above is that each ideology lives in a sea of radically 
unpredictable rivals and critics, and in order to survive it 
improvise defences as and when required.
Refinement.
(3) Attempts by intellectuals to generalise, make precise, 
clarify, simplify the theory. Attempts may be made to 
axiomatize the theory, giving it greater information content 
through Watkins's organic fertility requirement. Versions 
with loosely related assumptions will tend to be abandoned. 
All of which, if successful, contribute to the theory's 
survival value, for they make the theory easier to remember 
and communicate (i.e., its copyability is increased). 
Moreover, as explained in connection with Meyerson, there is 
a universal need for simple and general explanations, which 
springs from our instinctive curiosity. One often witnesses 
new theories, prompted by initial success in a narrow field, 
generalised beyond their immediate problem situation. The 
appeal of a simple but comprehensive explanation cannot 
easily be overestimated. As explained in chapter 1 the 
popularity of both religion and science is based on this 
important feature. A conversion experience may be very
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similar to the experience of seeing a good simple 
explanation in the sciences. On the other hand, as an 
unintended consequence, the theory becomes more vulnerable 
to criticism. It is easier to find counterexamples to a 
theory which ranges over many fields, has higher information 
content, than one which has narrower scope. So in being 
given greater copyability it also becomes more vulnerable to 
competing ideas.
Testing
(4) Encounters with criticism. The content and timing of 
criticism is in many circumstances impossible to predict, 
and for the same reasons that new theories cannot be 
predicted. (Marx could not have predicted in a scientific 
way the emergence in the 1870s of the marginal revolution in 
economics, which was to be the strongest criticism of the 
labour theory of value.) The involuntary nature of the 
impact of counterevidence or criticism on beliefs allows 
error elimination to work even on beliefs produced by 
wishful thinking or associated with deep commitments etc. 
Remember that the involuntariness of belief applies in all 
forms of rationality, so this point is quite general and 
applies to all types of criticism.
In The Retreat to Commitment Bartley starts his enquiry by 
assuming that there are systems of ideas that are retained 
regardless of the facts. This is his general position. 
However, when he analyses liberal Protestantism, his case 
study, he finds that it is open to argument, after all. He 
finds that protestant theologians agree on a number of 
criteria of sound criticism. Bartley makes a list of types 
of criticism that no network of ideas can avoid completely. 
In expounding these types of criticism, I will use some of 
my own examples to reinforce the importance of this 
surprising concession of Bartley's.
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(a) Inconsistency. Is the network internally coherent? To 
be more precise, does the system contain at least two 
statements which cannot all be true under any 
interpretation? Leon Festinger, thought by many to have 
provided an irrationalist theory of man faced by 
counterevidence, makes considerable use of a similar notion 
in his idea of cognitive dissonance. Festinger's main point 
is that humans value consistency and will try to change 
their beliefs in order to reduce inconsistency, hardly an 
irrational motive; certainly not a motive that would close 
the belief to criticism.
(b) Empirical refutation. Are there observable 
counterexamples to the system? For example, the price of 
unproduced goods like land are a counterexample to the 
labour theory of value. Even passionately held religious 
systems of ideas can succumb psychologically and 
sociologically to empirical refutation. Festinger, in his 
book When Prophecy Fails. [1956], supplies many examples.
Festinger's theory is often adduced in many arguments in the 
theory of ideology (e.g. Elster; Paul Veyne.). Prima facie 
Leon Festinger's work is contrary to my own, but it is in 
fact in complete agreement with my thesis.
Festinger attempted to show that groups highly committed to 
an idea will often increase their efforts to convince others 
after a disconfirmation of their beliefs. Those who have 
heard of Festinger remember this point. However, it is 
rarely remembered that he goes on to show that with further 
disconfirmation morale drops and the movement disintegrates.
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As Festinger points out, the details of the messianic 
movements he comments on are poorly recorded. However, two 
of the groups that he deals with, the Millerites and the 
Sabbataians, although at first increasing their 
proselytising after initial disconfirmation, disintegrated 
after repeated disconfirmation.
The Sabbataian movement strikingly illustrates the 
phenomenon we are concerned with: when people are 
committed to a belief and a course of action, 
clear disconfirming evidence may simply result in 
deepened conviction and increased proselytising.
But there does seem to be a point at which the 
disconfirming evidence has mounted sufficiently to 
cause the belief to be rejected. (Festinger,
Rieken and Schachter, [1956], page 12.)
Exactly as predicted by this thesis. It may be retorted that 
these are just a few examples conforming to my thesis. But I 
am not looking for confirmation of my thesis, but for a 
refutation of the common idea that if people hold an idea 
with passionate commitment they are thereby closed to 
argument. It is interesting to find refutations of this 
idea in a work held by many to support the irrationalist 
thesis. Furthermore, my intention here is to undermine the 
impression, spread by poor scholarship, that Festinger's 
theory supports the irrationalist thesis, that under certain 
conditions systems of ideas are closed to argument in an 
important psychological sense.
The Jehovah's witnesses are a further illustration of the 
impact of empirical refutation. The Witnesses have made 
numerous predictions for the end of the world, which of 
course have failed. So much is obvious. Few have looked 
closer to discover that the interpretations placed on these 
predictions have been radically changed. For example, when 
the world did not end in 1914 as they predicted the 
witnesses reinterpreted the prediction to mean that "the 
coronation of Jesus Christ in heaven" had taken place in
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that year. The point is that the Witnesses know that the 
predictions have failed and have abandoned the original 
prediction. They are not dominated by blind faith or by 
wishful thinking. Though the movement continues (with a 
doctrine increasingly different to the original laid down by 
Russell Tace Wallace in the 19th Century) thousands of 
individuals are leaving, many because of these failed 
predictions. During 1985 36,638 individuals had to be 
disfellowshipped from the Christian congregation. Here we 
have a clear case of the psychological, sociological and 
logical impact of empirical refutation.
Ignoring the distinctions made in the introduction between 
the movement, doctrine, total membership, and turnover rate 
of members in ideological movements leads to misleading 
comments. For example Wells, while at other points 
admitting the losses that the Jehovahs' witnesses have 
suffered, nevertheless says that
the movement, like many others within and outside 
Christianity, has shown that it can survive 
destructive criticism of any kind by 
reinterpreting the primary data. (Wells, [1988], 
page 14.)
If the rate of gain of new members is at least as great as 
the loss of members, then the movement can survive. But it 
hardly follows that the movement can survive destructive 
criticism that leads to a rate of loss greater than the rate 
of gain. And Wells does not present any argument to show 
that movements can be guaranteed from this sort of 
criticism. Wells fails to put sufficient emphasis on the 
fact that the predictions are being reinterpreted. If he did 
then it would be more apparent that they were being 
abandoned. The strange but true conclusion must be that a 
movement may survive empirical criticism without either its 
members or its doctrine.
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(c) Unscientific. Is the system inconsistent with 
scientific theories?
This form of criticism is so strong that nearly all popular 
networks of ideas ape at least the appearance of science and 
try to find confirmation of their doctrine in scientific 
theories. Their other tactic is to argue that science deals 
with a fundamentally different realm; but they at least feel 
obliged to meet this possible source of criticism. Both 
Marx and Freud saw their theories as scientific, and one of 
the strongest criticisms of their doctrines is that they 
fail to meet scientific standards.
(d) Fails to solve original problem. This form of 
criticism seems to apply to all networks of ideas without 
exception. It can also take the form of comparing the 
relative success of rival ideas in solving the problem. 
Whether the ideas are meant as an empirical description, 
explanation, rhetorical device, to reinforce social 
cohesion, to inflame people's passions etc, they are open to 
criticism in so far as they may fail to satisfy their 
purpose. This is another way of looking at what I earlier 
called instrumental rationality.
Bartley takes the failure to solve a problem as one type of 
criticism. But one might even define criticism in general 
as the assessment of the degree to which a proposed solution 
is a solution to its intended problem. As I have already 
said, all problems can be formulated in a publicly 
inspectable way, and hence both their formulation and their 
intended solutions can be criticised. Some problems are 
extremely difficult to formulate in detail, and Russell was 
keen to point out that, at least in philosophy, getting the 
question right was more important and difficult than finding 
the answer. But even a vague formulation will give 
criticism some criteria to work on.
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Propagation.
(5) The ideas that survive testing are propagated. As I 
have already pointed out, those features that make an 
ideology an appealing explanation - clarity, generality and 
simplicity - also make it easier to propagate. It is at the 
stage of propagation that irrationality is often thought to 
be paramount. Sloganeering, emotionally stirring speeches, 
repetition - the use of advertising techniques - are all 
thought to be evidence of a reduced scope for rational 
criticism. But I argue in chapter 3 that advertising
techniques, the use of rhetorical devices etc., are all 
rational and do not guarantee the message against criticism.
The role of advertising and rhetoric can be understood as 
the production of messages which are (a) attention grabbing 
and (b) memorable. Much of the sinister power attributed to 
advertising by writers such as Vance Packard lies in a 
failure to properly estimate the importance of these 
necessary features of successful advertising. I say 
necessary and not sufficient, because even after having 
contrived the most arousing and memorable form for a message 
it is still an open question whether the audience will agree 
with it.
Both Russell and Le Bon laid great stress on the role of 
affirmation and repetition in accounting for the acceptance 
and propagation of ideas. Moreover, both thought 
affirmation and repetition were irrational. On our theory of 
advertising, however, they simply enhance the memorability 
of the message. The element of truth in Russell's and Le 
Bon's positions is that complex argument does not lend 
itself easily to propagation. It takes longer to transmit 
and is less memorable. However, there is no suggestion here 
that shorter arguments or assertions having been spread by 
affirmation and repetition are more closed to argument.
156
Affirmation and repetition may help spread an ideology, but 
they do not provide a barrier to criticism.
Each of the processes can itself be analysed as 
incorporating these processes, so that, for instance, the 
perception of the problem and an attempt to formulate it may 
itself be subject to refinement and testing. Refinement may 
have its own problems and tests etc. Hence the model 
consists of a number of nested critical feedback loops.
2.10. Explanation of apparent imperviousness of some
ideologies
In chapters 1 and 2 I have tried to show that on Popper's 
principles we should expect all networks of ideas to be open 
to criticism in a logical, psychological and sociological 
sense. That is, that there are no absolute barriers to 
sound criticism. However, this account would be seriously 
flawed if it did not acknowledge the fact that some networks 
of ideas do seem to be closed to argument and which seem to 
persist regardless of the facts presented against them. 1 
will summarize some points made earlier and point to some 
other important factors that explain this apparent absolute 
imperviousness to argument.
2.10.1. The complexity of the learning task.
2.10.2. Importance of values at stake.
2.10.3. Popper's "dogmatism"
2.10.4. Sociologized version of (3)
2.10.5. Early loss of intellectual giants.
2.10.6. Retention of original terminology.
2.10.7. Shame over admitting error.
to • O • 00 • Bad Faith.
2.10.9. Conformity.
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2.10.1.
The complexity of the learning task
No one seems to have noticed that seeing the full import of 
sustained criticism on a complex network like Marxism or 
Freudianism is a complex learning task. These systems take 
a long time to learn and it should not surprise us if they 
take a long time to "unlearn". The transition from say 
Marxist to Classical liberal or the reverse obviously takes 
considerable time and effort.
It is rare for an ideologist to abandon one system of 
assumptions without a substitute. Marxists or Freudians 
cannot be drawn away from these ideas even if they see the 
faults in Marxism and Freudianism, for in the absence of an 
alternative explanation, a false system may rationally be 
preferred as at least an approximation to the truth.
2.10.2.
Stubbornness of Important Beliefs
We have already explained the role of wishful thinking in 
sustaining a belief in a system in the face of 
counterevidence. This obviously contributes to the 
appearance of absolute imperviousness of some networks of 
ideas. Christianity, which involves the promise of heaven 
and the threat of hell has perhaps derived a great deal of 
its staying power from wishful and fearful thinking. From 
our analysis of wishful and fearful thinking we should 
expect this kind of stubbornness to be greater the more 
important the issues at stake are. And, indeed, we do 
observe that religions, which deal with the most important 
values in man's life, are the most stubborn in this sense.
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2.10.3.
Popper's "Dogmatism"
Popper has always maintained that theories should not be 
given up too soon, for their real strength may only become 
apparent at a later stage of the argument. Hence even if a 
Marxist or Freudian encounters overwhelming counterargument, 
it may still be rational to press on with his defence of his 
system.
2.10.4.
Sociologized Popper's "Dogmatism"
There is also a sociologised version of this Popper's point. 
An individual in a movement may have had his beliefs in the 
system severely impaired because he is simply unable to deal 
with the objections he faces. Nevertheless, he may continue 
in the expectation that others in the movement more 
knowledgeable or able will have the right answer. (I owe 
this suggestion to Steele, author of the forthcoming 
Communism: Marx and Mises)
2.10.5.
Loss of Intellectual Giants
There is a tendency for a moribund ideology to become more 
stubborn before it is falls completely in to disrepute, but 
not through any deliberate strategy, but because of a 
sociological effect. Arguments work like judo tricks; the 
more intelligent the opponent the more quickly he will 
succumb to a sound argument. Therefore, with a seriously 
flawed ideology we will expect its intellectual giants to 
leave earlier under the impact of sound criticism. In all 
movements there are a relatively small number of 
intellectual leaders whose views are consulted: (a) in the
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event of threats to the system: to supply defences both 
psychological, logical and sociological.
(b) to interpret new events and problems in the light of the 
system.
When they leave, the movement is liable to lose credibility 
to members and potential recruits. But more to the point, 
the remaining members will give the impression that the 
movement is very stubborn in regard to criticism.
2.10.6.
Retention of Original Terminology
A very important element in the appearance of imperviousness 
is the retention of old terminology. Todays Liberal Party, 
for example, is quite different to the Liberal party of the 
early 18th Century. Meanings and theory change while the 
words linger on for far longer. It is easier to police 
conformity to rules about ritual, ceremony and word-use than 
it is to police conformity in interpretation of these 
symbols. The founding fathers of the orthodox church, 
represented by Ireneous and Turtulian, then later reinforced 
by the council of Nicea, laid great emphasis on the 
observance of certain rituals in contrast to the Gnostic 
heretics who argued for the importance of an intuitively 
grasped spiritual maturity as constituting the essence of 
being a follower of Jesus. This may be the reason why the 
ritual of orthodox Christianity has propagated at the 
expense of the Gnostic's "secret knowledge".
2.10.7.
Shame of Error
When argument does have a psychological impact, even to the 
extent of getting the propagandist to modify his message, he 
rarely announces the fact. People do not like admitting
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error in public. Hence argument often seems impotent even 
when it is successful.
Shame in error need not be a barrier to criticism, for it is 
itself open to criticism. Not being gods we are all liable 
to error. There need only be shame in perpetuating error, 
by keeping the possibly erroneous ideas closed to public 
scrutiny. But that is the last thing a propagandist wants 
to do with his ideas in any case, for they then cannot be 
propagated.
2.10.8.
Bad Faith
I should not ignore the influence of bad faith and 
cowardice. Perhaps in 18th century England, there were many 
intellectuals who disbelieved in Christianity, but 
nevertheless acted to perpetuate Christian belief and 
prevent criticisms of it from being made or heard. They had 
goals other than the pursuit of truth, and they sometimes 
sacrificed the pursuit of truth to those goals. This would 
lead to less people being persuaded against Christianity, 
because the actions of the dishonest or cowardly would mean 
that anti-Christian arguments would not survive, so each 
generation would start afresh, with all the Christian 
arguments well mustered, but the critical arguments lost.
Similar influences probably occurred in Marxism and 
Freudianism. Gellner notes such a case in Freudianism, 
quoting from Anthony Storr's article "The Concept of Cure":
The American Psychoanalytic Association, who might 
be supposed to be prejudiced in favour of their 
own speciality, undertook a survey to test the 
efficacy of psychoanalysis. The results obtained 
were so disappointing that they were withheld from 
publication. (Quoted in Gellner, [1985], page 
161, from Rycroft, ed., [1966], page 58.)
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I suppose the A.P. A. knew that when revealed, this 
concealment of unfavourable evidence could itself serve as a 
strong argument against psychoanalysis, but reasoned that 
this would involve fewer lost believers than publication. 
They may not have realized that such concealed 
counterevidence would acquire greater rhetorical power from 
its very concealment. But at least the concealment shows 
that the A.P.A. recognise the influence of truth, for if it 
were impotent, why conceal it?
However, it is worth pointing out that the originators of 
the most popular ideologies - Marx, Freud etc - have been 
sincere in their beliefs and search for truth. Belief 
provides the strong motivation necessary for the arduous 
task of building up a system over many years, sustaining it 
against argument and propagating it etc.
Mendacity nay serve to propagate sincere beliefs. This may 
seem paradoxical, but let me explain. A Marxist, convinced 
that Marxism is true on the whole, may well lie about what 
he regards as details in an argument in order to propagate 
this doctrine. (I owe this idea to David McDonagh.) He 
reasons that the benefits from the widespread adoption of 
Marxism will more than compensate for relatively small 
errors in Marxism. Therefore this form of mendacity is 
dependent on sincere belief.
The influence of dishonesty or cowardliness must be 
qualified, for it need not prevent the emergence and spread 
of arguments against the relevant doctrine. In the case of 
Christianity, all that the cowardly needed to affirm was 
their belief; intellectual speculation and argument about 
the existence of god etc could then be seen as fairly 
innocent and harmless. David Berman points out that in 
eighteenth century controversy many writers denied that
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atheism was a possible state of mind for a human being, and 
yet went on to argue against it. (Berman, [1988].) 
Dishonesty can work in both directions.
2.10.9.
Conformity
Certain experiments in social psychology have strengthened 
the popular idea that conformity is an overwhelming factor 
making for the preservation of ideologies. The pressure of 
conformity, it is said, can suppress the expression of 
dissent and even control belief; criticism is therefore 
severely limited. Once an ideology is adopted by a large 
number of people, it becomes virtually self-perpetuating; 
indeed it becomes self-reinforcing, because as the number of 
adherents rise the pressure to adhere rises also. This is 
pehaps what Gustave Le Bon was referring to when he spoke of 
the contagion of the crowd. (Le Bon, [1895].)
The most notable experiment is that conducted by Soloman 
Asch. Asch found that when subjects were asked to judge the 
relative length of vertical lines after confederates of the 
experimenter had made their (incorrect) judgement, the 
subjects tended to judge wrongly in agreement with the 
majority. This is how the results of the experiment are 
often reported, but there are very important qualifications 
that are neglected by those who use Asch's experiment to 
support the irrationalist thesis. An example of this 
neglect can be found in Hassan [1988].
The most important qualification is that if the subject is 
presented with only one ally, his tendency to conform to an 
erroneous judgement by the majority is reduced sharply. 
(Asch, [1951], pages 117 - 190.) In addition, if there is 
unanimity, then the size of the group need not be very large 
to elicit maximum conformity. Surprisingly, increasing the
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size of the majority beyond 3 people does not lead to 
increased conformity.
In the original Asch experiment, the subjects had to express 
their judgements in the presence of the majority. There was 
no way, therefore in which to test for sincerity. It has 
been found that a minority's conformity tends to be only 
nominal: the greater the privacy in which to express 
judgements after exposure to a majority the less conformity 
there is. (Morton Deutsch and Herald Gerard. "A Study of 
Normative and Informational Social Influence Upon Individual 
Judgement". Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology. 51. 
1955. pages 629-636; Jane Mouton, Robert Blake and Joseph 
Olmstead. "The Relationship Between the Frequency of 
Yielding and the Disclosure of Personal Identity". Journal 
of Personality. 24. 1956. pages 339-347; Michael Argyle. 
"Social Pressure Upon the Modification and Distortion of 
Judgement". Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology. 54. 
1957. pages 172-175.)
Thus conformity is a factor in the apparent imperviousness 
of an ideology to criticism, but a much overrated influence. 
An ideology will be faced with serious criticism from within 
the ranks if only two of its adherents dissent from the 
ideology, because the leaders cannot suppress it simply by 
appeal to the majority or by increasing its membership.
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Chapter 3 
Ideology and Irrational Emotion
3.1. Ideology and Irrational Emotion.
3.2. Hitler's Theory of Propaganda.
3.3. Intellectual Elites and the Emotional Masses.
3.3.1. Evidence from Psychology.
3.3.2. High Arousal Interferes with Transmission of New, Complex 
ideas.
3.3.3. Intense Emotion Transmits Ideas Already Accepted.
3.4. Suggestion as Simple Groundless Assertion.
3.4.1. Suggestion as Implicit Argument.
3.5. Influencing Versus Determining Public Opinion.
3.5.1. Long-term Propaganda Versus Political Canvasing.
3.5.2. Thinking about Abstract Ideas Versus Thinking in Accord 
with them.
3.6. Fitting the Theory to the Emotion.
3.7. Moral and Amoral Feelings and Factual Assumptions.
3.8. The Relevance of Intense Emotion.
3.8.1. Intense Emotion and the Theory of Advertising.
3.1. Ideology and Irrational Emotion
Can intense emotions associated with ideologies make the 
ideologists irrational and therefore insulated against all 
criticism? And would the ideology then be more likely to 
spread? Almost all writers take the irrationality of 
ideological emotion for granted, but I intend to show that 
the ideologies at issue are rational (though perhaps wrong 
or foolish) and open to argument. The implicit assumption is 
that if ideological emotion is thoughtless and therefore 
independent of theory, then critical argument is irrelevant 
for it has no target. I grant that intense emotion
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engendered by an ideology may impair the appreciation of 
critical argument, but insist that argument is always 
relevant because our emotions are under the control of our 
theory of the world and our place in it. Because our 
emotions have such a theoretical basis, they are subject to 
the rational filters I explained in chapter 2. It makes 
evolutionary sense that our emotions are under the control 
of our theory of the world and subject to the rational 
filters, for how else might they be made appropriate to 
subtle, complex, remote and even merely hypothetical 
circumstances? Inappropriate emotions lead organisms to 
shun the beneficial and embrace the harmful, and as a 
probable, though not necessary, consequence impair genetic 
reproduction. Of course, human beings are foolish, but this 
does not mean that they cannot or are indisposed to correct 
their errors; it only means that they are fallible and may 
take time to readjust their emotions to the facts.
There are two closely associated ideas about the role of 
emotion and morality in the emergence and spread of 
ideologies, both of which are thought to support the idea 
that ideologies are closed to criticism. One is that 
ideologies spring from and thrive on irrational emotions, 
emotions that are not subject to reason, nor abstract theory 
or argument: gut feelings of anger, resentment, envy, greed
etc, unadorned by abstract ideas. In this theory emotion and 
thought are placed in radically different compartments. 
Pareto seems to have held such a theory. Raymond Boudon 
argues that Pareto thought that ideologies were 
rationalizations of feelings.
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Boudon states what he conjectures to be the general argument 
behind Pareto's theory:
(1) people believe in the objective truth of all 
kinds of propositions, both unproved and 
unprovable;
(2) by definition, their conviction cannot be 
founded on the objective truth of these 
propositions;
(3) therefore it must have its basis in an 
irrational act of faith;
(4) which can only be based on feelings. (Boudon,
[1986], page 60.)
Boudon argues that both Durkheim [1915] and Weber [1978] 
also held this sort of theory. He makes a good case that it 
is implicit in Durkheim's discussion of respect for the flag 
(cf section 3.3), but Weber's analysis of respect for 
charismatic leadership attributes a leaders success to his 
followers' assessment of his actual performance (3.5.). I 
will also discuss Minogue's discussion of Bertill Oilman's 
view of the Labour Theory of Value.
The other idea is that what is most important or even 
necessary and sufficient in the emergence and spread of 
ideologies is a high level of agitated, usually violent, 
emotion evoked by the ideologue in potential followers.
Those who espouse this view have in mind the turbulent 
emotions of the parades and rallies that adorn political 
regimes and the riots and assassinations that attend their 
demise. Can the emotions that drive the terrorist to plant 
a bomb, the protester who goes on hunger-strike, and the 
Kamikaze pilot all be rational? Surely, it is thought, 
such emotional people, especially the violent ones, are 
outside the scope of abstract theory and argument, and 
therefore of criticism.
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Even if ideologies appeal to emotions and passionate moral 
aspirations, this is no insurmountable obstacle to abstract 
critical argument. Even the most violent and anti­
intellectual ideologies are steeped in abstract theory and 
argument, and their origin and spread is traceable to 
conspicuously intellectual sources. All the great 
ideological movements have had rather undramatic beginnings 
with the writing of an abstract text by some obscure 
scribbler fascinated by some abstract problem, and they have 
been sustained or demoralized by abstract argument.
The intellectual content of even anti-intellectual 
ideologies is no surprise once it is realized that all 
emotion is cognitive and all cognition is emotional. There 
is no thoughtless emotion, and no emotionless thought 
(sections 3.3.1.). All thoughts, even of particular 
things, can only be constructed from abstract ideas and 
arguments. It seems implausible to suggest that anti­
intellectual ideologies arouse people on account of being 
empty of meaning. One might say that it is hard to avoid 
meaning. Even "nonsense" poetry or humour excites us on 
account of the meaning that we impute to it. Caroll's 
"Jabberwocky", for example, contains many words that are not 
in the dictionary or part of any natural language, yet the 
poem conjures up in our mind all sorts of strange creatures.
Some writers, such as Durkheim, might say that since at 
least some emotion is instigated by particular objects, 
abstract theory is sometimes irrelevant. If this type of 
emotion were responsible for maintaining ideologies, then 
they would be immune to theoretical attacks against the 
emotion. However, Popper has argued that even the 
identification of particular objects involves abstract 
theory that goes beyond the immediate observational data. 
Popper argues that even to describe something as simple and
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concrete as a glass of water involves attributing to it a 
set of dispositions that have not yet been fulfilled:
The statement, "here is a glass of water" cannot 
be verified by any observational experience. The 
reason is that the universals which appear in it 
cannot be correlated with any specific sense- 
experience...By the word "glass", for example, we 
denote physical bodies which exhibit law-like 
behaviour, and the same holds for the word 
"water". (Popper, [1934], page 95.)
This is a broad notion of theory, but it is, nevertheless, a 
defensible one. The extension of the notion of theory is 
parallel to the extension of the notion of information, 
allowing us to speak of computer programs or genes as 
containing information. Indeed, just as the concept of 
information has been severed from its connection with 
language Popper's broad notion of theory allows us to 
conjecture that even a cat and mouse have instinctive 
theories about each other's law-like behaviour, theories 
which guide their responses to one another. A corollary is 
that even if an ideology or some of its components are non- 
linguistic responses to particular objects, as their 
emotional elements might be, a theoretical attack may still 
be appropriate.
My main point is that even if we admit that ideological 
emotion can sometimes spring from particular objects, this 
does not by itself make the ideology immune to theoretical 
criticism. A better example in this context would be the 
statement "This is my Father." A father is clearly a 
particular object that arouses much emotion, but it is a 
particular object that is only understood through a complex 
and not easily testable theory, a theory that goes far 
beyond immediate experience. One can easily see how this 
line of argument can be extended to straightforwardly 
ideological notions such as "Leader", "Follower", "Heretic",
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"Class Traitor" etc,. Thus theories that ascribe the 
success of an ideology to a charismatic leader (cf. Max 
Weber) who arouses deep emotions, or to a particular object 
such as a flag (cf. Durkheim) cannot exclude the relevance 
of theory to that propagandistic success. For it is the 
theories held by the leader's audience that makes him a 
charismatic leader and that endows the flag with its 
emotional significance.
Thus I argue for the Stoic idea that "men are not moved by 
things but by the views they take of them". (Epictetus.)
My position is slightly different, as I argue that the views 
we have of things are at least partly explained by the way 
things are. Therefore the way we feel about things is at 
least partly explained by the way things are. Perhaps 
closer to my position is that of Dubois:
If we wish to change the sentiments it is 
necessary before all to modify the idea which has 
produced them. (Quoted by Beck, [1976].)
I add that changing the ideas is not only necessary but 
sufficient, and moreover is always possible.
It follows that abstract critical argument is always 
relevant. On the other hand, emotion does have an affect on 
the spread of an ideology. Therefore, although truth and 
validity are always relevant they are not the only relevant 
factors. Nevertheless, I argue that the effect of emotion 
on the competitive strength of an ideology can be analysed 
in terms of a basic theory of advertising, and that such an 
analysis shows how it need not be a barrier to criticism.
One may distinguish for the purpose of argument between the 
emergence, maintenance and abandonment of an ideology. Even 
if I concede that ideologies spring from and are maintained 
by noncognitive emotion, I can still argue that critical
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argument can prompt the abandonment of any ideology. 
Maintaining an ideology would then be like the reflex 
function of the heart which continues until voluntary action 
brings it to an end. Some subset of emotions may be like 
the reflex functions of the body: they will control certain 
behaviours without conscious thought, but conscious thought 
can intervene at any moment to override the reflex, just as 
a coughing reflex might be consciously suppressed out of 
etiquette at a concert or a formal dinner.
I think that we must concede that intense emotion may impair 
reasoning, but this does not mean that it eliminates it. 
Conceding an element of the irrationalist case, I grant that 
an argument may engender an emotional attitude so intense 
that some subsequent critical arguments requiring sharp, 
coherent, complex thought become ineffective. But the 
proposer of the irrationalist thesis must grant as common 
observation that intense emotional perturbations cannot last 
a life-time, though a disposition to such emotions may. 
Therefore, there will be times when the appreciation of even 
difficult arguments will not be prevented by intense 
emotion. I also argue (section 3.3.3) that this barrier 
depends on the correct identification of criticism which, as 
I argued in chapter 1, section 1.3.1., is not always easy.
I will centre my discussion on the theories of Hitler, 
Chakotin, and Gustave Le Bon.
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3.2. Hitler's Theory of Propaganda
Hitler held that successful propaganda is based on appeals 
to emotions devoid of abstract content, and in particular to 
agitated or violent emotions. Hitler is worth quoting at 
length since, having achieved power, his views on propaganda 
are probably regarded by many as at least close to the 
truth.
The broad masses of a nation are not made up of 
Professors and diplomats. Since these masses have 
only a poor acquaintance with abstract ideas, 
their reactions lie more in the domain of the 
feelings, where the roots of their positive and 
negative attitudes are implanted. They are 
susceptible only to a manifestation of strength 
which comes definitely either from the positive or 
negative side, but they are never susceptible to 
any half-hearted attitude that wavers between one 
pole and the other. The emotional grounds of 
their attitude furnish the reason for their 
extraordinary stability. It is always more 
difficult to fight successfully against faith than 
against knowledge. Love is less subject to change 
than respect. Hatred is more lasting than mere 
aversion. The driving force that has brought 
about the most tremendous revolutions on this 
earth have never been a body of scientific 
teaching which has gained power over the masses, 
but always a devotion which has inspired them, and 
often a kind of hysteria which has urged them to 
action. (Hitler, [1933], page 283.)
The most successful movements are those with the most 
intense or agitated, abstractionless emotion behind them, 
for these are most lasting intrinsically, and the most 
resistant to any counter-appeals.
I suspect that many theorists have been influenced by this 
view of ideological change. And the view is by no means 
confined to national socialists or even confined to one end 
of the political spectrum.
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Edmund Wilson, famed for his eloquent exposition of Marxism, 
expressed his predilection for a similar theory of 
propaganda and ideology:
You cannot reason an English Tory into a 
conviction that the lower classes are not 
unalterably inferior to the upper; and it would be 
useless to dispute with a Nazi over the innate 
inferiority of non-nordics.11... "you can only 
appeal to them by methods which, in the last 
analysis, are moral and emotional. (Wilson,
[1940], page 389.)
It was purportedly Marx's moral genius , inherited from his 
Jewish background, to have grasped this truth and exploited 
it to the full. The persuasive power of Das Kaoital. we are 
to believe, has no connection with its labour theory of 
value and historical assertions; it lies rather in its 
ability to instil a moral fervour to abolish capitalism and 
institute communism. Zombie-like the proletariat somehow 
acquire from Das Kaoital a hatred for capitalism and on 
they march to the revolution.
It is surprising that so perceptive a political commentator 
as Edmund Wilson should have overlooked the case of 
Gladstone, who was reasoned out of Tory doctrine and into 
Classical liberalism, in which he was to make a large 
contribution.
The idea that one cannot reason with a Nazi or a racist is 
one of the key ideas behind the intimidatory tactics of many 
left-wing student groups. These groups reject free speech 
as an anachronism. Their resort to physically obstructing 
those who want to attend a speech by a racist or chanting 
during such speeches flows from their disillusionment with 
argument. But if argument and reason has nothing to do with 
racism, it is somewhat ironic that they go to so much
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trouble to suppress arguments in favour of racism; or is it 
being suggested that one can be reasoned into racism but not 
out of it? (See section 3.3.2.) When prompted, some members 
of the group suggested that argument was a waste of time 
because racism is instinctive. In this vision Apartheid and 
Nazi Germany are a product of instinct. Racism may build on 
an instinctive suspicion of strangers, but such a suspicion 
is hardly sufficient to explain these particular regimes. 
Such glib attempts to understand a phenomenon they are 
trying to eliminate is probably the sad but predictable 
effect of an inveterate contempt for argument and debate.
To such people, racists are animals without any regard to 
theories and argument and who, therefore, can only be 
opposed by physical obstruction and censorship.
3.3. Intellectual Elites and the Emotional Masses
Hitler did see a role for abstract argument and theory in 
propaganda, but this was confined to the intellectual elite. 
Serge Chakotin, a socialist leader at the time of the Nazis 
rise to power and pupil of the Russian scientist Pavlov, 
held very similar thoughts on political propaganda.
In his study of totalitarian political propaganda, "The Rape 
of the Masses". [1940], Chakotin portrays the masses as 
puppets of leaders, "soul engineers", who supposedly make 
use of suggestion to manipulate them. I argue that several 
defendable interpretations of Chakotin's vague concept of 
suggestion fail to support his theory.
Some of the ideas of Hitler and Chakotin were anticipated by 
Durkheim in 1915 in his book Elementary Forms of the 
Religious Life. Although Durkheim was more concerned with 
the analysis of primitive cultures, he occasionally applies 
his thoughts on totemic religion to phenomena such as the
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glorification of the national flag and charismatic 
leadership. Durkheim's theory suffers from a vague 
distinction between the abstract and the concrete and an odd 
mutant of Pavlov's theory of classical conditioning. Both 
Chakotin's and Durkheim's theories succumb to more recent 
research which has refuted the absolute dichotomy between 
emotion and cognition.
Speaking of suggestion Chakotin says:
The question of suggestion, especially through the 
spoken word, or through any symbol, plays an 
important part here...If we analyse the 
possibilities of resistance to suggestion - a 
question, as we shall see, which is of the utmost 
importance - we find that, apart from pathological 
cases of congenital inadequacy or sickness or 
poisoning, these possibilities are largely a 
function of culture...which makes up the psychical 
mechanism of the individuals concerned. Ignorance 
is the best medium for the formation of masses who 
easily lend themselves to suggestion. This is a 
capital fact in the domain of politics and the 
social order...It is often said that consciousness 
varies inversely with susceptibility to 
suggestion. (Quoted by Harold Walsby in The 
Domain of Ideologies, published in association 
with the Social Science Association by William 
Mclellan, Hope Street, Glasgow, pp. 51 - 52.)25
Chakotin divides communities into two classes: (1), those 
who are largely immune to suggestion but who are receptive 
to theoretical, rational, persuasive argument and to 
doctrine; (2), those who are passive, non-intellectual, 
unobjective or subjective, and greatly susceptible to 
emotion and suggestion. The relative numerical proportions 
of the two classes are 1 to 10 respectively: 10 per cent, 
are active and thinking, 90 per cent, passive and emotional.
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Since there were two sorts of persons, Chakotin reasoned, 
there must be two forms of propaganda:
one addressed to the 10 percent who are 
sufficiently sure of themselves to be able to 
resist crude suggestion, and the other to the 
passive 90 per cent., who are accessible to 
suggestion, especially suggestion working on the 
first (combative) instinct...These two forms of 
propaganda, addressed to these two groups of 
persons, thus differed in principle. The first 
acted by persuasion, by reasoning; the second by 
suggestion, by means of fear, now of its positive 
compliment, enthusiasm or excitement, sometimes 
ecstatic, sometimes furious; these reactions also 
proceeded from the combative instinct. (Ibid. pp. 
53-54. )
Here we see loud echos of Hitler's theory.
Chakotin stresses that the intellectual 10 percent of the 
population require propaganda with an idea behind it because 
they are "immune" to emotional propaganda:
Far be it from us to suggest, indeed, that 
propaganda of any sort can usefully be carried on 
with no idea behind it, merely an appropriate 
technique. The "10 percent." must be enlightened 
and guided by some idea...
(Ibid. p. 54.)
But the 90 percent are converted by purely emotional appeals 
through suggestion, without any idea behind it. Such a view 
is clearly opposed to Epictetus's theory and more in accord 
with those of Pareto, Weber and Durkheim. Chakotin 
constantly refers to the use of "signs" and "symbols" to 
carry through what he calls suggestion. Durkheim's flag may 
be an instance of one of these suggestive, but 
untheoretically interpreted, signs.
Durkheim argues that abstractions are a net hindrance to the 
arousal and maintenance of what we might call ideological 
emotion and behaviour, such as respect for the flag and
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nationalism. Such behaviours, Durkheim argues, are aroused 
not by abstractions but by concrete symbols. The emotions 
that something arouses in us spontaneously attach themselves 
to the symbol that represents them. There are both abstract 
and concrete ways of representing something, but these 
emotions attach themselves more readily to the concrete 
symbols. This is because representing something abstractly 
is labourious and confusing, whereas a concrete symbol is 
simple, definite and easily representable. At this point 
Durkheim introduces an odd assumption to the effect that the 
emotion originally aroused by something attaches itself 
exclusively to its concrete symbol. Thus a country,
Durkheim says, may arouse in someone feelings of loyalty, 
and this feeling will become associated with the country's 
flag and other signs of nationality; but then these feelings 
of loyalty may be completely transferred to the flag and 
other symbols.
Whether one standard remains in the hands of the 
enemy or not does not determine the fate of the 
country, yet the soldier allows himself to be 
killed to regain it. He loses sight of the fact 
that the flag is only a sign, and that it has no 
value in itself, but only brings to mind the 
reality it represents; it is treated as if it were 
the reality itself. (Durkheim, [1915], page 220.)
The flag in Durkheim's analysis is a totemic symbol, which 
is a sign of common moral life and communion. As such 
individuals imbue it with a mysterious force that is felt to 
transcend their society even though it actually receives all 
its apparent power from its capacity to represent society's 
moral force. Durkheim's analysis of the totem is thus 
rather like Feaurbach's analysis of the God of the Christian 
religion, in which God is an unconscious projection of man's 
idealised virtues and power, but is nonetheless felt as a 
transcendent power.
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I think Durkheim has captured some truth about emotional 
symbols. Some symbols are clearly better able to represent 
and arouse emotions. Good novelists are keenly aware of 
this.
Durkheim's analysis of the soldier's behaviour is a little 
unfair as he fails to consider any possible tactical 
rationale behind a perilous or life-sacrificing attempt to 
regain the standard from the enemy. The fate of the country 
perhaps does not depend on who holds a particular standard. 
But winning each battle of a war is partly dependent on 
moral. Seeing the enemy with the flag brings the image of 
defeat to mind. The heroic soldier may be trying to correct 
this demoralising state of affairs. More importantly for 
my case, would the soldier correct his behaviour on 
reevaluating the costs of his action? (I explored this in 
general in chapter 2 in connection with Weber's more 
elaborate scheme.) Even if we make the fantastic assumption 
that the soldier is only concerned with resting flags from 
the enemy, it seems incredible that he would attempt to 
rescue a standard if he thought it impossible or that as a 
remote consequence more flags would fall into the hands of 
the enemy. But in fact soldiers are concerned with other 
possible costs to their action, such as the loss of other 
men, especially in their own company.
The psychological theory behind Durkheim's analysis is 
surprisingly poor. When he talks about a symbol being 
charged with the feeling originally aroused by the object of 
the symbol, one is reminded of Pavlov's theory of the 
conditioned response. But then he says the feeling may be 
completely transferred to the symbol, and for this strange 
assumption he offers no argument. The theory of classical 
conditioning is the most elaborate version of Durkheim's 
sketchy associationist theory of emotion. Let us see how it 
fairs in comparison. In Pavlov's theory the unconditioned
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stimulus remains effective after the conditioned stimulus 
has been made effective. Although Pavlov's theory has been 
refuted in other respects, this implication of Pavlov's 
theory has remained unrefuted and forms part of the current 
theory of conditioning. In conditioning either an 
unconditioned or conditioned stimulus may be used to 
establish a conditioned stimulus. The original stimulus 
could become inactive only if it were not the stimulus to an 
instinctively unconditioned response; that it itself has 
been made effective only through conditioning. But this 
ineffectiveness is brought about by the process of 
extinction, in which the conditioned stimulus is repeatedly 
presented in the absence of the original (conditioned or 
unconditioned) stimulus. But the extinction of a conditioned 
stimulus will transfer to any stimuli that have been 
conditioned with it. Hence if one's emotional response to a 
country depends on a set of unconditioned stimuli that forms 
a part of that country then that country will always have 
this emotional significance; if, on the other hand, these 
stimuli are purely conditioned, then if they become extinct 
any other stimuli associated with them (e.g. a flag) will 
also become extinct. In either case Durkheim's hypothesis 
of a complete transfer of all emotion from the original 
emotional object to its symbolic representation is thwarted.
It is not obvious that more abstract concepts or symbols are 
always more effective in eliciting an emotional reaction 
than less abstract symbols. Extreme fear may be conditioned 
to the very abstract concept of redness. People develop 
phobias about open spaces, itself a fairly abstract concept. 
Neither is it clear that the most difficult concepts to 
fully represent are always the most abstract: it may be 
easier to form an image of the colour green than it is to 
represent to oneself all the important features about one's 
wife, friend or brother, and again these are objects of much 
emotion. We can imagine that changes in some of the
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abstract features of the world would strike terror into the 
most insensitive: if, for example, people could walk through 
normally impenetrable objects. The terror would not be 
lessoned by the fact that these changes are very abstract.
Psychological research, on other animals at least, shows 
that the range of conditioned responses that can be 
established depends on the species of animal. Animals 
display a certain selectivity in which stimuli can be paired 
with which responses. Rats, for instance, will learn to 
avoid saccharine-flavoured water whose ingestion has been 
followed by illness induced by X radiation, but visual or 
auditory stimuli cannot be so conditioned. Contrariwise, an 
avoidance response to electric shocks to the feet can be 
conditioned to auditory and visual stimuli but not to 
saccharine. (Garcia & Koelling, [1966], pages 123-4.) 
Perhaps there is selectivity of emotional learning to 
certain ranges of stimuli in Man, a selectivity which is not 
so easily captured, as Durkheim suggests, in the contrast 
between abstract and concrete concepts. The selectivity in 
man's emotional response may, as with the rats, cut across 
the distinction between abstract and concrete.
Both Chakotin and Durkheim rely on the notion of a purely 
noncognitive emotion, which presumably is equivalent to the 
physiological arousal we associate with emotions. But it is 
hard to see what use purely physiological arousal can be to 
either a politician like Hitler or someone concerned with 
long-term propaganda. If the aim is to induce people to 
organize and work toward a given goal, then simply 
increasing their respiration rate and heart beat etc will be 
futile. If the aim is to spread ideas then, again, a purely 
physiological stimulus with no ideas behind it will be 
useless. A major weakness of Chakotin's and Durkheim's 
theory is that the relationship between emotion and 
cognition is insufficiently explored. In order to assess
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Chakotin's and Durkheim's theory it is appropriate to 
explore this avenue in more detail.
3.3.1. Evidence from Psychology
Experimental research into emotion suggests that in a normal 
state cognition and emotion are invariably connected. 
Everyone agrees that an emotion can involve both 
physiological states - blood pressure, heart rate, 
perspiration etc.- and thoughts, for example, feeling angry 
toward someone for some reason. Now research seems to show 
that these two aspects of emotion can only be separated 
under the influence of drugs or surgery. In these abnormal 
conditions people can for example, know that they are in 
great danger, but remain quiescent; or when injected with a 
drug that causes the above physiological perturbations, 70% 
of subjects report no emotional experience, the rest report 
what may be called pseudo-emotions, that is, they say such 
things as "I feel as if I were angry". (Maranon, [1924].) 
More recently, Schachter and Singer tested the theory that 
both cognition and physiological arousal were necessary for 
a genuine experience of emotion. Simplifying their report 
somewhat, they found that subjects injected unknowingly with 
epinephrine, a drug that stimulates the above physiological 
correlates of emotion by activating the sympathetic nervous 
system, experienced anger or euphoria depending on their 
interpretation of these physiological conditions plus 
environmental clues. Subjects knowingly injected with 
epinephrine and with an explanation of its effects on 
physiology did not experience anger or euphoria. Subjects 
not injected with epinephrine but presented with the same 
environmental clues also did not experience anger or 
euphoria. Both arousal and interpretation were necessary and 
sufficient for emotional experience. (Schachter & Singer, 
[1969], pages 379-99.) Schachter conjectures that arousal 
of the sympathetic nervous system is necessary for emotion
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but does not provide any distinctive cues with which to tell 
different emotions apart. The various emotional states are 
distinguished by our cognitions about the world.
3.3.2. High Arousal Interferes with the 
Transmission of New, Complex Ideas
High levels of arousal will certainly interfere with 
propaganda. Experiments have consistently born out what is 
known as the Yerkes-Dobson law relating learning efficiency 
to degree of cortical arousal, and this law is not dependent 
on the type of learning involved. As arousal is increased 
from a state of sleep performance increases up to an optimum 
point beyond which further arousal leads to a deterioration 
in performance. Plotted on a graph the relationship is 
expressed as an inverted /UUH shape. The Yerkes-Dobson law 
is really a precise statement of common observation. Peopl 
e rarely excel when half a sleep or paralysed by fear or 
anger. It is ludicrous to suppose that Kautsky, Lenin, 
Trotsky, Stalin etc absorbed Marx's writings in a frenzied 
state of emotional arousal. Das Kapital alone takes weeks 
of sober, concentrated reading.
3.3.3. Intense Emotion Transmits Ideas Already Accepted
We must not reject Chakotin's theory without trying 
sympathetically to salvage some truth from it. While high 
arousal may be detrimental to the learning of complex and 
novel ideas, it may assist the transmission or reinforcement 
of simple, more familiar ideas. Experiments have shown that 
the more familiar or simpler the items to be learned the 
higher is the optimum level of arousal. So the 
propagandist's method of whipping up of emotion (and I grant 
that the type may not matter much) could assist in getting 
people to do something simple and / or that they are already
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predisposed to do. The ironic result is that emotionally 
charged speeches are only useful in getting people to act on 
ideas that they already accept or on some watered down 
version of the full-blown doctrine.
Intense emotion may help sustain a position once acquired. 
Racism, for example may be instilled with calm argument or 
assertion, but once acquired may generate intense emotion 
that interferes with the understanding of critical 
arguments. But intense emotion cannot be used in general to 
instil the new idea in the first place (whether this is a 
radically new idea, or a subtle combination of old ideas). 
What the irrationalist thesis gains on the roundabout it 
loses on the slide.
It must be noted, however, that this barrier only applies in 
those cases in which the racist has correctly identified the 
critical bearing of a message. This leaves open the 
possibility that he can learn something that is only later 
identified as having a critical bearing. This is a common 
phenomenon. It is common because almost everyone possesses 
a vast number of moral and factual assumptions about the 
world which cannot themselves be fully surveyed, let alone 
checked for all the implications that would flow from 
combining new ideas and theories in various logical ways 
with them. Simply determining whether c follows logically 
from a theory T is often an extremely difficult task. (See 
chapter 1 and chapter 4 on the unfathomable content of 
theories.)
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3.4. Suggestion as Simple, Groundless Assertion
Chakotin's notion of suggestion is vague, so we can only 
propose alternative defendable interpretations and examine 
each in turn. The notion seems to be open to two 
interpretations: suggestion as groundless assertion, and 
suggestion as implicit argument. On either interpretation, 
however, Chakotin's theory can be undermined.
If suggestion is simple assertion, then it cannot really be 
called non-intellectual, unless Chakotin is stressing a 
matter of degree: that some people are better able and 
inclined to cope with more complex and abstract arguments 
and debate. But in that case the force of his argument is 
vitiated. All explicit arguments are connected series of 
assertions; one could call them complex assertions. In this 
sense reason is still required for interpretation of the 
assertions and there is not a great gulf between argument 
and suggestion. If suggestion is meant to refer to what is 
implied by the propagandist's assertions, then again it 
seems inapt to describe this as non-intellectual or as 
purely emotional, because the implications of an assertion 
are a matter of logic, and the mind's answer, right qr 
wrong, to a problem of logic cannot be reduced to 
physiological arousal, but quite obviously involves 
reasoning. And if it involves reasoning, there is then an 
avenue for criticism to undermine the ideology sustained by 
suggestion.
Western culture is permeated by what Bartley has called 
justificationism, the idea that reason or rationality is 
equivalent to the giving of grounds for one's assertions 
(plus the idea that to criticize a position is to show how 
it violates a standard of justification). (cf. Bartley, 
[1962].) Bald assertions without reasons are taken to be
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less rational or reasonable. This may have been one of the 
ideas guiding Chakotin when he contrasts suggestion and 
reason and Pareto when arguing that if ideologies are 
unsupported by proven propositions they must be supported by 
irrational feelings. Others who have attributed great 
importance to suggestion have explicitly defined suggestion 
in this way. For example, J A C Brown defines suggestion as
the attempt to induce in others the acceptance of 
a belief without giving any self-evident or 
logical ground for its acceptance. (Brown,
[1972], page 25.)
Others have taken the use of simple assertion in propaganda 
as irrational. Bertrand Russell had this to say:
Non-rational propaganda, like the rational sort, 
must appeal to existing desires, but it 
substitutes iteration for the appeal to fact. The 
opposition between a rational and an irrational 
appeal is, in practice, less clear-cut than in the 
above analysis. Usually there is some rational 
evidence, though not enough to be conclusive; the 
irrationality consists in attaching too much 
weight to it. (Russell, [1938], page 144.)
And how are people lead to attach too much weight to it? By 
their desire and the frequent repetition of the message:
Belief, when it is not simply traditional, is a 
product of several factors: desire, evidence, and 
iteration. (Ibid. page 144.)
Pareto went so far as to define ideologies as scientifically 
unprovable positions and therefore based on irrational 
faith, which in turn can only be based on feelings. Behind 
every ideology there are simply feelings, the ideology is 
simply an attempt to rationalize these feelings by invalid 
scientific reasoning. Such spurious reasonings Pareto called 
"derivations11. Pareto thought that people did not want to 
admit that their feelings on an issue were without
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scientific proof because they thought that an unprovable 
position was without authority.
Brown's and Pareto's position is quickly vitiated once it is 
realized that there can be no self-evident grounds for a 
belief or assertion, and in general no certain proof of any 
statement. Moreover, the merit of science does not lie in 
its being able to prove its conjectures, but in its being 
able to offer better explanations of the world. Popper and 
Bartley have argued that there are no self-evident grounds 
for any belief. The idea of self-evidence was introduced to 
avoid the main problem of justificationism. If every 
assertion has to be justified then there is no end to 
justifying any assertion since the assertion provided to 
justify the first assertion itself requires another for its 
own justification, and so on (see section 1.2.2.). The 
notion of self-evidence was meant to stop this infinite 
regress. But no candidates for self-evidence have survived 
a critical examination. Intuition is liable to error and 
perception is liable to illusions and hallucinations. Even 
work in mathematics and logic is hypothetical, since one 
never knows what one has overlooked. All positions are 
incorrigibly hypothetical; as Xenophane said: everything is 
but a woven web of guesses.
It follows that Chakotin's division of the community into 
those susceptible to and those not susceptible to suggestion 
collapses if suggestion is defined simply as the assertion 
of some position, for as we saw in chapter 1, all argument 
(no matter how complex) must take some assumptions for 
granted.
Russell's position does not rely on the notion of self- 
evidence, but of rationally apportioning weight to evidence. 
It is thought that to have one's beliefs grow stronger or 
weaker in proportion to one's desire is irrational.
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However, if one views wishful (and fearful) thinking as a 
way in which we can pursue our goals more efficiently, the 
appearance of irrationality dissolves (section 2.4.).
Humans, like other animals, seek their goals by producing 
and testing hypotheses about the world. Because we are 
fallible and are liable to make mistakes not only in our 
initial hypotheses but also in assessing the evidence 
provided in the tests (e.g., we may wrongly interpret the 
non-sighting of some prey as the non-existence of prey in 
the neighbourhood) we might attain our objectives if we hold 
on to our beliefs even in the face of some apparent counter­
evidence. If our ancestors had been disposed to give up 
their search for food or shelter at the first disappointed 
expectation, they would not have been our ancestors.
3.4.1. Suggestion as Implicit Argument
We could also interpret Chakotin's suggestion as referring 
to the fact that, particularly among those with little 
interest in ideas, much argument remains at an implicit 
level. Often, one or more of the premises of an argument 
will be left unspoken, the speaker leaving it up to his 
listener to supply the suppressed premise(s). The speaker 
may even neglect to assert the conclusion, again leaving it 
up to the listener to supply the suppressed item. Either of 
these omissions may be for rhetorical effect or simply 
convenience. Now in all of this reason is evidently needed, 
albeit operating covertly.
But one might still ask if the suppressed premises are 
protected from criticism on account of being hidden from 
view? This is unlikely, as they are unvoiced precisely 
because both parties know that both parties accept them; 
each knows what the other is thinking. But what of 
outsiders, potential new converts? They are ignorant of the 
suppressed items and so communications directed at them
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cannot make use of them. Hence we have the paradoxical 
conclusion that suggestion cannot be used to obtain new 
recruits to the movement. They cannot easily be transmitted 
outside the initiated to a wider public, so any ideology 
that assumes this form will run a grave risk of extinction. 
Moreover, it is more difficult to police implicit 
assumptions and interpretations, which may then easily stray 
from the original position. So although they may be safe 
from outside criticism, they are also safe from maximum 
propagation and are subject to transmission errors within 
the initiated. Such is the logic of the propagandist's 
situation.
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3.5. Influencing versus Determining Public Opinion
Chakotin's idea that the masses are the puppets of their 
leaders, of their "soul engineers", seems to be a gross 
exaggeration. A more defensible position is that the 
authority that any leader has is imputed to him by his 
followers by virtue of a theory they hold about him, and the 
"followers" accept or reject commands from the leader in 
accord with this theory. Moreover, this theory is open to 
revision in the light of arguments and experience, both 
moral and factual. This position is in accord with the 
modern economic theory of democracy.
Boudon assumes that both Durkheim and Weber agree that 
charismatic leadership overrides reason. However, Weber's 
position is closer to my own since he attributes a leader's 
authority to his actual performance: if the leader fails to 
lead his followers to victory or to prosperity etc., his 
authority will be taken away from him by his disappointed 
followers:
He must perform miracles if he wants to be a 
prophet, acts of heroism if he wants to be a 
leader in war. Above all his divine mission must 
"prove" itself in that those who entrust 
themselves to him must prosper. If they do not, 
then he is obviously not the master sent by the 
gods. (Weber, [1922], page 229.)
As an example, Weber cites the Chinese Monarch's extreme 
deference to his people, sometimes shown by commiting 
suicide, on failing to extricate his people from a calamity 
such as a flood or defeat in war.
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Durkheim's almost mystical position can be taken as 
representative of theories attributing charismatic 
leadership to factors impervious to reason:
We say that an object, whether individual or 
collective, inspires respect when the 
representation expressing it in the mind is gifted 
with such a force that it automatically causes or 
inhibits actions, without regard for any 
consideration relative to their useful or 
injurious effects. When we obey somebody because 
of the moral authority which we recognize in him, 
we follow out his opinions, not because they seem 
wise, but because a certain sort of physical 
energy is imminent in the idea that we form of 
this person, which conquers our will and inclines 
it in the indicated direction. (Durkheim, [1915], 
page 207.)
At least Durkheim, unlike Chakotin, recognizes that moral 
authority is given by the follower and not imposed on him by 
the leader. Durkheim fails to analyse what this "idea that 
we form of the person" may amount too.
Boudon agrees with Durkheim's analysis, adding the 
qualification that the feeling of respect for a leader may 
have something to do with his message. Nevertheless, Boudon 
says, what is said is believed because it is the leader who 
says it, and this is because leaders are often thought to be 
infallible. (Boudon, [1986], page 56.)
I have already dealt in chapter 2 with the general question 
of whether humans can act without regard to the feasibility 
and costs of their actions. However, we might ask whether a 
command from a charismatic leader would always be obeyed if 
either the follower thought that obeying it would render him 
incapable of obeying any more commands or he thought that 
the command conflicted with another command, or that obeying 
it would endanger his chosen leader. Given conflicting
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commands, the follower must make the choice by himself since 
there can be no reliance on command.
As I argued in the introduction, even identifying a leader 
is a theoretical achievement. Whether someone is the leader 
is a question that cannot be settled conclusively on 
immediate inspection, and certainly not just on his say so, 
just as identifying one's father is a theoretical 
achievement whose implications go far beyond even a complete 
physical description. Boudon admits that if the Ayatollah 
Khomeini were to repudiate Islam his authority would suffer. 
But he could lose his authority if people simply thought he 
was an impostor. If the person called "Ayatollah Khomeini" 
were discovered to be an impostor, a finding that might 
require very subtle, abstract detective work, his authority 
over "his" people might vanish.
A difficulty for the almost mystical theory of charismatic 
leadership is that the authority of a leader is always 
circumscribed to a particular field of competence, something 
of which Weber was aware. The Pope or the Ayatollah would 
not be asked for their opinion on car maintenance. Their 
judgement on matters outside their ascribed field is not 
thought to be privileged or special. This is easily 
explained on the assumption that we choose leaders on the 
basis of a theory about them and their abilities.
Clearly, if one leader could determine the opinions of his 
audience, then there would be no room for contrary views, 
for criticism. Some small communities might approach this 
state of affairs. In 1978 more than 900 people died in Jim 
Jones's Jonestown, Guyana. At first it was thought that 
they had all committed suicide on Jones's command as part of 
a religious ritual. This alleged mass suicide has 
strengthened many in the belief that charismatic leaders can 
completely control the minds of their followers. However,
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this initial theory has been undermined. Some have argued 
that no more than 2 00 died voluntarily, the rest being 
murdered by the administration of poison in to the upper arm 
in a position that it would have had to have been 
administered by someone else. Tape recordings of the 
killings also support this interpretation. (Barker, [1989], 
page 54.) But even if one accepts that all the members 
committed suicide on Jones' command, it does not follow that 
he controlled their minds. One could argue that the 
followers of Jones already shared much of his world view 
before they joined the Peoples' Temple and that his 
influence consisted principally in channelling these beliefs 
into certain activities.
Moreover, even if an individual can control the minds of a 
thousand people, no leader could ever be so influential as 
to determine the opinion and feelings of millions of people, 
even if we confine ourselves to matters of important 
governmental policy. The turn-of-the-century German Social 
Democrats illustrate this ineradicable intransigence of the 
"masses". The German Social Democrats were lead by Marxists 
but the mass of social democratic voters reserved some 
opposition to their leaders despite their support of the 
party. The Marxists advocated proletarian internationalism 
and an opposition to war, but the rank and file were no less 
nationalistic than the voters of other parties in Germany 
and elsewhere, and some were quite prepared to die on the 
battlefield for their nation. Again, the overwhelming 
majority of politicians and opinion leaders in Britain for 
decades have been strongly against capital punishment; but 
the majority of the population have steadfastly favoured it.
Still, there is some truth in the important role that 
Chakotin attributes to intellectuals, but it is not simply 
in converting other intellectuals (the 10%) to new ideas.
The truth is that the ideas of intellectuals form the
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framework, the background assumptions, in terms of which the 
masses identify, interpret, accept and reject leaders and 
their messages. Walter Laqueur in his book on the Weimar 
Republic mentions that views similar to National Socialism 
were popular in the universities before they became 
generally popular. Hayek makes the same point in his The 
Road to Serfdom. [1944]. In general as Keynes said:
The ideas of economists and political 
philosophers, both when they are right and when 
they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly 
understood. Indeed the world is ruled by little 
else. (Keynes, [1936], page 383.]
3.5.1. Long-term Propaganda versus Political Canvasing
Hitler, Edmund Wilson and Chakotin were lead into their 
position on the immutability of political beliefs because 
they took the politician's view of ideological change: from 
one election to the next there is little fundamental change 
in peoples' views and values. The politician's aim is power 
for his party at the next election. There is no time to 
change public opinion on fundamentals, so his only 
alternative is to try and convince the public that he 
already holds their views and that his party will most 
effectively implement them. The politician operates on a 
stage already fitted-out by a long process of abstract 
intellectual argument. Politicians who have flouted this 
constraint, who have been more concerned with promoting an 
unpopular opinion, have suffered a loss of actual power. 
Enoch Powell, Goldwater and McGovern are politicians who 
have forsaken power for their greater concern with trying to 
persuade the public of their policy ideals. On the other 
hand, Johnson, Heath, Harold Wilson and Nixon, all of whom 
adapted to public opinion rather than try to change it, were 
notably more successful at gaining power. Now that he is no 
longer in the race for leadership Heath is now more
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concerned with long term objectives, such as a federal 
European state.
This view of the behaviour of politicians is borrowed from 
the new economics approach to politics, substantially 
developed in the University of Virginia, particularly by 
Gordon Tullock. (cf. McKenzie & Tullock, [1975] & Tullock, 
[1976].) In this model voting and buying are seen in the 
same light: the same man behaves in an economic way whether 
in the supermarket or the voting booth; he will choose the 
product or candidate he thinks is the best bargain for him. 
Seen in this light, Enoch's, Goldwater's and McGovern's 
approach to politics is like trying to sell the Ford Edsell 
and the new version of Coke long after they flopped. Of 
course, political policies do not strictly coincide with 
popular opinion, as the earlier example of capital 
punishment shows, but unlike Chakotin's theory, the 
Virginian theory does not have to assume that there is 
strict control running from the controllers (in the 
Virginian School, the voters) and the controlled.
Edmund Wilson's Nazi and Tory were reasoned into their 
positions. Decades of abstract argument by intellectuals 
such as Oswald Spengler, Werner Sombart, and Friedrich List 
preceded and made possible Hitler's rise to power. The 
German people have been depicted as puppets of Hitler's 
emotionally stirring speeches. But perhaps Hitler was 
expressing in a clear, simple and dramatic way what had 
already become the predominant ideology. It may have been 
this facility to express the "common sense" of his time that 
made his speeches so stirring. Hitler gained power because 
he was able to convince the German electorate of his 
superior ability to govern in accordance with goals and 
theories that they had already embraced, not because he was 
able to excite an agitated cocktail of thoughtless emotion, 
or because he was able, single handedly, to inculcate in a
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few years in the minds of millions the ideas behind National 
Socialism.
3.5.2. Thinking About Abstract Ideas versus 
Thinking in Accord with them.
Durkheim's, Chakotin's and Hitler's intuition that there is 
an important difference between the ideologue and the broad 
masses in their attitude to abstract ideas was right but 
inaccurate. The masses are indeed poorly acquainted with 
abstract ideas, but it does not follow that they do not 
think in accord with them. Many of the concepts and 
presuppositions that we take for granted in daily life are 
susceptible to quite complex and intricate analysis.
Everyone uses numbers to count their groceries without 
having to understand Russell's definition of a number in 
terms of the number of a given class: the class of all
classes similar to the given class.
The same point can be applied to more emotive concepts.
While democracy, patriotism and leadership, etc., are for 
the broad masses abstract principles they take for granted 
as means for solving social problems, for the ideologue, 
democracy etc., themselves are objects of thought and 
argument.
On the other hand, one could argue that the broad masses are 
more familiar with the abstract notion of democracy than 
with the particular institutions that effect it. Few 
Britons could explain how Parliament operates, but everyone 
is able to state that democracy is the rule of the majority. 
This is a problem for a Durkheimian theory for it would 
imply that if given a choice between the concrete (totemic) 
parliamentary building and abstract democracy, the populace 
would automatically opt for the building (itself absurd) 
because, in Durkheim's theory, the particular object is more
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familiar and easier to represent than an abstract 
characterization of it.
3.6. Fitting the Theory to the Emotion
A more recent exponent of the theory that the emotion and 
morality in ideologies is prior to and independent of theory 
is Minogue. (Alien Powers. [1984].) Minogue's theory, 
however, differs from that of Durkheim, Chakotin's and 
Hitler's in that it attributes a greater role to theory.
It is similar to Pareto's theory of rationalization.
Minogue argues that it is moral censure that engenders the 
Marxist's acceptance of the labour theory of value, not the 
other way round. The Marxist hates capitalism anyway, with 
or without the economic theory. The labour theory of value 
is just consonant with the prior feeling that capitalism is 
exploitative, and the Marxist adopts it despite the fact 
that
An inquirer who discovers realities deserving of 
censure is more impressive than a censor who picks 
and chooses his theories to support his emotions.
(Ibid. p. 58.)
The rich have throughout history been censured for greed, 
luxury, idleness and much else. The ideologist simply picks 
and chooses his theories to fit these emotions. Therefore, 
even if the theory succumbs to criticism, the moral censure 
will prevail; censure survives theory.
196
Minogue illustrates his point with the labour theory of 
value. He quotes Bertil Oilman:
The labour theory of value forces the capitalist 
to justify his role and the benefits he receives 
in a context where no justification is possible.
It puts him in a corner from which there is no 
escape other than the practical one of keeping the 
workers from realizing their situation. (Ibid. p.
57.)
Minogue attempts to show how confused such a position is.
The labour theory of value, Minogue points out, is normally 
advanced as a scientific account of reality, revealing the 
laws of motion of capitalist society. But, Minogue 
continues, laws of motion are no basis for an indictment; on 
the contrary they render both indictment and justification 
logically pointless.
The term "capitalist", Minogue says, has acquired an 
ambiguous meaning. In one sense it refers to a social type 
created by the inexorable laws of social evolution; in the 
other sense it refers to the class of employers who have 
been caught out committing the crime of robbery. Oilman's 
certainty that no justification is possible derives from the 
supposedly scientific theory connected with the first sense; 
it is the second, quite different and incompatible theory, 
that makes it appear to Oilman that indictment is at all 
meaningful in this context.
Is it true, as Minogue asserts, that a scientific law cannot 
in principle be the basis for an indictment? The following 
syllogism might be taken as a possible counter-example:
Anything that necessarily involves unpaid labour 
should be swept away;
Capitalism necessarily involves unpaid labour; 
Therefore, capitalism should be swept away.
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Compare this with a feminist argument:
Anything that necessarily involves patriarchy
should be swept away.
Capitalism necessarily involves patriarchy.
Therefore, capitalism should be swept away.
Each of these is a valid argument. One of the premises must 
be a value judgement, but it still seems to be a counter­
example to Minogue's assertion. The point is that the law­
like statement, the second premise, makes it possible to 
validly infer the moral conclusion, which is an indictment.
Perhaps Minogue's point is that an indictment presupposes 
that the indicted could act differently, and so cannot apply 
to strictly inevitable behaviour. However, Minogue does 
speak of laws as such, not of statements of inevitable 
developments. (However, if the Marxist abandons his talk of 
inevitability, and instead talks of laws in a scientific 
sense, then indictments are not strictly futile.
Indictments may be considered as part of the initial 
conditions determining human behaviour. By taking certain 
drugs one places oneself under the influence of certain laws 
of physiological psychology which predispose one to 
aggressive behaviour. But it is still quite appropriate for 
others to censure me, if the censuring is thought likely to 
stop me taking the drug in future.)
Vacillation between one interpretation and the other helps 
to deflect criticism, but the rhetorical impact of Minogue's 
analysis of the ideologists manoeuvres should not be 
underestimated. Oilman may well succumb to Minogue's 
dissection. Still, Minogue contends that even if Oilman's 
confusion were cleared up and he were also convinced that 
the labour theory of value is false, his censure of 
capitalism would survive. There is some truth in Minogue's 
position. George Bernard Shaw was persuaded of the falsity
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of the labour theory of value, but his repugnance for and 
censure of the capitalist continued, albeit as a non-Marxist 
socialist. Two more recent examples are the Marxists John 
Roemer and Ian Steedman:
...the labor theory of value was intended to 
emphasize the fact that capitalists exploit 
workers in a capitalist system. Although the 
labor theory of value is false, I think the 
conclusion is true. (Roemer, [1988], page 2.)
Roemer entirely discards the classic Marxist definition of 
exploitation in terms of surplus value and instead defines 
exploitation in terms of the inequality of outcome 
associated with the unequal ownership of property.
Steedman has explicitly rejected Marx's theory on the 
grounds that even if Marx had succeeded in transforming 
input prices his argument is internally inconsistent. 
Steedman has opted for the theory developed by Straffa, in 
which the conditions of production and the real wage paid to 
workers, both specified in terms of physical quantities of 
commodities, suffice to determine the rate of profit. In 
this model labour values are not proportional to prices, and 
neither is the total surplus value equal to total profit.
The connection with exploitation in Steedman's eyes, like 
Morishima's, is retained because in Sraffa-like models it 
can be shown that profit will be positive if and only if 
there is surplus value, i.e. capitalist exploitation. 
(Steedman, [1977].)
But is it true that the censure would survive the demise of 
any theory? Popper has emphasized that our empirical 
experience is theory impregnated. But equally, theoretical 
interpretation also pervades all our moral experience. It 
is sometimes difficult to point to the exact theory that 
lies behind a moral position, if only because people's
199
avowed reasons for holding a position are not always the 
same as the real reasons. Matters are further complicated 
by the fact that in many cases an emotion is supported by 
more than one theory. It might be that though the emotion 
can prevail in the absence of one or more of its theoretical 
supports, it cannot prevail if they all collapse. 
Nevertheless, in saying this it is admitted that the reasons 
are there. Through this admission we again have an avenue 
for the impact of theoretical criticism.
Although Minogue may have represented accurately later 
Marxist intellectuals, he fails to capture one of the 
reasons behind the original Marxist repugnance towards 
capitalism. What offended Marx and Engels most about 
capitalism was that it is unplanned, a conspicuously 
intellectual complaint. There is a lot of planning within 
the market, for instance in the way labour was organised 
within each factory, but there is no overall planning. Each 
car company might plan to make a certain number of cars per 
year, but the total number of cars produced in any one year 
is not planned. To Marx this was irrational, and socialism 
would replace this anarchy of many plans with a rational 
system based on a single plan. This attitude explains why 
they saw a trend to larger companies as a welcome move 
toward socialism. The cartels or "trusts" that Engels 
witnessed toward the end of the nineteenth century were the 
germ of socialism within a moribund capitalism. The labour 
theory of value is perhaps an attempt to give some 
theoretical embroidery to the already existent feeling that 
the wealthy exploit the poor. The wealthy, as Minogue says, 
had always been censured for this, but they had rarely been 
censured for being disorganised before. Such a complaint 
bears little kinship with the much more spontaneous 
untutored envy that Minogue speaks of; Marx's complaint 
requires more intellectual sophistication. (On this 
neglected aspect of Marx's thought see Steele's forthcoming
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Book, Marx and Mises; Socialism and Economic Calculation. 
Open Court.)
Minogue's account makes a mystery of the ideologist's use of 
theory, for if the requisite emotions exist willy nilly, why 
bother with the theoretical embroidery? To appear academic 
or scientific, perhaps, and thus steal some of the authority 
of academia and science. But does not the authority of 
science derive from its success at discovering truths? 
Perhaps truth, and thus reason, is important to ideologies, 
after all. Now if one grants that theory lies behind all 
our moral and emotional experience, then why not take the 
Labour Theory of Value as at least one of the factual 
theories behind the Marxist's rejection of capitalism?
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3.7. Moral and Amoral Feelings and 
Factual Assumptions
Marx's and Engels' advocacy of communism is based on the 
theory that it is possible. Thus Roemer clearly takes this 
for granted when he says that
The private property system is just one possible 
way of organising economic activity; it may have 
been the best way for a certain period but is 
probably not the best way today, nor will it be in 
the future. (Ibid. page 11.)
This is typical of moral ideals: they are rarely advocated 
if they are thought to be unattainable. Some ideals are 
advocated as goals to be approximated, but if they could not 
even be approximated the injunction would lapse. Even the 
advocacy of ideals in a cynical manipulative manner is based 
on certain factual assumptions.
All moral and amoral feelings are based on factual 
assumptions. All cognition is emotional and all emotion is 
cognitive. Emotions such as anger, love, disgust etc have 
objects to which they are directed by thought. One does not 
simply feel anger, one feels angry about some object of 
one's thought. The fact that someone holds an emotional, 
perhaps even violent, position does not mean he is 
irrational: for these emotions are under the control of that 
person's conjectures about the factual state of the world.
As David Hume put it:
The moment we perceive the falsehood of any 
supposition, or the insufficiency of any means our 
passions yield to our reason without any 
opposition. (Hume, [1739], page 158.)
If a Marxist is convinced by argument that the market system 
is not the cause of poverty, or of the other things he 
loathes, his righteous anger against the market will
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subside. The moment the Marxist is convinced that communism 
is impossible his ardour for revolution will wane (unless, 
of course, the revolution becomes a means to other ends, but 
then the same argument applies to these new ends). To obtain 
the Marxist's approval of or resignation toward capitalism 
it need not be denied that capitalism exploits workers, for 
there may be no better alternative. To return to our 
syllogistic moralizing, one might have the argument:
Anything that involves murder should be abolished.
Society involves murder.
Therefore, society should be abolished.
Of course, no one is going to suggest that we all 
voluntarily kill ourselves or live as hermits. A certain 
amount of unpreventable murder is accepted as a necessary 
price for all the benefits of living in societies, along 
with the possibility of contracting contagious diseases etc. 
So we may conclude that the Marxist's argument, even if it 
did establish that capitalism were exploitative, would not 
be conclusive. One would have to look at his alternative.
So Oilman is wrong to say that the defender of capitalism is 
Min a corner" without any escape but deception.
If all emotions are cognitive, it follows that if ideologues 
succeed by appealing to emotions, they must do so by 
appealing to reason. But they can only do that through 
theory and argument. As a corollary, the fact that 
ideologies are based on emotion does not protect them from 
factual criticism.
The only possible counterexamples that I have been able to 
think of to the theory that all emotion is cognitive are 
perhaps moods and the psychological states brought on by 
certain drugs (e.g. Caffeine apparently induces anxiety).
It is hard to imagine caffeine having anything to do with 
the acceptance or rejection of an ideology. A mood can be
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understood as a succession of similar thoughts. For 
example, a depressed mood is a series of depressing 
thoughts. Alternatively, a mood may be interpreted as a 
disposition to entertain emotions of that mood because of 
some temporarily accepted theory which colours a person's 
interpretations of events. It is not uncommon for people 
who have been burgled, for instance, to find themselves in a 
depressed mood, and this because of a temporarily lowered 
opinion of people in general.
The moral element to ideological systems might seem to rule 
out factual criticism right from the start. The Fascist 
feels that the state is morally good; the anarchist feels 
the state is morally bad: and that is an end to the matter. 
Many philosophers have denied any logical connections 
between moral and factual claims. They have taken to heart 
Hume's conclusion that no moral position can be logically 
derived from a factual statement.
Many have gone as far as to endorse G.E. Moore's verdict 
that
No truth about what is real can have any bearing 
upon the answer to the question of what is good in 
itself. (Princioia Ethica. [1903], page 118.)
Hume's conclusion still stands, and so does Moore's verdict. 
Suppose it had been established that humans are 
instinctively prone to aggression; it would not follow 
logically that humans ought to be aggressive. Equally, if 
they were shown to be instinctively communal; this would 
not license the logical derivation of the idea that humans 
ought to be communal. However, we have no reason for 
concluding that facts have no logical bearing whatsoever on 
moral positions. Although no moral position can be derived 
from factual statements, facts may undermine moral 
injunctions.
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If one advocates communism and communism, however defined, 
happens to be impossible, then one's moral injunction is 
undermined by the facts. The injunction that one ought to 
help bring communism about seems to imply that one can 
actually contribute to its emergence, and is therefore 
undermined by the impossibility of complying with it. In 
many cases "ought" seems to imply "can". Bartley supplies 
an instructive example:
Suppose that it is argued that one ought not to 
punish criminals but to treat them all 
psychologically in order to cure them of criminal 
tendencies. To this proposal it is retorted that 
"ought" implies "can", and that there exist some 
criminals - for example those with certain genetic 
defects - whom it is impossible to cure by 
psychological treatment. The example is not 
fanciful: the XYY chromosomal abnormality has been 
widely associated by researchers with criminal 
behaviour and/or low intelligence in adult males; 
and recent studies show that one male in every 300 
may be born with just this abnormality. This 
factual information, which bears logically on the 
original proposal for a different public policy, 
will if taken seriously lead to a modification of 
the proposal. Thus Dr Park S Gerald of the has 
urged that a large scale study of XYY incidence 
should be done because "a great deal of social 
planning could be related to this. These people 
(with XYY syndrome) might still get into trouble 
despite present welfare programs. (Bartley,
[1962], page 200.)
Still, Moore's position represents a problem for my approach 
since it would imply that different ideologies simply have 
fundamentally different values. There are ends of human 
action and there are means to those ends. One can argue 
about the correct or most efficient means to a given end, 
but when it comes to those given ends themselves, there is 
no fact of the matter.
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My answer to this problem is as follows. The adoption of a 
moral end is like the adoption of a factual position in this 
respect: they are both conjectures. In the one case we 
guess what is true; in the other case we guess what is 
morally good. In either case we can be wrong. (The idea 
that morals are conjectures is neutral as to whether morals 
are feelings, tastes, or objective realities.) How do we 
check our guesses? Well , in the case of factual guesses, 
we can compare what we think with the world in observation 
and experiment. Perhaps we cannot do this with moral 
guesses, but we can compare one guess with another to check 
for coherence. We can also check the costs of each moral 
value in terms of the others. Often the relationship 
between our morals and our factual assumptions is not 
obvious and needs an argument or a different perspective to 
bring it to light. For example, Roemer concentrates on the 
alleged greater inequality of income and ownership in 
capitalism on the assumption that this is the decisive issue 
between capitalism and socialism. (Ibid. page 3.) In taking 
this approach he neglects to examine an unconscious 
assumption: that inequality and poverty go hand in hand.
This explains why he fails to consider the following moral 
choice between two types of society: a society of great 
inequality and a society of great equality, but whose 
poorest (or average) are even worse of. The type of society 
that produces the greatest inequality may also be that which 
lifts the poorest (and/or the average) the highest. If this 
relationship does hold then any choice between the societies 
would have to check the cost of each of two moral values in 
terms of the other: the marginal cost of an increment in 
equality in terms of a loss of income on the part of the 
poorest (or the average). My point is that any such 
balancing of moral values depends on the assumption that 
their satisfaction in reality is related, and that this 
makes relevant factual criticism of a moral position.
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Another answer is to point out that there are no fundamental 
differences in values. What are taken as fundamental 
differences in values are differences of opinion on factual 
matters. Why should we adopt such a position, since it 
seems to fly in the face of the myriad varied religions, 
moralities and political positions that we see in the world? 
Such a position will appear less strange once we bear in 
mind that all human beings evolved from the same ancestors, 
and although their anatomy and physiology varies, along with 
their tastes, their most urgent values are the same the 
world over. Ludwig von Mises argues that all peoples have 
the most urgent values in common:
This fundamental fact is often ignored. People 
believe that differences in world view create 
irreconcilable conflicts. The basic antagonisms 
between parties committed to different world 
views, it is contended, cannot be settled by 
compromise. They stem from the deepest recesses 
of the human soul and are expressive of a man's 
innate communion with supernatural and eternal 
forces. There can never be any cooperation between 
people divided by different world views. However, 
if we pass in review the programs of all parties - 
both the cleverly elaborated and the publicized 
programs and those to which the parties really 
cling when in power - we can easily discover the 
fallacy of this interpretation. All present day 
political parties strive after the earthly well­
being and prosperity of their supporters. They 
promise that they will render economic conditions 
more satisfactory to their followers. With regard 
to this issue there is no difference between the 
Roman Catholic Church and the various Protestant 
denominations as far as they intervene in 
political and social questions, between 
Christianity and the non-Christian religions, 
between the advocates of economic freedom and the 
various brands of Marxian materialism, between 
nationalists and internationalists, between 
racists and the friends of interracial peace. It 
is true, that many of these parties believe that 
their own group cannot prosper except at the 
expense of other groups, and even go so far as to 
consider the complete annihilation of other groups 
or their enslavement as the necessary condition of 
their own group's prosperity. Yet, extermination
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or enslavement of others is for them not an 
ultimate end, but a means for the attainment of 
what they aim at as an ultimate aim: their own 
group's flowering. If they were to learn that 
their own designs are guided by spurious theories 
and would not bring about the beneficial results 
expected, they would change their programs.
(Mises, [1949], pages 180 - 181.)
However, Mises did not explain why this should be so. 
Darwinian theory combined with the common origin of the 
world's races would seem to suggest that all humans should 
have broadly the same set of urgent wants and dislikes. 
Hominids seem to have originated in Africa. Most of the 
detectable evolution of the hominids from pre-hominid to 
Homo sapien sapiens occurred in the African population. 
Circumstantial evidence for a great overlap of preferences 
is the fact that the market for mass-produced goods is 
world-wide, and the rapidity with which Western technology 
and consumer goods are absorbed even by primitive societies. 
The world-wide clamour for western goods is so conspicuous 
that it has been called "cultural imperialism". But two 
temples made of the same brick may be temples to different 
gods. Better evidence are the so-called social universals 
found by anthropologists: sanctions against murder and
theft, the institution of marriage, the acceptance of 
patriarchy, etc. An overlap in values also explains why 
Christian missionaries have had so much success in every 
society known to anthropology.
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3.8. The Role of Intense Emotion
Although I think it has been exaggerated, emotion does have 
a role to play in the evolution of an ideology. I argue that 
emotion presupposes theory, and therefore cannot be the 
source of an ideology. If this were so then one might 
expect original ideological texts to be poems or novels, 
since these forms of literature evoke the most powerful 
emotions. But they are not. Nevertheless, poems and novels 
may well help to perpetuate an ideology already accepted by 
applying it to particular circumstances and thereby evoking 
strong emotions. This seems to be the case with the works of 
Dickens, Zola, Jack London, Upton Sinclair. As I argued in 
the introduction to the thesis one should distinguish 
between movements and the ideologies that those movements 
help to perpetuate. There are new movements with new ideas, 
and old movements with old ideas; there are also old 
movements with new ideas, and there are new movements with 
old ideas. According to the theory of emotion expounded 
above, intense emotion, provided by poets, orators and 
novelists, would be most useful to old and new movements 
with old ideas.
Hitler was wrong to think that the most intense emotions are 
the most long-lasting. Emotions of the agitated sort - the 
emotions of parades or riots - cannot alone be responsible 
for the creation and the initial fostering of an ideology, 
for they are too short lived to sustain the intellectual 
creator of the ideology through the thousands of hours of 
writing and arguing his case. Neither can the perpetuation 
of the ideology once accepted be imputed to intense emotion 
alone. It is psychologically impossible to be intensely 
emotional for more than half an hour or so. Of course, a 
disposition to intense emotion may persist for years. But in 
that case, why should "love be less subject to change than
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respect", or "hatred more lasting than mere aversion"? 
Respect may outlast love and aversion may outlast hatred 
because love and respect require less effort. The long-term 
propagandist must have a profound taste for theory and 
argument themselves, independent of the excitements of 
righteous anger and missionary zeal. Emotion arises when a 
person applies his ideology to a particular right or wrong. 
Contemplation of the abstract structure of the ideology 
itself arouses little agitated emotion, save that connected 
with the beauty of the theory.
Good novelists and journalists know well that it is concrete 
and particular things which most excite interest and 
emotional involvement, although as I said in connection with 
Durkheim, the difference between more and less emotive 
writing is not fully captured by the abstract/concrete 
distinction. If ideological change were a matter of 
exciting agitated emotion, one would expect a high 
proportion of novels and other literature concerned with 
particulars to be among the original texts of ideologies. 
However, there are none, yet poems and films are amongst the 
most evocative forms of art. I do not want to deny that some 
poets and novelists can be counted among the originators and 
contributors to mass movements. Bernard Shaw, influential 
member of the Fabian Society, and Ayn Rand, founder of the 
Nathaniel Branden Institute, are examples. But to the 
extent that their respective intellectual movements had 
distinctive ideological content one must look less to their 
emotive work and more to their abstract arguments and 
treatises to explain this. The more abstract an argument is 
the more difficult it is to incorporate it in popular 
novelistic or poetic work, although there are some works of 
popular fiction that contain fairly abstract argument: the 
Ragged Trousered Philanthropist being just one notable 
example. The most popular novels and poems take the 
prevailing ideology for granted, and are preoccupied by
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particular people, their hopes and fears, their successes 
and failures - in short by the vicissitude of their day to 
day existence.
Eric Hoffer, author of The True Believer, said that
the readying of the ground for a mass movement is
done best by men whose chief claim to excellence
is their skill in the use of the spoken word.
(Hoffer, [1958].)
In the introduction to his book Mv Struggle. [1933], Hitler 
expressed his belief that more converts to mass movements 
had been won through the spoken word than through the 
written word. The suggestion is that the spoken word is 
more moving than the passive text and hence is more 
important for the emergence of an ideology. But it is not 
the man of words as such but the man of abstract theory and 
argument who lies behind the origin of mass movements. A 
flood of words may mask an arid and theoretically infertile 
mind. On the other hand, if we bear in mind the distinction 
between a movement and its ideas, we may agree with a more 
precise statement of Hoffer's and Hitler's view: that the 
spoken word is important for the creation and maintenance of 
a movement with old ideas. Hitler's error lies in the 
assertion that all of "the most tremendous revolutions on 
this Earth" were created by intense "hysterical" emotion.
Hitler asserts that none of the tremendous revolutions have 
been inspired by scientific teaching. Yet the abolition of 
the mercantile restrictions on trade and the rise of 
liberalism is in no small measure attributable to Adam 
Smith's abstract economic analysis The Wealth of Nations, a 
work not lacking in abstract argument.26 Hitler's assertion 
suggests that the creator of the basis of a mass movement 
must be concerned with particulars, which I have tried to 
undermine. I do not want to deny, however, that those
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preoccupied by particulars have an important role in the 
evolution of ideologies. Historians and journalists, for 
instance, often provide information about particular events 
which may serve to refute the factual assumptions of an 
ideology and thereby undermine its authority. But even here 
in the field of refutation as opposed to theory creation, it 
is often the connoisseur of abstract theory and argument who 
makes the most of the material provided by the journalist 
and historian. As a rule, the journalist and historian take 
for granted the abstract theories they use, of which they 
may only be dimly aware, while they focus on the uniqueness 
of the historical phenomena they have chosen to describe or 
explain.
3.8.1. Intense Emotion and the Theory of Advertising
Even though emotion is not the source of an ideology, 
perhaps it still has some role in the acceptance and 
rejection of ideas? An objective account must tease out 
what truth there may be in those theories in which emotion 
plays such a central and often exclusive role. There is 
good and bad poetry - effective and ineffective, quite apart 
from the logical rigour of the poem. Perhaps there is 
something analogous to poetry that could be used to 
manipulate people.
Contrary to Hitler, Chakotin, Wilson, Sargant and many other 
writers, the effect of intense emotion - parades and 
dramatic speeches etc - is not the direct inducement of 
belief, but simply the conveyance of a message. Effective 
advertising packages the message in an attention-grabbing 
and memorable form, and all propaganda faces the same 
problem. Most writers underestimate the problem of simply 
conveying a message, and have attempted to discern all kinds 
of strange and insidious powers behind modern advertising 
techniques. The power of advertising is easily
212
overestimated because we do not often see the advertisements 
for goods that fail to sell, simply because such goods are 
taken of the market. Successful goods make for successful 
advertisements.
The extravagance and eccentricity of much advertising is 
seen as a sign that it appeals to the irrational in man.
But the attraction and maintenance of attention, and the 
making of a memorable message seem to be the main function 
of successful advertising, something that is eminently 
rational. There is no implication here that the recipients 
of such communications are led to endorse an idea 
independently of their reason's grasp of some theory, and 
thus no suggestion that what they endorse or their 
endorsement itself is immune to criticism.
This minimal theory of advertising can help us see the 
relevance of evocative forms of literature and art to 
ideologies. Producing a best-selling novel can attract 
attention to a writer's other more abstract work which only 
later catches on. Ayn Rand seems to be such a case: she was 
a very successful popular writer before she founded her 
"Objectivist" theory of ethics. Her early books put her in 
contact with other intellectuals who were then persuaded of 
Objectivism.
I would summarize the role of emotion in ideologies as:
(1) Facilitating advertising: making an attention capturing 
and memorable message.
(2) Eliciting already available or easily learnable 
behaviours.
(3) Inducing relatively simple messages, (recall the 
discussion about the Yerkes Dobson law.)
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Introduction.
A ubiquitous assumption is that an ideology can set up 
logical barriers to criticism, giving it an evolutionary 
advantage in the competition of ideas. The possibility of 
setting up such logical barriers to criticism can be 
explored in connection with the so-called immunizing 
stratagem. I shall also explore the implications for the 
propagandist of Duhem's and Lakatos's argument that a 
theoretical system can only be tested and criticized as a 
whole because any part of it may be made safe from criticism 
by suitable adjustment to other assumptions of the system.
My aim is not to show that a network of ideas cannot deflect 
criticism in any way by logical means, but rather to show 
the limitations and costs of trying to do so. Immunizing 
stratagems either abandon the theoretical system they are 
supposed to protect and/or lower the survivability of the 
system. Duhem's and Lakatos's arguments cannot be used to 
show that a privileged part of a system may be guaranteed 
from criticism because of the unfathomable content of 
theories and hence the unforeseeable evolution of their 
defence. In chapter 1 I touched on the difficulty of 
achieving conformity in the interpretation of a theory. In 
this chapter (4.3.) I will expand in detail how this leads 
to the emergence of factions that disagree on how best to 
defend an ideology and even on what to count as the 
privileged part of an ideology and what to count as the 
dispensable part.
Karl Popper originally used the term "conventionalist 
stratagem", but then adopted the term "immunizing stratagem" 
from Hans Albert to describe an aspect of the unscientific 
methodology of certain ideologies claiming to be scientific, 
Marxism and Freudianism. Apparently Arther Pap anticipates 
this usage. 27 Popper argued that Marxism, which originally
215
was an empirically testable theory, had been recast in the 
form of empirically irrefutable metaphysics. This manoeuvre, 
Popper argued, saved Marxism from refutation and immunized 
it against further attacks. (Popper, [1976], page 43.) 
Freudianism was, Popper says, irrefutable from the 
beginning. The basic theory of Freudianism does not need any 
immunization to make it irrefutable. Nevertheless, it does 
incorporate immunizing stratagems. Popper contrasted these 
two theories with the theories of Newton and of Einstein 
which were full of testable (i.e. falsifiable) content.
Thus the term "immunizing stratagem" arose in connection 
with Popper's attempt to solve the problem of distinguishing 
scientific from pseudo-scientific theories - the so-called 
demarcation problem. Popper's solution was the 
methodological rule to allow into science only empirically 
falsifiable hypotheses, and subject these to severe 
criticism. In addition, theory development was to proceed 
from less to more testable, i.e., more informative theories. 
If a theory is refuted and an alternative sought, it had to 
be more testable, not less, and the more testable the 
better. For to reduce testability is to reduce knowledge, 
but in science we desire the growth of knowledge. An 
immunizing stratagem is a development in theory that reduces 
testability.
4.1. Popper's Own Examples of Immunizing Stratagems
Popper says that immunizing stratagems save theories from 
refutation. However, Popper's own examples of immunizing 
stratagems undermine the claim that an ideology can maintain 
itself against criticism by logical means. Popper's 
examples are not examples of saved theories but examples of 
repudiated theories: to immunize a theory in these cases is 
to abandon it. The two main effects of these immunising 
stratagems are (1) Saving the theorist from embarrassment at 
the price of abandoning the original theory; (2) clouding
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•the issue and reducing information content. The latter 
obviously interferes with the growth of knowledge. I think 
that Popper was dimly aware that immunizing stratagems do 
not strictly save theories (in some cases he puts the word 
"saved" in scare quotation marks), but he did not see the 
full implications of this, especially for the survival of an 
ideology.
To illustrate points (1) and (2) I have chosen the simplest 
of Popper's examples. Popper [1934] asks us to consider 
the case of a man who makes the bold claim that all swans 
are white, but on being presented with a black swan promptly 
denies that it is a swan. After all, he says, whiteness is 
part of the definition of the word "swan". Popper says that 
the theory has been saved from refutation. However, what 
had been an empirical theory about the world was turned into 
part of a definition. This is more accurately expressed 
this way: the original theory, supposedly protected by the 
immunizing stratagem, has been replaced by an implication of 
a vacuous definition.
This logical point is worth expanding. The original theory 
was empirical in Popper's sense: it was capable of clashing 
with reality. The statements "All swans are white" and 
"There is a black swan" cannot both be true. A definition 
or implications derived exclusively from a definition, 
however, cannot clash with reality for they say nothing 
about the world. Thus there could not have been a more 
drastic repudiation of the original theory: only the words 
are the same. But the repudiation is implicit and 
unacknowledged, thus saving face despite abandoning the 
original claim. Once this is accepted we can derive some 
interesting implications about the evolution of an ideology 
under criticism.
217
Of course, in a real life people do not simply make such 
bold assertions out of the blue. Rather, they are made with 
a certain intention, background assumptions and more or less 
clearly formulated problems. It is this context of 
assumptions and problems that both guides us in identifying 
an immunizing stratagem and in refuting the original 
assertion. For example, the sentence "All swans are white" 
might be derived from a biological theory of colouring in 
birds. Knowing this allows us to exclude a whole range of 
immunizing stratagems that contradict this biological theory 
or seem to make irrelevant the intention of maintaining the 
biological theory as a solution to the problem of colouring 
in birds.
Provisionally, we may define an immunizing stratagem as an 
evasion of falsification by the reinterpretation of a theory 
or the modification of its assumptions so that the modified 
theory is then consistent with the critical evidence. The 
reinterpretation or modification must consist in a reduction 
of information content, which is defined as the class of all 
and only those statements that are logically excluded by the 
theory.
Scientific development can be described in terms of 
concepts, theories, problems, method and evidence. We can 
classify immunizing stratagems with respect to these 
categories.
Conceptual immunization. For example, conventionalist 
interpretations of Newton's laws of motion portrays them as 
definitions and thus taken alone are rendered uncriticizable 
by empirical tests.
Theoretical immunization. A theory that is contradicted by a 
true observation report e may be weakened just so that it no 
longer implies not e, or it may be weakened in this way but
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also strengthened by the addition of a new auxiliary 
hypothesis so that e becomes a consequence of the altered 
theory. (Note that the theory cannot be made consistent with 
e simply by adding extra assumptions, something I examine 
below.)
Immunization through change in problem. A theory may escape 
a specific criticism by a change in the problem supposedly 
being solved by the theory. We will see that Freud does 
this with his theory of dreams in order to deal with the 
counterevidence of anxiety dreams.
Methodological immunization. One's theories might be 
associated with a method which, either deliberately or 
unwittingly, excludes certain domains of potential 
falsifiers. For example, if a Freudian only considers 
evidence from the couch, then, providing he sticks doggedly 
to this method, lots of non-analytic evidence will be made 
impotent. He may be frightened to discover that he has been 
wrong for many years, or he may be simply ignorant of the 
relevance of such evidence.
Reinterpreting or denying the evidence. The evidence may 
simply be denied or reinterpreted.
Metaphysical immunization. One's theories may be attached 
to a metatheory that interprets them in a certain way. For 
example, one might combine catastrophe theory with the 
metatheory that all argument is illusory. (This hybrid is 
purely hypothetical.) If taken seriously and heeded, this 
would amount to an exclusion of all possible criticism of 
catastrophe theory since it would exclude all possible 
criticism of any theory.
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I argue that Popper's demarcation criterion is useful 
methodological advise if our objective is to promote the 
growth of knowledge. The term "immunizing stratagem" helps 
us to designate those moves in theory development that flout 
the criterion. But as protection against criticism, 
"immunizing stratagems" have serious limitations, and 
certainly do not provide an easy and thorough logical means 
of ensuring the survival of an ideology. Many immunizing 
stratagems involve abandoning the ideology for whose 
protection they have been introduced, an unplanned, often 
unforeseeable, process that consists of numerous successive 
slight modifications extending sometimes over hundreds of 
years. Other immunizing stratagems seriously lower the 
survival value of the ideology through the acquisition, 
sometimes over a long period, of a burdensome and confusing 
"protective belt" of hypotheses, each of which acted at 
least in the short-run, to deflect criticism away from a 
privileged sector of assumptions.
Moreover, I see the use of immunizing stratagems not as a 
sign of an ideology in Bartley's sense, as a complete 
disregard of truth, but rather of a confused and incompetent 
attempt to take account of criticism. Those resorting to 
immunizing stratagems are rather like the American Officers 
in Vietnam who said that they had to destroy a village in 
order to save it. Thus I also disagree with Anthony Flew. 
Flew characterizes evasions of falsification as involving 
"surreptitious" and "arbitrary" manoeuvres, (page 48.)
They also show "that your concern is with what you would 
like, rather than with how in truth things are." (Anthony 
Flew, [1975], page 54.) My argument is that the changes may 
not be designed, but may be the unintentional consequence of 
an attempt to deal with criticism and retain the theory. To 
the extent that the manoeuvres abandon the original doctrine 
in response to the specific falsification involved they 
cannot be wholly arbitrary. This comment reinforces my
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point that falsification can act as a Darwinian-like 
filtering device on ideologies even if evasive (intentional 
or unintentional) moves occur. It may be that although each 
successive immunizing stratagem is intentional and 
introduced in the knowledge that the ideology is being 
altered in a slight respect, the whole sequence of 
immunizing stratagems and their accumulated effect is 
unplanned and unforeseeable. An analogy with the evolution 
of language might clarify my point. Even if every change in 
the language were a conscious innovation, the total effect 
of all the unintentional ramifications of these intentional 
changes cannot be foreseen. No one living in Medieval 
England, for example, could have predicted the shape of 
today's English language.
If ideologists are indifferent to truth then why do they 
employ immunising stratagems at all? There may well be 
cynical ideologists who have more dominant concerns than of 
truth, who are more interested in the perpetuation of their 
doctrine. But their audience is interested in truth.
Perhaps the use of immunizing stratagems is an attempt to 
satisfy these conflicting interests. In any event, whatever 
the intentions of the propagandist his audience selects 
those elements that pass the filters of rationality that I 
discussed in chapter 1. The rationality of the 
propagandist's audience is part of the logic of his 
situation. Thus I see this chapter as reinforcing my general 
thesis that truth acts as a Darwinian-like filter device on 
ideologies.
Marxism and Freudianism are vast rambling structures, so I 
intend to focus on the Labour Theory of Value and Freud's 
theory of dreams. On the other hand, with the aid of the 
notion of the immunizing stratagem I aim to show that 
Marxism and Freudianism are less rambling than they appear. 
The immunizing stratagem helps us to link up the various
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stages of evolution of these structures by relating the 
changing theories to the changing problem situation facing 
Freud and Marx, a sequence of problems itself partly created 
by the use of immunizing stratagems.
There seem to be two types of theoretical development that 
involve a reduction of information content: dishonest and 
unwitting. The term "immunizing stratagem" suggests a 
dishonest move. Popper is concerned to promote intellectual 
honesty, partly because this would go a long way to prevent 
content- decreasing evasions, but even from the point of 
view of the growth of knowledge a dishonest and an unwitting 
reduction of information content have the same effect. And 
since I am concerned with how the propagandist's audience 
selects elements from his message, a process independent of 
his intentions, there is no loss in generality if I speak of 
an immunizing move rather than stratagem. In most cases 
"immunizing stratagem" can be interpreted as immunizing 
move.
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4.2. The Demarcation Problem
To appreciate the significance of my argument it is 
important to understand the demarcation problem and Popper's 
proposed solution.
Popper expressed his wish to characterise a heroic 
conception of science, a conception that captured the spirit 
and method of great scientists such as Galileo, Kepler, 
Newton, Einstein and Bohr. (Popper, [1974], Sections 5-8 of 
Replies to my Critics.) It must be understood that Popper's 
main concern in his philosophy of science is to account for 
and to promote the growth of knowledge. It is Popper's idea 
that such men made possible a tremendous growth of knowledge 
by championing bold ideas and subjecting them to severe 
attempts at refutation. Popper's criterion of demarcation 
is the outcome of a logical/methodological analysis of what 
has counted as bold ideas and severe criticism, and thus of 
what promoted the growth of knowledge.
Popper begins with a rough characterization of bold ideas: 
a theory is bold if it is a new, daring, hypothesis. It is 
daring if it takes a large risk in being false. Popper 
argues that this risk can be analysed ultimately in terms of 
the amount that the idea excludes, the degree to which it 
forbids states of affairs. Severe attempts at refutation 
are severe critical discussions and severe empirical tests.
Popper illustrates these ideas by examining the development 
of cosmology, from the heliocentric theories of Aristarchus 
and Copernicus to Einstein's general theory of relativity. 
Popper argues that this development illustrates not only the 
growth of knowledge but an improvement in method, in which 
theories become ever more daring and subject to severer
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■tests. It becomes apparent that riskiness and testability 
are linked: the greater the former the greater the latter.
Aristarchus and Copernicus conjectured that the sun sat at 
the centre of the universe, in opposition to the prevalent 
earth-centred view of their own times. The heliocentric
theory was exceptionally bold because it clashed with both
. • 28common sense and the pnma facie evidence of the senses.
It went beyond the appearances to posit an unobserved 
reality; the appearances were explained in terms of this 
unfamiliar reality. This was bold in itself, for it broke 
with the Aristotelian idea that to explain something is to 
reduce it to the familiar.
However, Popper says, neither Aristarchus nor Copernicus 
were fully scientific because neither of them was bold 
enough to predict new observable appearances and thereby
• • • 2 9expose their theories to new empirical tests. They 
explained the known appearances, but did not explicitly 
suggest the existence of unknown appearances, appearances 
that might decide between the heliocentric and earth-centred 
views. If they had made such predictions their theories 
would have been much more informative, and therefore have 
taken a larger risk of being false, but they would also have
promoted the growth of knowledge.
Kepler comes closer to Popper's idea of good science.
Kepler had a bold theory of the world, but he also made
detailed predictions of new appearances. Not only that, he 
abandoned many of his ideas in the light of the observations 
furnished him by Tycho Brahe. In accordance with a promise 
he had made Tycho, Kepler tried to fit Tycho's model of the 
solar system to these observations. Tycho accepted neither 
Copernicus's nor Ptolemy's model, but like all other 
astronomers Tycho took for granted their 
Aristotelian/Platonic assumption that orbits must be
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circular. Nevertheless, he subjected this idea to empirical 
testing. Kepler made seventy different trials to fit the 
model to the data and failed. He then took the bold step of 
proposing that the orbits of the planets were elliptical.
The data fell snugly into place.
Kepler's three laws, though good approximations to the 
truth, have been refuted. But, Popper says, though false, 
Kepler's theory is regarded as scientific. Newton's theory 
is also regarded as false but scientific. Hence it is not 
truth which decides whether a theory is scientific. Why 
should this be? Each theory, though false, represented an 
attempt to increase knowledge, and did so because even 
though each was false, it had greater truth content than its 
predecessor and exposed itself to more tests. Popper's 
answer, then, is that it is a theory's openness to empirical 
refutation that makes it scientific. But more generally, it 
is whether the theory is an attempt to expand our knowledge, 
whether it represents an increase of information on the 
theory it replaces.
We may infer from this that Marxism or Freudianism would not 
be counted as unscientific simply because they have been 
refuted, but because of the way Marxists and Freudians have 
dealt with refutations. What is most important for the 
demarcation criterion is a critical attitude and the 
proposal of increasingly falsifiable theories in response to 
refutations. Kepler's elliptical orbit hypothesis 
represented just this sort of increase of information 
content in response to empirical refutation.
What impressed Popper most about the theory of relativity 
were the following characteristics:
(1) Like Kepler's and Newton's theories, Einstein's theory 
was very bold, differing fundamentally from Newton's 
outlook.
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(2) Einstein derived from the theory three predictions of 
vastly different observable effects, two of which were 
radically new, all of which contradicted Newton's theory.31
(3) Einstein explicitly declared in advance of the 
experimental tests of his theory, that they were crucial: if 
the results did not precisely match his predictions, he 
would abandon them as false.
(4) Einstein regarded his theory as simply a better 
approximation to the truth. For a number of reasons he was 
convinced that it was false. He specified a number of 
characteristics that a true theory would have to satisfy. 
(Popper argued that Einstein's attitude to his theory 
clearly showed that belief in the truth of a theory was 
unnecessary to working on it as a promising candidate. It 
is worth noting, though, that Einstein believed that the 
theory was closer to the truth than its rivals; so it could 
not warrant the inference that belief is irrelevant to 
explaining why Einstein worked on the theory.)
Popper's proposal was that science was distinguished from 
nonscience by two things:
(1) The boldness of predicting as yet unobserved phenomena; 
especially phenomena which will pit the theory against its 
competitors and allow us to decide between them. Einstein 
was acutely aware of the need to compare his theory with its 
competitors.
(2) The boldness of looking for tests and refuting 
instances. (I would also add: the boldness of accepting 
refuting instances, which is not implied by the boldness of 
looking for them.)
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We may generalise the methodological conclusions of Popper's 
investigation as follows:
1. Propound empirically testable theories; 2. Aim to refute 
them; 3. Given any theory T, aim to replace it by another 
theory T' which is more general and precise (i.e, has higher 
information content.32 ), one that explains the success of 
T, explains the refuting evidence of T and is moreover 
independently testable.
In his early writings, [1934], Popper would have phrased 1. 
as "propound only empirically testable theories". We will 
see that Popper later put much more emphasis on the 
importance of non-empirical theories, while retaining 
empirical content as the ultimate goal of theory 
development.
These are purely methodological rules. But there is also an 
historical thesis connected with it. It is Popper's 
conjecture that these ideals are responsible for some of the 
greatest leaps of man's scientific knowledge. Many 
commentators have confused Popper's methodological/normative 
analysis with his historical hypothesis. Kuhn is perhaps 
mostly responsible for this confusion, and others (for 
example, Boudon) have been lead astray by relying on 
secondary sources. Chalmers also makes this mistake. 33
It is worth emphasising that there are two aspects to the 
demarcation criterion: one of attitude and one of pure 
logic. Firstly, the scientist must try to find falsifying 
instances to his theories. This is a matter of the correct 
attitude; the critical attitude. Secondly, the scientist 
must have at his disposal refutable theories. The 
possibility then arises of a scientist earnestly following 
the first injunction without realizing that the theory he is 
dealing with is empirically irrefutable. Equally, a body of 
theory may be logically capable of refutation, though its
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adherents have refused or neglected to look for refuting 
instances.
Since Popper is interested in the growth of knowledge he is 
most concerned to discourage the use of immunizing 
stratagems that flout the demarcation criterion, effectively 
reducing the information content of our theories. (the term 
"information content" will be defined later.) Kepler, for 
instance, could have described the planets that did not fit 
his master's model as not really planets. After all, he 
might have said, planets do not behave like that: a planet 
is essentially an object with a circular orbit. This would 
have been an example of what Popper calls an immunizing 
stratagem. 34 Such a manoeuvre, Popper would say, saves 
the theory but at the price of a reduction in information 
content. As we have seen Kepler's actual response greatly 
increased the informative content of astronomy, and is 
rightly admired for that.
Not all evasive moves are on the wrong side of the 
demarcation criterion. Some auxiliary hypotheses introduced 
to deflect a refutation from a valuable assumption have 
added greatly to our knowledge. One such auxiliary 
hypothesis was the prediction by Adams and Leverier of the 
existence of the planet Neptune. It had been observed that 
the orbit of the planet Uranus was not in accord with 
Newton's core theory (the laws of motion and the law of 
gravity) plus the then known initial conditions (ie 
assumptions about the gravitational influence of other 
planetary bodies). Newton's theory could have been regarded 
as falsified by this anomaly. However, Adams and Leverier 
proposed the existence of a previously unknown planet to 
account for the failure of the predictions, thus saving 
Newton's theory. But this particular evasion brought 
increased information content to the Newtonian system as was 
clear from the fact that the hypothesis was empirically
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testable by independent means (i.e., not simply by checking 
whether the hypothesis agreed with the already observed 
perturbations of Uranus).
My point, contrary to Popper, is that "immunizing 
stratagems" are auxiliary hypotheses that are on the wrong 
side of the demarcation criterion and precisely those that 
while saving the original theory from refutation effectively 
abandon it, replacing it with another theory. In our 
hypothetical example, Kepler's redefinition of planets as 
essentially circular in orbit would introduce a radically 
new theory and jettison the original claim. I will expand 
on this point in a later section, after we have seen how 
Popper deals with the problem presented by metaphysical 
theories to his demarcation criterion.
4.2.1. Problems with the Demarcation Criterion and the 
Criticizability of Metaphysical Theories
Popper was from the beginning aware of several problems with 
his demarcation proposal, whose solution is very pertinent 
to the idea that ideologies such as Marxism and Freudianism 
are safe from empirical criticism. I argue that Marxism and 
Freudianism do not save themselves from empirical criticism 
by assuming metaphysical form, and that even in the absence 
of empirical criticism there is potential criticism from 
other metaphysical theories.
Popper realized as early as 1934, the year of the first 
edition of the Logic of Scientific Discovery, that a 
metaphysical idea can inspire the creation of an empirically 
testable theory. In that book he gave a number of examples, 
such as atomism (which inspired John Dalton's atomic theory 
which explained the regular proportions in which elements 
combine); the corpuscular theory of light (which inspired 
Planck's photon theory); and the theory of terrestrial
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motion. (Popper, [1934], page 278.) However, Popper notes 
that he was not fully alive to the fact that metaphysical 
ideas are rationally arguable and in spite of being 
empirically irrefutable, criticizable. (cf. Ibid. page 206. 
footnote 2.) The boundary between science and non science 
is a vague one. More importantly for methodology, we may 
infer that a theory should not be discarded simply because 
it is metaphysical, for it may well inspire the formulation 
of a theory with more empirical content, one that can clash 
directly with experimental results. Many brilliant theories 
must begin their lives as half-baked, rough and ready 
formulations that flout the demarcation criterion. I infer 
from this that if the demarcation criterion were understood 
as a proscription on entertaining such ideas they would not 
have time to develop. I am unsure as to whether Popper 
would agree, but I suspect that the demarcation criterion is 
better understood as an ideal to strive for, simply because 
satisfying it brings more knowledge within our grasp.35
In 1957 Popper became very interested in the fact that 
Metaphysical theories could be not only inspiring, but also 
arguable and open to criticism. He argued that doctrines 
such as determinism that do not admit of empirical 
refutation are nevertheless open to criticism as to their 
effectiveness at solving the problem for which they were 
proposed. (Popper, [1958])
In the light of this discussion I would like to suggest that 
the three methodological rules discussed in the previous 
section may be simplified by eliminating (1). Rule (3) 
takes into account the injunction to move from metaphysical 
speculations to empirically testable theories, as well as 
the injunction to move from less to more informative 
metaphysical theories.
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If it is accepted that what is important is the move from 
less to more informative theories, then interesting 
conclusions follow. For example, even if Marxism has been 
made into untestable metaphysics, it could be made testable 
again. Equally, Freudianism could be made testable. A 
Marxist or Freudian could be shown how their theories could 
be interpreted empirically and promptly refuted. This need 
not be as arbitrary as it seems. Even lovers of metaphysics 
are constrained in their speculations by a whole network of 
what they regard as background knowledge (which may consist 
of both empirical and metaphysical theories) and their 
problem situation.
Popper also realized that there is a rational function to 
resistance to criticism; one can be too sensitive to 
criticism. Clearly, if refutation is avoided at all cost, 
then one gives up science. But on the other hand, if a 
theory is abandoned too easily in the face of apparent 
refutation, then the theory has no opportunity to show its 
strengths, which may only become apparent later in the 
course of debate. Popper concludes that there is room in 
science for dogmatism, by which he means sticking to a 
theory even against very strong arguments. Moreover, it may 
require considerable debate to discover that what at first 
seemed purely metaphysical is actually empirical. The actual 
information and logical content of a theory is not only a 
conjectural matter, but is mostly unfathomable, a point I 
touched on in chapter 2 and will take up later. The late 
physicist, Feynman, made a similar point when he stressed 
how difficult it is sometimes to work out how a new physical 
theory might be tested in the laboratory because it is often 
not even clear what, if any, empirical implications it has. 
Another example is Planck's reinterpretation of Kaufman's 
experiment of 1905, the result of which at the time was 
taken by everyone as bearing unfavourably on the 
Lorentz/Einstein theory and favourably on Abraham's
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classical theory of how an electron should behave in an 
electromagnetic field. Planck discovered that the failed 
Lorentz/Einstein prediction was no longer derivable from the 
theory if one were to reject an auxiliary assumption that 
both theories shared. We may draw the inference that the 
apparently "irrational" stubbornness of some ideologues may 
in some cases be scientifically rational. The refutation of 
a complex theory is not an obvious and mechanical procedure. 
Certainly, stubbornness per se is not irrational.
4.2.2. Empirical versus Metaphysical Criticism
But more to the point, it does look as though the ideologies 
most infamous for their apparent obstinacy in the face of 
criticism, take on a metaphysical form. Marx held that for 
all economies based on wage labour and a market in factors 
of production (i.e. capitalism) there is a tendency for 
monopolization of factors to increase and for an expansion 
and integration of workers' organisation. When 
monopolization had created one supreme world employer, the 
workers would take over its administration and institute 
communism. Apparently, Marx thought the revolution was 
imminent, certainly within his lifetime. The Marxist, 
however, can always say, it is often said, that communism 
will arrive eventually: the tendencies to monopolization, he 
might protest, have been temporarily countered by opposing 
tendencies. Other utopian systems can escape direct 
refutation by making their prophecies apply to some eventual 
future rather than by putting a definite date on the coming 
of the new era. Can they be criticised in that form 
without first interpreting them empirically?
To clarify the logic of the sorts of systems we are talking 
about and the possible empirical criticism to which they 
could be put, let us take an example from chemistry. A
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classic metaphysical sentence is: gold has an acidic 
solvent. This is an irrefutable statement, for however far 
and wide one looks for such an acid without finding it, it 
is always possible to say that it exists at some other time 
or place. So is experience, our strongest critic, 
irrelevant to this type of statement? Professor John 
Watkins has pointed out that experience can be brought in as 
a critic here indirectly via a well tested scientific theory 
which is directly testable. (Watkins, [1958].) The 
metaphysical sentence in question is in fact incompatible 
with the well tested theory that gold has no acidic solvent.
But is such an analysis relevant to the Marxist's attempt to 
evade criticism? Yes, for like the spatio-temporally 
unrestricted singular statement about gold, the Marxist's 
apology is also a spatio-temporally unrestricted singular 
statement. Both would require a systematic search of the 
whole of space and time for a direct empirical refutation 
(or confirmation), which is obviously impossible. (Of 
course, the Marxist's assertion covers only future time, 
though it might be made to cover the past if he were 
desperate enough.)
A Marxist is unlikely to adopt such an unrestricted 
prediction, at least not at the time of writing. Such a 
position might emerge after innumerable attempts to evade 
criticism, perhaps taking 50 to 100 years to evolve. By 
that stage the moral of the apologist may well have sunk to 
an unrecoverable low. But even if a Marxist did resort to 
this desperate manoeuvre, he would still be open to an 
indirect empirical refutation. Ludwig Von Mises argued that 
without a price system, which communism would eliminate, 
there is no even equally adequate way to allocate resources. 
("The Impossibility of Economic Calculation in the Socialist 
Commonwealth". [1930].) Against the desperate hope in the
233
possibility of communism Mises pitted economic theory, a 
theory which makes many detailed empirical predictions.
One might argue that economics does not make predictions of 
the same empirical precision as does chemistry. One might 
even argue that economics is not empirical at all, but a 
very suggestive and true metaphysical theory. The analogy 
with chemistry would then be weakened. But we can certainly 
say that economics has greater informative content than the 
Marxist's unrestricted singular prediction, and may still 
undermine the Marxist's case.
It is easy to assume that empirical observation is the 
strongest critic. The implication would be that if a 
network of ideas succeeds in shielding itself from empirical 
counter-evidence, it will have evaded, if not all sorts of 
criticism, at least the most damaging both psychologically 
and logically. This may not be true. An interesting 
possibility is that perhaps opposing metaphysical theories 
are sometimes of greater weight than empirical observations. 
Watkins has shown how metaphysical theories serve to filter 
out some possible theories before they even enter the body 
of science; these theories do not even get discussed because 
they conflict with the prevalent metaphysical background 
assumptions.
Watkins' discussion of the influential role of metaphysical 
doctrines ('haunted universe doctrines') is highly 
suggestive in this context:
...what informs and integrates the heterogeneous 
ideas of Augustine, or Bossuet, or Condorcet, or 
Burke, or Comte, or Marx is in each case a 
distinctive view of history which both shapes each 
of their interpretations of historical facts and 
suggests a certain kind of moral and political 
outlook....the moral-political suggestiveness of 
haunted universe doctrines indicates that large 
clashes of belief in the moral-political sphere
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need not have their origin in disagreement over 
moral principles or over observable facts. They 
may be generated, partly or wholly, by conflicting 
metaphysical interpretations of the world. (Ibid. 
p. 360.)
There are other methods of criticism that can be applied to 
metaphysical theories. Galileo suggests a charming way to 
criticise doctrines that fail to exclude rivals by empirical 
test. Galileo was able to report that his telescope showed 
that the Moon was not a perfectly smooth sphere as the 
Aristotelians expected, but was instead marked by craters 
and mountains. One of Galileo's adversaries tried to defend 
the Aristotelian doctrine by suggesting that an invisible 
substance filled up the craters and covered the mountains so 
that the Moon was actually spherical. When Galileo asked 
him how the substance was detectable, he said it was 
undetectable. Galileo responded by saying that he was quite 
prepared to accept the hypothesis of the invisible 
substance, but insisted that it was in fact piled up high on 
the mountains of the Moon in such a way that the Moon was 
even more uneven than the telescope could reveal. Galileo's 
rejoinder allows one to see the inadequacy of the immunizing 
move, of making empirical testing irrelevant. The same type 
of rebuttal can be applied to conspiratorial theories that 
have assumed an empirically untestable form. For example, 
suppose some cynic asserts that all the set-backs in the 
workers' movement are instigated by undetectable groups of 
capitalists operating behind the scenes. One could counter 
this by saying that the set-backs are real and there are 
conspiratorial capitalist groups working against the 
workers' movement. However, their efforts are always 
unsuccessful, because they are always thwarted by 
undetectable renegade workers' groups who are the actual 
cause of the set-backs in the workers' movement. If the 
conspiratorial theory is successful on account of its lack 
of empirical testability, then the propagandist is prompted
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by the logic of his situation to try to counter the rival 
conspiratorial theory. But he can do this only by 
augmenting his theory with testable content.
We may conclude that even if an ideology assumes the form of 
a metaphysical doctrine it may yet be criticised, not only 
by unproblematically empirical theories, but also by 
scientifically acceptable metaphysical assumptions. The 
Marxist's retreat to unrestricted prediction, does not save 
his position from criticism, but only creates other grounds 
for criticism.
4.3. Damaging versus eliminating a network of ideas.
In correspondence the late W.W.Bartley III, partly conceding 
my point, argues that:
in a strict sense, the introduction of an 
immunizing stratagem may be tantamount to 
abandoning the position; but in practice it is 
more likely to be tantamount to damaging the 
position. (Feb 13th, 1988.)
Dr Shearmur (Senior Research Fellow of the Institute for 
Humane Studies) has made a similar criticism of my thesis. I 
think this is true, but misleading. Drastic revisions of a 
theory through the use of an immunizing stratagem are rare, 
for they are too obvious and unconvincing. The revisions 
are more often of a marginal nature.
Bartley's and Shearmur's disagreement with me rests on an 
unexamined assumption of theirs that there is a difference 
between modifying a network of ideas and making a new set of 
ideas, a form of essentialism that is false. One might say 
that a network of ideas may evolve yet survive, in the sense 
that the fundamentals are retained. My immediate response
236
to this would be to ask how fundamentals of a network of 
ideas would be defined other than as: those elements of a 
modified network of ideas that are retained? Definitions 
are rarely important, but asking for a definition here could 
be revealing.
Even if we accept for the purposes of argument that to 
damage a position is not to eliminate it, the distinction 
breaks down when we look at the history of ideas. 
Metaphorically speaking, a sufficient number of injuries to 
a theory is equivalent to its death. Each intentional or 
unintentional concession made by an ideologue may be 
individually insignificant; but a sufficient number of 
insignificant differences makes a significant difference. As 
was pointed out in chapter 1 when discussing Hattiangadi's 
comments on conformity, numerous, successive, slight 
modifications may lead from orthodoxy to radically different 
interpretations - to heresy. This is clear when we look at 
networks of ideas over the centuries, over periods of time 
in which the accumulation of injuries due to criticism has 
become conspicuously fatal. Take an example from religion. 
The Jehovah's Witnesses, for example, interpret each of the 
seven days of creation as being 7,000 years long. Moreover, 
the creation is interpreted as referring only to the 
creation of the Earth. The original Genesis account of 
creation has been abandoned. I am not sure whether this 
current position was arrived at by a great number of 
marginal revisions, but one can easily imagine such a 
process.
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This example prompted me to the thought that in analysing 
the evolution of a network of ideas we ought to distinguish 
the following:
(1) The uninterpreted terminology of the doctrine as 
embodied in books etc;
(2) The interpretation placed on the terminology;
(3) The interpreter's theory about how his interpretation 
compares with previous interpretations (his own and 
others').
(If we wish to include ceremony etc, we can substitute 
"symbolism" for "terminology". The notion of an 
uninterpreted term is purely conceptual; in nature perhaps 
everything attended too gets some kind of interpretation.)
It is important to recognise that (1) and (3) may remain 
constant while (2) changes quite dramatically. For example, 
in the simple case discussed, the words "all swans are 
white." are retained, but the interpretation placed on them 
is altered considerably. We can also imagine that the 
person who proposed the claim about swans thinks that his 
later interpretation of his statement is exactly the same as 
his earlier interpretation - when challenged he might 
retort: I thought that all along.
The fact that old symbolism is kept for new ideas is partly 
responsible for the overestimation of the stubbornness of 
ideologies. For example, the present day British Liberal 
party shares very little of the original Liberal party's 
doctrine. These distinctions are particularly important in 
assessing the relevance of Lakatos's notion of a hard core 
versus protective belt in a theoretical system to 
ideological survival in the face of criticism.
238
4.3.1. Do all Immunizing Stratagems Abandon the Theory for 
whose Protection they were Introduced?
It is not my aim to show that criticism cannot be deflected 
in any way by logical means. My aim is to show that many so 
called immunizing stratagems actually abandon the theory 
they were introduced to save, while many others often lower 
the chances that the theory in question will be reproduced 
and successfully compete with other theories. But to take
account of Bartley's and Shearmur's criticism I need to
distinguish more precisely between a privileged subset T of 
a set of assumptions, and a useful but dispensable subset A. 
The more subtle claim then is that by tinkering with the 
subset of dispensable assumptions A, any T may be preserved 
in the face of any counterevidence.
Suppose T & A yields as a consequence the implication e, but 
the accepted counterargument implies -e. If the response of 
an ideology to criticism is to modify its assumptions then 
it may replace A by A' in one of three ways:
(1) T & A' I- -e, where A' = -e. .
(2) T & A' I- -e, where -e is not derivable from either T
or A' alone.
(3) Such that neither T & A' I- -e, nor T & A' I- e.
If (1) then information content will be lowered and each 
successive theory will become increasingly a burdensome 
hotchpotch of unrelated hypotheses, sacrificing by 
incremental steps the preference for systematic 
organisation. The system also becomes more difficult to 
learn and pass on. Moreover, there is no proof that a 
replacement A' that is consistent with T can always be found 
(T and -e may be inconsistent).
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If (2) then T is retained and also used systematically in 
the derivation of -e. There may even be an increase of 
information content. But this latter would make T & A' even 
more open to criticism. Again, there is no general proof 
that for any counterevidence -e against any theory T & A 
there is always a suitable A' that in conjunction with T 
will yield -e.
If (3) then there is clearly a loss of information content. 
Weakening A so that T & A' no longer implies e may also 
necessitate a loss of other implications that were important 
in solving problems for which T & A was initially adopted.
As I have indicated, not all immunizing stratagems involve 
modification to the information content of a theory's 
assumptions. Some that at first do not seem to fall into 
this class can be interpreted this way, but not all. It 
would be helpful if I made a list of the types of immunizing 
stratagems and then examine which one's involve the 
abandonment of the original theory, and which impair the 
theory's chances of spreading.
(1) Denying the refuting evidence, e.
(2) Reinterpreting the theory as a definition or the 
implication of a definition.
(3) Adding other assumptions to T in the presence of which 
the resulting theory is consistent with or implies e.
(4) Subtracting assumptions from T such that the remaining 
set of assumptions is consistent with or implies e.
(5) Reinterpreting the theory as essentialistic.
(6) Introducing the idea that the theory is beyond the 
capacity of human reason to criticize or test, (e.g., God 
moves in mysterious ways.)
(7) Introducing ad hoc exclusion clauses to T for special 
cases.
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(8) Reorganising the conceptual structure of the theory.
(1) An example of the denial of evidence is Marx's attitude 
to the price of goods offered for sale that are not mass 
produced commodities, such as honour, conscience or unworked 
land etc. In these cases, Marx asserts, the prices are 
imaginary, like certain quantities in mathematics. (Marx, 
[1867], Vol.I, page 105.) In saying this Marx expresses his 
confusion. It may look as if he is saving the labour theory 
of value but he is substituting another theory instead, one 
that may well be implied by the original theory but 
certainly one of much lower information content.
Suppose the refuting evidence, e, is denied under all 
circumstances. For example, in the swan case, the person 
who advanced the theory that all swans are white may simply 
deny that any black swan presented to him is black.
Prima facie, this does not look like a case in which the 
original theory is abandoned. But let us look more closely. 
At least some of the information content of an empirical 
statement is logically equivalent to the class of basic 
statements with which (perhaps in the presence of other 
assumptions) it is inconsistent. In other words, the basic 
statement that constitutes e would be part of the meaning of 
T. Now if no basic statement is treated as inconsistent 
with a purported empirical statement, then we may infer that 
it is, after all, non empirical. As a corollary, it follows 
that the original claim was either wrongly presented as 
empirical, or was empirical and was later abandoned for 
another theory with the same terminology. In either case, 
the original claim has been abandoned.
(2) Reinterpreting a theory is in some cases abandoning the 
earlier theory; in some cases it is simply changing the 
conceptual structure without changing the theory. We will
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see in the case of Marx's Labour Theory of Value how the 
crucial term "socially necessary labour time" is 
reinterpreted several times, the total amounting to an 
abandonment of both the original theory and the original 
problem.
The assumption that one can modify a theory without 
abandoning it does have some truth to it. One can 
completely reorganise the conceptual structure of a theory 
without changing its empirical content. Popper himself has 
been keen to make this distinction between a theory and the 
concepts in which it is expressed. (Popper, [1982], Quantum 
Theory and the Schism in Physics, page 42.) The same 
theory may be formulated in many different ways and may use 
different conceptual schemes.
Changes in the conceptual system employed by a theory may 
function as protection against criticism, since it may 
disarm the critic - it may appear to the critic that the 
theory has been abandoned under the pressure of his 
criticism, whereas in fact the old theory is retained under 
the (intended or unintended) camouflage of the new concepts. 
However, such an effect has costs for the ideology's 
survival value that may be overlooked: (a) the ideology has 
to be relearned - a transmission cost; (b) to the extent 
that the change of concepts is unintentional there is a loss 
of understanding of the theory. After all, if the ideologue 
believes that the conceptually transformed theory really is 
a different theory he cannot have a good grasp of the 
theory.
Can a propagandist guarantee that by introducing ad hoc 
purely abbreviative definitions to evade criticism that the 
system will not incur new unpredictable commitments that are 
themselves open to criticism? One might think that a purely 
abbreviative definition adopted as camouflage would be
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neutral, but as Popper argues, some abbreviative definitions 
are creative in the sense that they alter what can be 
derived from the theory. (Popper, [1982b], page 170.) A 
definition is creative if there are theorems not containing 
the defined term that cannot be derived without the help of 
the definition of the term. There is no routine way of 
telling whether a definition is creative or not, so even 
seemingly trivial evasive redefinitions may have unwanted 
but unforeseeable repercussions in the rest of the system, 
perhaps creating other more serious avenues for criticism.
(3) Adding assumptions. One might at first think that there 
are two main ways in which a theory T may be immunized 
through changes in the assumptions of the theory: (i) a move 
from T to T' (where T' is the conjunction of T and one or 
more auxiliary assumptions, denoted by B); (ii) a move from 
T to X (where X is T minus some of its assumptions, perhaps 
with replacements). Only (ii) represents the abandonment of 
assumptions of T, and its replacement by another theory. One 
might argue that (i) preserves the original theory within 
the substitute, and therefore immunization can preserve an 
ideology. Thus Lakatos says:
For instance, we may have a conjecture, have it 
refuted and then rescued by an auxiliary 
hypothesis which is not ad hoc in the senses which 
we have earlier discussed. It may predict novel 
facts some of which may even be corroborated.
(Lakatos, [1970], page 175.)
But (i) is not a logically possible immunization. The 
modified theory cannot be consistent with the falsifying 
evidence if one simply adds extra assumptions that increase 
information content. For suppose theory T is false with 
respect to evidence e; then, since a conjunction is false if 
and only if one of its conjuncts is false, any conjunction 
consisting of T and an extra assumption B will also be false 
with respect to e.
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This general point can be applied to Boudon's treatment 
[1986], Boudon's analysis suffers from a lack of logical 
sensitivity, which grossly misleads him. His failure to 
distinguish between different components of a theory allows 
him to infer that a refuted theory can be consistently 
retained by adding extra assumptions:
Suppose that a physicist of Newton's time 
discovers that a planet is deviating from the 
orbit assigned to it by theory T. T could 
nevertheless be kept thanks to an adventitious 
hypothesis. (Ibid. page 161.)
and because of exit costs of leaving T for T' (an 
alternative theory) and entry costs (learning a new language 
etc.) of adopting T',
people will try to keep T going by trying to 
reduce the inconsistencies between T and the facts 
of the real world by means of adventitious 
hypotheses. (Boudon, [1986], page 162.)
This argument amounts to a simplification of Lakatos's 
argument, discussed below. As we will see, Lakatos makes a 
careful distinction between different components of the 
theory at issue.
To make this point clearer consider the case of Leverier and 
Adams. They did not reject Newton's laws of motion and 
gravity. Newton's theory, consisting of the laws of motion 
and of gravity conjoined with auxiliary assumptions 
regarding the number, mass, position and acceleration of the 
planets and the Sun, was inconsistent with the observation 
reports of the motion of Uranus. Leverier and Adams 
introduced another assumption: the existence of the planet 
Neptune, with a certain mass, position and acceleration.
Now if an ideology adopted this tactic it would be adding to 
knowledge and sustaining itself. But it must be born in
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mind that the augmented theory is now more open to 
criticism, so is hardly being guaranteed from it.
But the above is not accurate enough. What Adams and 
Leverier did was to deny one of the auxiliary assumptions of 
Newton's theory: that there were no other planets in the 
solar system but Mercury, Venus, Earth, Mars, Jupiter, 
Saturn, Uranus. Therefore, the modified theory of Adams and 
Leverier actually contradicted Newton's theory (though not 
the laws of motion and gravity alone). If any ideologist 
did this he would be abandoning his ideology.
(4) Subtracting assumptions that reduce the information 
content of an ideology effectively means that the original 
theory is abandoned. Though subtracting disjuncts may 
increase information content, for a statement p is logically 
stronger than p or q. We will see below that Lakatos 
effectively replaces a conjunction of premises in Newton's 
theory by their disjunction and thereby empties the theory 
of much content.
(5) Reinterpreting the theory as essentialistic. As we 
will see in the case of Kepler, if he had tried to sustain 
his masters' position on the circularity of planetary orbits 
by asserting that the orbits of planets are essentially 
circular, he would have replaced a hypothesis with much 
content with one of possibly zero content. But not all 
essentialistic hypotheses are completely devoid of content. 
Hume says of the parapetetics that when they were asked for 
the cause of a phenomenon, they would resort to faculties or 
occult qualities. They would say that bread nourishes by 
virtue of its nutritive faculty and senna purged by virtue 
of its purgative powers. (Hume, [1779], page 73.) Hume took 
these hypotheses as devoid of content, but in fact they 
could be interpreted so that they rule out some 
possibilities, such as the class of causes which lie outside
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the bread or senna. But as with the swan hypothesis, in 
making the interpretation, one would have to check it 
against the proposers' background knowledge and problem 
situation. However, if the theory is empirical in Popper's 
sense, then replacing it with an essentialistic theory will 
abandon much content. I argued in chapter 1 that man prefers 
to adopt ideas of higher information content. Essential 
explanations often imply an ultimate explanation. 
Essentialist immunizations run the risk of
offending the desire for more information because they rule 
out further generalisations, explanations of greater depth. 
It may then lose in a competitive struggle with other ideas 
that address the same problems.
(6) This sort of tactic is very interesting. Neither Marx 
nor Freud resorted to it as it would have been completely 
anathema to their enlightenment inclinations, but it is a 
common practice in religious circles. It is an example of 
what W W Bartley would call a retreat to commitment. But 
its strength can easily be exaggerated. To function properly 
it must be kept under control, for it may backfire. For 
example, a sceptic may retort: if God moves in mysterious 
ways, how do you know that it is God and not the Devil that 
speaks to you on any given occasion? God's command to 
Abraham that he sacrifice his son Isaac was, I suppose, a 
mysterious way of acting. But when Abraham obeyed God's 
command he did not first try to establish the identity of 
the voice that spoke to him. But why not? It could have 
been the devil, as far as he knew - if, as you say, God 
moves in mysterious ways. So there is a counterargument.
But the original theory - that God exists - looks as though 
it has been retained: has it? Well, at first we have the 
confident assertion that a unique being answering to a 
definite description exists (ie all powerful, completely 
benign, .) Whatever else may be true of this being, it does 
follow necessarily that if he did exist there could be no
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evil for he would not suffer evil to exist. But in the face 
of counter-evidence this implication is denied. In so far 
as it is denied we have a different theory before us. The 
doctrine that there is a completely unfathomable mysterious 
something seems to be almost no doctrine at all.
(7) The introduction of ad hoc exclusion Clauses is also a 
case of abandoning the original claim. For example, suppose 
someone advances the theory that bread nourishes, but then 
notices that a certain batch of bread kills some people. If 
he then says bread nourishes, except that particular batch 
which killed those people, then he has reduced the content 
of his claim and therefore abandoned the original theory. As 
more counterinstances are dealt with in this way the theory 
becomes increasingly a hotch potch of unrelated hypotheses, 
losing its systematic character. It not only becomes clumsy 
in application but more difficult to learn and pass on.
(8) The propagandist may alternate between two or more 
theories. This is an interesting case in which the original 
theory is not completely abandoned. It is quite possible 
that two interpretations of the text are maintained, each 
being brought to the fore when powerful criticism makes it 
is difficult to assert the other. Frank Cioffi has noted 
this phenomenon in connection with Freudianism:
It is characteristic of a pseudo-science that the 
hypotheses which comprise it stand in an 
asymmetrical relation to the expectations they 
generate, being permitted to guide them and be 
vindicated by their fulfilment but not to be 
discredited by their disappointment. One way in 
which it achieves this is by contriving to have 
these hypotheses understood in a narrow and 
determinant sense before the event but a broader 
and hazier one after it on those occasions on 
which they are not borne out. Such hypotheses 
thus live a double life - a subdued and restrained 
one in the vicinity of counter-observations and 
another less inhibited and more exuberant one when 
remote from them. (Cioffi, [1970], page 474.)
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The bold version is still prized for its richness of 
information content and so is brought forward in certain 
circumstances.
How does this phenomenon fit in to the evolution of an 
ideology? We may conjecture that this is a typical stage in 
the response of an ideology to powerful criticism. First we 
have the pristine doctrine promulgated faithfully with great 
confidence. Then, in response to criticism, we have the 
original doctrine supplemented by the immunized version, 
brought forward in appropriate circumstances. Most 
commentators have overlooked the increased burden of the 
excess theoretical baggage that this alternation involves: 
new converts have to learn not only the original theory 
(usually quite cumbersome in itself) but also the adapted 
one. The likely consequences are (a) increased errors of 
transmission and (b) simple confusion, neither of which 
contribute to the morale of the movement and may impair the 
propagation of the ideology.
It is my guess that this stage tends to be followed by one 
in which the original doctrine is completely supplanted by 
the adapted version. Thus we have:
(1) Original doctrine;
(2) Original doctrine plus adapted doctrine;
(3) Adapted doctrine.
In many cases the ideology may reach stage two in the course 
of a single book. This seems to have happened with Freud's 
theory of dreams and with Marx's Labour Theory of Value.
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To further explore Bartley's suggestion that the use of 
immunizing stratagems may only amount to a modification and 
not an abandonment of the theory being "protected", I must 
also examine Lakatos's distinction between a hard-core and 
protective belt and Duhem's problem, since both of these 
seem at first sight to show that by tinkering with a system 
of hypotheses, refutation may be avoided and therefore a 
privileged sector of an ideology may be retained regardless 
of the facts. These ideas make more precise the suggestion 
that the "essentials" of a system might be guaranteed from 
criticism and perpetuated even though the system evolves in 
response to criticism.
I intend to argue that all I need to sustain my thesis that 
no system of ideas can be guaranteed from criticism is no 
more than Bartley and Shearmur concede: that the immunizing 
stratagem may simply "damage the position".
4.3.2. Hard core versus Protective belt
Lakatos makes the distinction between the hard-core of a 
theory, which is preserved in the face of unfavourable 
evidence, and a protective belt of hypotheses which may be 
changed to accommodate any unfavourable evidence. Lakatos 
argues therefore that no core scientific theory forbids any 
observable state of affairs. If this were true an ideology 
could in principle adopt this kind of stratagem to deflect 
criticism from a privileged portion of its structure. I 
argue that not only is this not always logically possible, 
but even if it were it assumes superhuman powers of memory 
and reasoning. First, most commentators have been too quick 
to assume that finding a suitable change in the protective 
belt is easy: creating such a protection may require more 
time, effort and genius than creating an alternative core 
theory. Second, any attempt to guarantee that the changed 
protective belt will not adversely affect the hard-core is
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doomed to failure: the line drawn between hard-core and 
protective belt is a conjecture, and one cannot always rule 
out the possibility that some remote logical consequence of 
the change to the protective belt will not be in conflict 
with the core theory. The same points apply also to Duhem's 
argument.
We can explain Lakatos' distinction between the hard core 
and the protective belt with the help of a story about an 
imaginary series of problems in Newton's research programme. 
(Lakatos, [1979], pages 100-101.) A Newtonian using 
Newton's mechanics, law of gravitation plus generally 
accepted initial conditions, calculates the trajectory of a 
newly discovered planet. However, the planet deviates from 
the calculated trajectory. The question then is does our 
Newtonian place the blame on Newton's theory? No, he 
attributes the failure in prediction to his statement of the 
initial conditions: there is an as yet unobserved planet p' 
which perturbs the trajectory of p. The Newtonian 
calculates the mass, orbit etc of this planet p' and asks an 
astronomer to try and detect it. The astronomer fails to 
observe it, but undeterred the Newtonian sustains his 
allegiance to Newton's theory and conjectures that the 
planet p' is too small to be observed even with the most 
powerful of current telescopes, and applies for a research 
grant to build a more powerful telescope. In three years 
the new telescope is built and is trained upon the sky. The 
planet p' remains undiscovered. Yet, our Newtonian persists 
to deflect criticism from Newton's theory, suggesting that a 
cloud of dust hides the planet from us. He calculates the 
properties of the cloud and a satellite is sent up to detect 
it. By now the reader will be able to continue the story 
for himself for a while without much trouble. Lakatos'
point is that with resolution and enough ingenuity, the 
Newtonian can select a part of his set of accepted
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statements as a privileged sector to be made safe from 
criticism by appropriate changes in other beliefs.
Lakatos supplies historical illustrations of research 
programmes whose protective belts have gotten into trouble, 
but then saved not by revising the initial conditions, as 
in the above example, but by very fruitful advances in 
either fundamental theory (Soddy's contribution to Prout's 
programme) or mathematical technique (Pauli's contribution 
to Bohr's old quantum theory). A modern version of Lakatos's 
story might focus on the hunt for the so-called dark matter, 
matter whose existence is postulated on the assumption that 
the universe is expanding despite gravitational attraction, 
but at a rate too slow given the relatively small amount of 
observable matter in the universe. This search has had a 
number of disappointments, but the researchers continued to 
search for a suitable particle, the most hopeful being the 
neutrino. However at first neutrinos could not even be 
detected, and when they were it was thought they were not 
heavy enough. Within the last year, however, several 
researchers have replicated the detection of heavy 
neutrinos.
Lakatos drew the conclusion that in fact no scientific 
theory can be refuted because the theorist can always 
introduce auxiliary hypotheses to deflect criticism from the 
theory:
exactly the most admired scientific theories 
simply fail to forbid any observable state of 
affairs. (Ibid, page 100.)
However, Popper has undermined this contention. Lakatos 
promises to back his "characteristic story" up with a 
general argument, but this general argument can only succeed 
if the most admired theories are denuded of part of their 
fundamental content. In assessing Lakatos's argument,
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Popper says, it is important to be clear that his thesis 
does not depend on arguing from defective observations:
...even if there were a firmly established 
empirical basis to serve as a launching pad for 
the arrow of the modus tollens: the prime target 
remains hopelessly elusive. (Ibid. p. 100.)
Lakatos feels that he can generalize from the 
"characteristic story" to the most respected theories, such 
as Newton's. But, Popper argues, this would require the 
assumption that any deviations of a planetary orbit from its 
predicted path can be accounted for by Newton's theory by 
postulating the influence of some other planet (more 
generally, massive body). However, as Popper points out, 
there are an infinite number of planetary orbits which 
cannot be accounted for in this manner. (To be precise, 
there is an infinite set of measure 1 such orbits.) For 
example, Newtonian gravitational theory cannot explain a 
square or a triangular orbit, no matter what is assumed 
about the mass, position etc of other planets. Lakatos's 
story, Popper concludes, cannot therefore be characteristic, 
but is in fact quite exceptional.
Lakatos asserts that
some theories forbid an event occurring in some 
specified finite spatio-temporal region (or 
briefly, a "singular event") only on the condition 
that no other factor...has any influence on it.
(Ibid. page 101.)
Putnam argued the same point in Popper ([1974], page 221). 
Lakatos draws from this the conclusion that such theories 
never alone contradict a basic statement, but at minimum (he 
says maximum, but the meaning is clear) the conjunction of a 
basic statement with a universal non-existence statement 
saying that no other factor is at work. What Lakatos 
overlooks is that his result is obtained at the price of
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emptying Newtonian theory of important content. Popper 
argues that Newton's theory of gravitation amounts to the 
thesis that all bodies in interplanetary space not only move 
according to Newtonian dynamics, but their movements can be 
explained by an appeal to gravitational forces 
alone.(Popper. [1974], page 1008.) If this is true, then 
Newton's theory does not allow the possibility that other 
factors may be at work, as Lakatos's ceterus paribus clause 
suggests, but actually denies their operation, making the 
theory much stronger logically. And this is why Newton's 
theory was refuted by the first rocket that travelled 
outside the earth's atmosphere.
O'Hear makes the same mistake as Lakatos. O'Hear criticizes 
Popper's counterexamples to Lakatos' thesis, saying that the 
peculiar orbits of the planets could be produced by powerful 
rockets on the planets involved. We will ignore for the 
moment that this state of affairs is ruled out by Newton's 
gravitational theory for the reason I have just discussed, 
to see how strong O'Hear's argument is in other respects. It 
is not clear that such an arrangement could produce 
rectangular orbits, and O'Hear supplies no argument here.
O'Hear finds it sufficient to say that Lakatos's general 
point is grasped: "that such explanations are always 
possible...". (O'Hear, [1980], page 102.) But O'Hear 
seems not to have taken heed of Popper's reply to Lakatos in 
the Schilpp volume, where he points out that Lakatos 
provides no general argument for such possibilities: it is 
far from obvious that such explanations are always possible.
Watkins [1984] agrees with and elaborates O'Hear's argument, 
making use of his notion of observational predicates.
Watkins begins with a useful distinction between the 
"fundamental" assumptions of a scientific theory and 
"subsidiary" assumptions, which Popper calls the initial 
conditions. In Watkins' account the "fundamental"
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assumptions of a scientific theory are universal statements. 
In the case of Newton's theory the fundamental assumptions 
are the law of gravitation and the laws of motion. The 
subsidiary assumptions would be, for example, statements 
concerning the position, mass, number and acceleration of 
the planets. Watkins calls the fundamental assumptions 
taken alone the "core theory" T, and the combination of this 
with subsidiary assumptions the "fleshed out theory", T & A. 
(page 324.) If we make this distinction, Watkins argues, 
then we may say, along with Lakatos, that all core theories 
fail "to forbid any observable state of affairs". This, 
Watkins says, is because the "core theory lacks the 
observational predicates needed for a possible conflict with 
observation reports." (page 325.) Only the subsidiary 
assumptions can supply these predicates. He infers from 
this that Popper's proposed examples of potential falsifiers 
of Newton's core theory do not count as such.
Paraphrasing O'Hear's conclusion Watkins writes:
Newton's laws of motion plus his law of 
gravitation say nothing about the physical makeup 
of the planets; in particular they do not rule out 
the possibility that the planets are enormous 
rocketlike devices that can accelerate themselves 
in all sorts of ways, (page 326.)
In a straightforward sense, it is true that Newton's core 
theory says nothing about the chemical constitution or size 
or mass or structure of the planets. However, the laws of 
motion rule out an infinite number of logically possible 
accelerated motions of objects with mass, and therefore 
motions of planets or rockets. According to Newton's core 
theory, therefore, rockets cannot "accelerate in all sorts 
of ways". Newton's core theory may not have the predicates 
"rocket" or "planet" but it certainly has the predicates 
"acceleration" and "mass", and all one needs to know about 
the planets is that they have mass for the core theory to
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rule out infinitely large classes of their possible motion. 
One could say, for example, that the second law of motion 
rules out the possibility of masses moving in accord with 
the law F=ma2. This is a little unconvincing because in 
order for these laws to contradict one another one has to 
assume that bodies with mass exist.
But I have a more convincing argument. A rocket cannot 
accelerate from zero to any finite velocity instantaneously. 
To modify Popper's rectangular orbit example, we can imagine 
a rocket moving at constant velocity v along each of the 
borders of the rectangle, stopping instantaneously at each 
corner, remaining stationary for an hour, then moving off 
instantaneously with constant velocity v to the next corner, 
(v could be any one of an infinite number of finite 
velocities.) We can imagine this, but according to Newton's 
second law of motion alone it is impossible. Since force 
equals mass times acceleration an instantaneous change in 
velocity would require an infinite force. Could an 
obstinate Newtonian just postulate the existence of infinite 
forces? No, for that would make the mass of the rocket 
indeterminate because an infinite quantity divided by 
another infinite quantity is indeterminate. (For example, 
aleph zero divided by aleph zero can have any value from 1 
to aleph zero.) But the meaning of Newton's law is that 
given any two of the values, F, m, a, the equation will 
yield a determinate answer for the third. Therefore, 
Newton's second law of motion taken alone rules out infinite 
accelerations.
In arguing against O'Hear and Watkins here I have allowed 
their argument considerable latitude and still found it 
wanting. I ignored the fact that the core of Newton's 
system contained the assumption that all the forces acting 
on the planets were gravitational. But this assumption is 
implicit in the way Newtonians solved their problems. It
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effectively rules out O'Hear's rocket propelled planets; a 
report of such phenomena would constitute a falsification of 
Newton's core theory and so could hardly serve to protect 
it. Watkin's should note here that Newton's core theory 
does not have to mention rocket propulsion for it to deny by 
implication rocket propulsion of the planets, since such 
propulsion implies that planetary motion is governed (at 
least partly) by non-gravitational forces.
A similar argument applies if instead of rocket propulsion 
the forces applied are gravitational. Taking the law of 
gravity : F= Gmm'/r2. (Where F is gravitational attraction;
G is a constant; m & m' are the masses of two objects; and r 
is the distance between these masses.) Substituting for F: 
am = Gmm'/r2. Substituting * (infinity) for a, and 
cancelling m: Gm'/r2 = *. Hence, either G or m' would have
to be of infinite size, and we would again have the problem 
of indeterminacy for one of the variables.
In this counterexample I have excluded Newton's atomistic 
theory of matter, for when it is conjoined with the laws of 
motion instantaneous accelerations follow as a consequence, 
which in turn leads to an absurdity. If Newton's atoms or 
corpuscles are infinitely hard and incompressible, one may 
ask what happens when two of them collide? Since momentum 
is conserved they would have to rebound from one another 
with an instantaneous acceleration. Now, since Newton's 
second law of motion states that force equals mass times 
acceleration, such an instantaneous rebound would imply that 
repulsive forces of infinite magnitude were involved in all 
collisions, which is absurd. (Kant seems to have been the 
first to notice this. See his Metaphysical Foundations. 
General Note to the Mechanic.) 36 But it again brings up the 
problem that the masses of the atoms become indeterminate.
256
4.3.3 Duhem's Problem
Duhem's problem is the problem of attributing the failure of 
a prediction. Suppose someone wants to test a theoretical 
statement B-±. If a set of assumptions B2 ,...Bn, are 
required in conjunction with B^ to deduce a prediction g, 
and the result of the experiment, e, contradicts g, one 
cannot conclude that B must be false. One can, however, 
deduce the falsity of the conjunction B^ & B2 ...& Bn . 
Therefore, Duhem concluded:
the physicist can never subject an isolated 
hypothesis to experimental test, but only a whole 
group of hypotheses. (Duhem, [1954], page 187.)
Even if we know that exactly one hypothesis is false, no 
experimental outcome will enable us to attribute the fault 
exclusively to one of the hypotheses.
To make this clearer let us examine one of the problems that 
confronted Mendeleev's theory of the periodic table of 
elements. Mendeleev's Periodic Law states that if the 
elements are arranged in order of their atomic weights, a 
periodic repetition of properties is observed. The table 
that Mendeleev constructed actually makes many very precise 
predictions about the specific heats, boiling points, 
densities, reactivities etc. of elements. However, early on 
Mendeleev noted that according to its valence and other 
chemical and physical properties iodine should be placed 
after tellurium and before xenon, but this would then put 
their atomic weights in the wrong order, contradicting the 
Periodic Law. These anomalies, of which there were several, 
were called reversed pairs.
Mendeleev could have rejected the Periodic Law but he 
realized that the predicted position of iodine was based not
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only on the periodic law but also on assumptions to do with 
the observations and measurements of some of the properties 
of iodine, tellurium and xenon. He had a choice of where to 
direct the blame for the failed prediction. Mendeleev chose 
to deny that the gaseous iodine used to calculate the vapour 
density and hence the atomic weight of iodine was pure. 
Noting that the gas was dried over anhydrous calcium 
chloride, he guessed that some of the iodine had been 
replaced by lighter chlorine, bringing down the measured 
vapour density and hence the calculated atomic weight. The 
important point is that Mendeleev faced a number of options 
left open by the experiment.
The relevance of Duhem's argument to ideology is this. The 
ideologist may seek to protect a privileged part of his 
system of assumptions in response to empirical criticism by 
jettisoning those assumptions he regards as of little 
importance. This privileged part of the ideology would then 
be guaranteed against empirical criticism. Popper tries to 
show how in some circumstances such a defence would be ruled 
out because we could focus the criticism onto just one 
hypothesis by comparing two systems:
Admittedly, Duhem is right when he says that we 
can test only huge and complex theoretical systems 
rather than isolated hypotheses; but if we test 
two such systems which differ in one hypothesis 
only, and if we can design experiments which 
refute the first system while leaving the second 
very well corroborated, then we may be on 
reasonably safe ground even if we attribute the 
failure of the first system to that one hypothesis 
in which it differs from the other. (Popper,
[1957], page 132, footnote.)
If this were valid it would also further undermine Lakatos's 
argument, for the crucial experiment may focus on what he 
calls the hard-core.
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However, Watkins has shown Popper's argument to be invalid. 
Watkins begins by paraphrasing Popper's description of the 
two systems to be compared by a crucial experiment:
denote that one hypothesis by and the large 
number of hypotheses common to both systems by B2 ; 
and let B^' be the hypothesis which replaces B^. 
(Watkins, [1984], page 321.)
Watkins compares theories to recipes. Suppose we have two 
recipes for a pudding, one uses cinnamon P and the other P' 
uses nutmeg instead of cinnamon. P' proves to be a better 
pudding. But this does not mean that nutmeg is 
gastronomically superior to cinnamon. Perhaps by keeping 
cinnamon and varying other ingredients in P the chef might 
produce a pudding even better than P'. Something analogous 
holds for theories:
Perhaps B1 is true and Bl' is false, but Bl' is 
the better partner for B2 because there is an 
error in B2 that is cancelled out by a 
compensating error in Bl'. (Ibid. page 322.)
One may quibble with the assertion that the errors in the 
assumptions are "cancelled out", for the falsity content of 
B2 & Bl' is no less than (and possibly greater) than the sum 
of the falsity contents of B2, Bl' taken separately.
Watkins' point may be stated more accurately: a conjunction 
of two or more false assumptions can yield true deductive 
consequences that none of the assumptions taken separately 
could yield.
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An example in political theory would be the following:
B2 = Communism will emerge in a society if and only if more 
than 70% of workers in that society are employed in industry 
and involved in unions.
Bl' = Russian society in 1987 had less than 20% of its 
workers employed in industry and involved in unions.
(Suppose Bl = Russian society in 1987 had 71% of its workers 
employed in industry and involved in unions.)
Even though both B2 and Bl' may be false, together they 
imply the true statement that communism did not emerge in 
Russian society in 1987. Whereas if the true statement Bl is 
conjoined with B2 we may deduce the false statement that 
communism emerged in Russian society in 1987.
In Watkins' interpretation of Popper's argument the two 
theories are treated as if they were telephone numbers of 
the same length, so that two theories differing in at most 
one hypothesis is analogous to two telephone numbers 
differing in at most one number position. But it seems not 
to take account of the situation in which the two theories 
that are put to the crucial test are exactly the same except 
one has an extra hypothesis, symbolically T and T&A. But 
this is not a possible interpretation of Popper's suggested 
exception, for it is logically impossible to have both T I- 
-e and T&A I- e. The theories in Popper's proposal must be 
representable as T&A and T&-A.
I freely accept that it is sometimes possible for an 
ideologist to protect a particular sector of his assumptions 
from some counterevidence that undermines his assumptions 
taken as a whole by tinkering with what he regards as 
trivial auxiliary assumptions. But no one has yet proven 
that this can always be done for any particular system for
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any counterevidence. It has yet to be shown, therefore, 
that an ideology can always in principle be guaranteed from 
criticism on account of Duhem's thesis.
There is also a purely practical problem for the 
propagandist in protecting his privileged sector of 
assumptions. Propagandists have a limited reservoir of 
immunising stratagems, especially in the short run, and 
persistent criticism will tax the most inventive apologist. 
Alan Musgrave makes a similar point in regard to theorists 
in science. Arguing against Lakatos's idea that scientists 
can always defend the hard core of their research programme, 
Musgrave points out that outstanding Newtonians tried for 
fifty years to explain Mercury's perihelion without having 
to abandon Newton's laws, but despite their undoubted 
ingenuity they failed. (Musgrave, [1978], page 195.) 
Moreover, each movement faces competition for adherents from 
many other movements; each has more critics than defenders. 
The "protective belt" may then collapse.
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4.3.4. Changing Demarcation between the Hard Core 
and the Protective Belt
Again, in assessing the relevance of Duhem's and Lakatos's 
idea to ideological survival, one must take a long-term 
view. Who is going to police the distinction between hard 
core and protective belt of an ideology down the centuries? 
As I pointed out at the beginning of section 4.3, the 
terminology of a system of ideas needs interpreting, so it 
is a conjectural matter as to whether the system of ideas is 
being reproduced or not. Thus error in a doctrine may be 
eliminated by error in transmission. Moreover, later 
adherents may well disagree, wittingly or unwittingly, with 
earlier adherents about what constitutes the privileged 
sector of beliefs, especially when the earlier adherents are 
no longer around to argue the point. These disagreements 
may be genuine mistakes in interpreting the work of their 
predecessors.
Marxism is a particularly good example here. Marx had a 
very definite idea of what communism was: an industrially
advanced society much more productive than our own without 
the buying and selling of factors of production. There 
would definitely be no market in factors of production: this 
was regarded as the indispensable part of Marxism. In the 
1920s and 1930s a devastating attack on the possibility of 
communism in this sense was launched by Ludwig von Mises and 
his pupil Friedrich von Hayek. (Mises, [1935], pages 87 to 
130.) 37
It took time for their arguments to sink in, but by the 50s 
and 60s so-called Marxists were advocating "market 
socialism". There had been no explicit acknowledgement of 
error, but the old message had been dropped by many. Not 
many Marxists today are aware of the fact that they are no
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longer reproducing what Marx said. Many self-styled 
Marxists are in fact espousing some form of pre-Marxist 
socialism; they are Owenites, Proudonists, etc, but rarely 
non-factor-market society Marxists. Many new forms of 
"Marxism" have also emerged, further threatening the 
original demarcation between the "hard core" and the 
"protective belt".
I would like to develop a general argument to show that 
there are limits to the ability of a propagandist to defend 
that part of an ideology that Lakatos might call a "hard 
core" and Watkins a "core theory". The logical ramifications 
(i.e., the information content and logical content) of a 
theory cannot be fully surveyed. Therefore, when 
modifications are made to the protective belt or subsidiary 
assumptions A, the theorist cannot always conduct a 
consistency proof to ensure that remoter consequences of the 
changes in A plus other assumptions remote from the core 
theory will be consistent with the core theory.
In the following argument I will adopt Watkins' terminology 
and distinctions with additions, but the same argument would 
carry through using Lakatos'.
T = The core theory of the ideology.
A = The subsidiary assumptions of the ideology.
A'= Modified A.
W = Total world view. The set of all assumptions, implied 
and asserted, that the individual maintains either in belief 
or in argument.
b= A'\A (that which is in A' but not in A).
Assume that T & A  implies e, but a counterexample c, which 
implies not e, is responded to by the replacement of A by 
A', which in conjunction with T implies not e (or is at 
least consistent with c). Assume that the modification of
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the subsidiary assumptions A to make A' amounts to the 
assumption b. Now, it is quite possible for b to be 
consistent with W \ T&A' and consistent with T, but for W & 
b to be inconsistent with T. For the propagandist to 
guarantee, therefore, that the adoption of A' would save T, 
he would have to survey the whole of his world view, which 
is at least practically impossible. I have assumed that the 
world view W of the ideologist includes and is larger than 
his ideology T&A. (Both Gellner and Shils have pointed to 
the fact that the ideologist exists in a surrounding culture 
that they cannot fully divest themselves of. (Shils, [1968], 
page 67.) This seems to be an inescapable part of the 
logic of the propagandist's situation: even if one assumed 
quite unrealistically that the propagandist himself was but 
a cipher of his ideology, his audience and converts have a 
much broader and richer belief system that may interact in 
unforeseeable ways with the ideology.
But the difficulty is even worse for the real life 
propagandist. Ideologies are adopted by people partly 
because they provide explanations or interpretations of new 
and unforeseen events and developments. These may include 
particular events - coup d'etats, wars, economic slumps etc 
- or theoretical developments. To do this an ideology has 
to adopt changes in the world view of its adherents and new 
subsidiary assumptions A' to interpret or explain these.
Even granting the propagandist superhuman powers that enable 
him to eventually perform a consistency proof for each 
modification it may be some time before the contradiction 
comes to light. By that time the assumption b may then have 
acquired great importance for explanatory and/or rhetorical 
reasons in maintaining adherence to the ideology. Costs in 
terms of learning alternative interpretations without b may 
also be considerable. Some of the content of T may then be 
sacrificed in order to retain b.
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The history of Marxism supplies an illustration. In [1908] 
Enrico Barone developed a system of simultaneous equations 
that described in formal terms the structure of input/output 
functions and prices in an advanced industrial economy.
Many Marxists who had been stung by Mises' argument 
mistakenly welcomed his paper as a vindication of their hope 
that an advanced industrial economy might be run according 
to a single plan. But Barone's paper actually helps one to 
understand how complex the problem of economic calculation 
is and to better understand Mises' argument. One could argue 
that having learned Barone's paper with the intention of 
bolstering their position Marxists became as an unintended 
consequence more open to counterargument.
This argument takes Watkins' distinction between the core 
theory and the subsidiary assumptions for granted. It then 
shows that even with this clear distinction between the part 
of the theory to be preserved and the expendable part, there 
is no guarantee of maintaining doctrinal integrity and 
propagational success. But with ideologies such as Marxism 
and Freudianism, there is no clear distinction between the 
core theory and the subsidiary assumptions. Thus these 
ideologies are even more open to such self-destructive 
developments than would appear at first sight in the light 
of a straightforward application of the analyses of Watkins, 
Duhem and Lakatos to ideologies.
4.4. Factionalism Generated by Unpredictable Emergence of 
Incompatible Immunizing Stratagems.
There is a tendency for different members of the original 
group to favour different stratagems, with the typical rise 
of conflicting factions which battle it out between them, 
often with a tenacity and vehemence worthy of a family feud. 
Indeed, the intensity with which factions squabble among 
themselves is greater than their quarrel with incompatible 
but non-heretical groups. Factions hate most those heretics 
most close to them. Thus a Stalinist has more venom for a 
Trotskyist than he has for a Classical Liberal. These 
factions in turn may split under the intensified criticism. 
The greater concern with close heretics than with distant 
opponents is a tacit acknowledgment that marginal 
deviations, if not checked, can eventually add up to great 
schisms. Hence the frequent resort that Christianity has 
made to special Councils to lay down explicitly what is to 
count as dogma. This is a very definite cost to the 
employment of immunising stratagems. With the formation of 
such factions the original demarcation between the "hard 
core" and the "protective belt" can easily become blurred 
and abandoned. In any living ideology there is a continual 
struggle between the attempts to achieve conformity and the 
unintended deviations tending to the formation of factions. 
It is a form of unstable equilibrium in two senses.
Firstly, even in the most stable reproduction of the 
ideology, there is a continual oscillation between deviation 
and correction. Secondly, once a faction is formed the 
forces leading to deviation increase dramatically. The best 
analogy in mechanics is a balancing act.
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4.4.1. Unfathomable Implications of an Ideology
The question naturally arises: could not some very 
determined propagandist settle the problem as to what 
stratagems will be needed and used in advance and so keep 
the faithful on the one true path? All new recruits could 
be specifically enjoined to keep to these and only these 
stratagems. This would be analogous to Lakatos's "positive 
heuristic". However, this problem of propaganda is in 
principle unsolvable.
This circumstance springs from certain logical properties of 
theories which make it impossible for any individual or 
group to foresee what specific immunising stratagems will be 
needed in response to awkward questions and criticism. The 
work of Church and others can be used to show that no 
ideologist could construct such a proven complete set of 
immunizing stratagems.
What our propagandist needs in order to guarantee his 
position in advance is an effective method of listing all 
and only the possible counterexamples to his ideology, so 
that he can check whether any proposed set of immunizing 
responses would meet all these possible difficulties. An 
effective method is one that can in principle be carried out 
by a machine: at any stage the method unequivocally 
determines how the computation shall proceed and terminate. 
According to Church's theorem of the undecidability of the 
predicate calculus this cannot be done. Imagine an arbitrary 
set of sentences constructed according to the rules of the 
predicate calculus. Church's theorem amounts to saying that 
there is no mechanical way of sorting these sentences into 
two sets: the set consisting of those sentences that are 
tautologous consequences and the set of those sentences that 
are not tautologous consequences. Because although any
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tautologous theorem will eventually be placed in the 
tautologous set, there is no way of telling of any sentence 
not so placed whether it is non-tautologous or whether the 
method has yet to class it as such. A consequence of 
Church's theorem is that any theory with universal and 
existential quantification ("all" and "some" statements) 
plus unambiguous cross-referencing cannot be supplied with 
an effective negative proof of theoremhood. In the 
propositional calculus the truth-table method can determine 
eventually whether any particular sentence is a logical 
truth or not. The truth-table method is an effective 
positive and negative test of logical truth for this system. 
However, only a positive test is available for the predicate 
calculus. But the predicate calculus describes the formal 
structure of the most interesting part of ideologies: the 
claims to universal significance.
Now, every non-tautologous theorem of a theory is false in 
some interpretation; i.e. every non-tautologous consequence 
has a possible counterexample. It follows that there cannot 
be an effective method of constructing counterexamples, for 
if there were then there would be a effective method of 
determining of any sentence whether it is not a tautologous 
theorem, contrary to Church's thesis. Our propagandist 
cannot therefore determine in advance a set of immunizing 
stratagems that would deal with all and only the possible 
counterexamples to his ideology because he cannot even 
determine the set of possible counterexamples to check them 
against. Of course, the argument does not exclude the 
possibility of the propagandists' simply guessing correctly 
what the possible counterexamples to his ideology are. 
However, we will see below that even in principle such 
counterexamples cannot be listed: they are indenumerably 
infinite.
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The non-trivial implications of any theory are infinite. No 
individual or group could therefore survey all possible 
criticisms and prepare standard responses to deal with them. 
To develop this argument it is helpful to distinguish 
between two associated but different senses of the content 
of a statement or theory, which Popper has called 'logical 
content' and 'informative content'.
The logical content of a theory consists of the set of all 
(nontautological) consequences which can be derived from the 
statement of the theory. The informative content of a 
theory consists of the set of all those statements which are 
logically incompatible with the theory. The latter idea 
derives from the intuitive idea that a theory tells us more 
the more it prohibits or excludes.
There is a one-to-one correspondence between the informative 
content and the logical content of a theory, for to every 
element of the one class there is an element in the other 
class that is its negation. Thus whenever logical content 
grows, informative content grows also and to the same 
degree.
Now the argument for the infinite size of the logical 
content of any theory can be presented as Popper presents 
it:
Let there be an infinite list of statements a, b, 
c,..., which are pair-wise contradictory, and 
which individually do not entail t. Then the 
statement 111 or a or both" is deducible from t, 
and therefore belongs to the logical content of t.
From our assumptions regarding a, b, c,...,it can 
be shown that no pair of statements of the
sequence "t or a or both", "t or b or
both",...,entail one another. It then follows 
that the logical content of t must be infinite.
(Popper, [1976], pages 26 & 27.)
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The following is a proof of the assumption that no pairs of 
the infinite sequence of statements entail one another.
The statement "b or t or both" follows from "a or t or both" 
if and only if it follows from a; that is, if and only if it 
follows from "a and non-b". But this last statement says 
the same as a (because b contradicts a). Thus "b or t or 
both" follows from "a or t or both" if and only if t follows 
from a; and this, by assumption, it does not.
Popper argues that since the information content of any 
theory is infinite, we can never know all that we talk 
about. Thus since Einstein's theory is incompatible with 
Newton's theory it must be part of the information content 
of Newton's theory. Newton could hardly have been expected 
to know this. Indeed, there are an infinite number of 
complex, non-trivial theories which are part of the 
information content of Newton's theory.
"t" could be: "Communism will be realized when market 
monopolization has increased to the point where there is 
only one capitalist agency. And under present trends p, this 
will occur in exactly n years". (Where p is a specification 
of the characteristics of the trend, and n is a finite 
number.) Then the infinite sequence of pair-wise 
contradictory statements can be constructed by substituting 
n+1, n+2, n+3,..n+y, and so on for the rest of the natural 
numbers. Clearly, however large n is there remain an 
infinite number of logically possible years in which 
communism could be established. The same can be done with 
the hypothesis about trends, p. But all these theories, 
even though they are but a variation on t, constitute an 
infinite set and every one of them contradicts t.
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Each of the above arguments is sufficient to show that 
Manning made a very serious error in saying that ideologists
...see all in the way of their belief and see all
of what they believe. (Manning, [1976], page 141.)
In putting his ideas into text the ideologist changes in a 
very special way the logic of his situation. He creates a 
set of ideas whose implications and ramifications go far 
beyond his comprehension and thus control. He cannot 
completely foresee how they will fare in argument, what sort 
of criticism they will provoke etc. In fact, this problem 
goes far beyond the capacity of any abstractly conceived 
predictor. In an important sense the ideologist becomes 
alienated from his own thought. (Bartley was well aware of 
this implication, but in some respects did not apply it to 
the evolution of an ideology under criticism. See especially 
Bartley "Alienation Alienated", chapter XVIII of [1987].) 
More importantly for our problem, no leader of a movement 
can control how the various propagandists will deal with 
criticism, specifically which immunising stratagem (in our 
example, which substitutes for n or p) will be created in 
response to each criticism.
As I argued in chapter 1 the logic of the propagandist's 
situation is such that if an ideology is to survive and 
propagate, its chances of doing so are increased if its 
adherents actually propagandise. The various propagandists 
will then meet various counterarguments. But at least some 
of these counterarguments will be unpredictable. As Popper 
has argued, new ideas - which includes criticisms and 
defences - cannot be predicted. (Popper, [1957].) If the 
number of propagandists is quite small, then they may 
continually consult with each other about the appropriate 
response to each criticism. On the other hand, if the 
number of propagandists is significantly large, then their
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responses to counterargument cannot be controlled by some 
kind of democratic decision or from a centre. The responses 
must be improvised there and then in debate. The 
possibility is then open for different propagandists to 
improvise quite different "immunizing stratagems". This 
will, of course set up the basis for the emergence of 
factions. But the gulf between such various factions runs 
deeper. In understanding a criticism one is understanding 
the theory being criticised, either because the criticism 
brings out a previously unnoticed implication or because one 
sees that it does not. If different propagandists improvise 
different immunising stratagems, they are at the same time 
developing (perhaps overlapping but) different 
understandings of the original canonical theory. As is 
clear from the above example of a Marxist style t, a 
propagandistic theory allows infinite room for divergence of 
opinion on what figure, n+y, to substitute for a falsified 
prediction n. (The substitution may occur not in response 
to a failed prediction but as a necessary consequence of 
other changes in the overall doctrine.)
In addition, each new immunising stratagem brings its own 
problems. And since the argument is general, each problem 
may be solved in any of an infinite number of ways. So we 
have a rapid accumulation of possibilities for the emergence 
of factions, the various propagandists possibly holding 
increasingly divergent interpretations of the same 
symbolism.
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4.4.2. The General Structure of Immunizing 
Responses to Criticism
I have maintained that the introduction of an immunizing 
stratagem will bring with it its own problems, which will 
need further immunizing moves. I have also maintained that 
this process gets us further and further away from the 
original theory. If I am right and the succession of 
immunized theories are in fact different theories how do we 
account for the appearance of continuity, for the 
relatedness of the theories? Once we grasp the general 
structure of the process that spurs the ideologist on from 
one theory to the next, we will have the answer to this 
question.
The general pattern of ideological evolution under criticism 
conforms to a schema proposed by Popper [1965] for the 
development of science:
Problem 1 — ► Theory 1 — ^  Error Elimination Problem 2
The original theory is an attempt to solve a problem. But 
this solution often has unforeseen problems of its own, so 
we have problem 2. This new problem then prompts the 
modification to the original theory to yield a different 
theory, theory 2. The pattern is infinitely iterative. 
Popper argues that even the problems are theory impregnated, 
and this is also true, though not at first sight, of 
practical problems. It might at first seem that some 
practical problems, such as pain or severe cold, are just 
felt. However, practical problems arise, Popper argues, 
because something has gone wrong because of an unexpected 
event. But this means that the organism has previously
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adjusted to its situation by some expectation, a pre- 
linguistic theory. (Popper, [1976], pages 132 - 133.)
To illustrate how this schema can be applied outside of what 
Popper would regard as science, we may point to the 
evolution of the idea of original sin. This example is 
taken from Wells [1988]. The belief that God is just 
naturally leads to the expectation that the virtuous will be 
rewarded and the wicked punished. (Theory 1.) But the 
suffering of innocents makes it hard to believe that 
happiness and unhappiness are distributed according to this 
principle. Christians, therefore, had a problem in 
reconciling their belief with the world. (Problem 1.) Now 
the idea that God will compensate the innocent sufferer in 
heaven and punish the happy wicked in hell was unavailable 
to the early Hebrews because they had no belief in 
immortality. So the Christians supposed that the innocent 
sufferer was paying for the sins of some wicked ancestor. 
After all, it is always easy to imagine some wicked 
ancestor; any possible refuting evidence is more difficult 
to collect since one can hardly survey the whole of anyone's 
ancestry. The Christians were then armed with a new and 
"immunized" theory. (Theory 2.) But this in turn brought its 
own problem, since it implies that the good in every 
succeeding generation must be punished until the end of the 
world, and that there is nothing one can do about it. 
(Problem 2.) This then prompts the emergence of a revision 
in the earlier doctrine, an elimination of error. The 
Christian idea of Atonement is such a revision: we are 
cleansed of our inherited sins by the death of Jesus, 
providing we have faith in him. (Theory 3.)
The logic of the situation is often much more complex, as is 
hinted in the above analysis of how immunizing stratagems 
may lead to the break up of a movement. The situation is 
perhaps better rendered with a branching structure in which
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each node represents an emerging faction dealing with the 
same problem in a different way (or with different problems, 
since factions may even disagree on what are the problems).
The above schema will help us to understand how Marx and 
Freud were led from one position to another in response to 
criticism. The schema helps us to see how the successive 
theories are, though different, related to one another. The 
thread that seems to tie them together is a problem: 
specifically the sequence of unpredictable problems that the
attempt to solve an original problem leads to. We also see
that since the way criticism is dealt with cannot be
predicted, any living doctrine must in one sense be a
rambling structure. The rambling nature of the doctrine 
through time is no obstacle to our analysis, but its very
object. (It is interesting to note at this point that over
considerable time the importance of the various problems may 
shift considerably, either because later generations have 
forgotten the original primary problem or have different 
interests.)
The schema will also help us to identify immunizing 
stratagems. When identifying immunizing stratagems it is 
not sufficient to analyse individual statements. One has to 
relate the sequence of theories to the original problem that 
the first theory was meant to solve. (In some cases we are 
fortunate to be able to relate the alleged immunizing 
stratagem to the explicitly formulated objectives of the
theorist and his intentions to solve it. We will see that we
can do this quite clearly in the case of both Marx and 
Freud.) For example, in the case of the swan hypothesis 
talk of essence could be identified as an immunizing 
stratagem if the original problem was to give empirical 
information about all swans - which in the hypothetical 
example is taken for granted.
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4.5. Marxism
Now let us deal with a less trivial example of Popper's. In 
the Open Society Popper argues that Marx's theory of social 
development was refuted by the Russian revolution of 1917:
According to Marx the revolutionary changes start 
at the bottom, as it were: means of production 
changes first, then social conditions of 
production, then political power, and ultimately 
ideological beliefs, which change last. But in 
the Russian revolution the political power changed 
first, and then the ideology (Dictatorship plus 
Electrification) began to change the social 
conditions and the means of production from the 
top. The reinterpretation of Marx's theory of 
revolution to evade this falsification immunized 
it against further attacks, transforming it in to 
the vulgar Marxist theory that the 1 economic 
motive and the class struggle pervade social life. 
(Popper, [1976], page 43.)
Popper's claim here is quite bold and interesting:
(1) The original theory is saved from falsification; and
(2) Immunized against further attacks.
It must be clear that the reinterpretation that Popper is 
speaking of here is no mere change of conceptual baggage; 
there is a change in informative content as one theory is 
replaced by another. The vulgar Marxist theory is a new 
theory which did not exist before the Russian revolution and 
in preference for which the original economic historicism 
was repudiated. In the competition of ideas, Marx's theory 
of revolution has lost, and this is true even if Marxists 
are unaware that they are no longer reproducing Marx's 
theory.
Is the theory immunised against further attacks? In a way 
it is, for it is no longer presented in debate for criticism 
(although the text is still accessible to criticism).
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Vulgar Marxism clearly is subject to less criticism for it 
has less information content. Indeed, it may not be open to 
empirical refutation. This is the important truth in 
Popper's claim that the substitute theory (for that is what 
it is) is not open to further attack. But in so far as it 
makes any claim, it is still open to some possible 
criticism, and is therefore open to future attacks. 
Moreover, even if it is not open to criticism with respect 
to the truth, it is open to the methodological criticism 
that the substitution is unacknowledged and reduces 
information. We should not overlook the possibilities 
here for confusion, and the notion of the immunizing 
stratagem may do a lot to clarify to the Marxist what his 
theoretical manoeuvrerings amount to.
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4.6. Labour Theory of Value
Marx's labour theory of value affords another example of a 
theory whose immunising stratagems served to abandon the 
original theory. In Capital Marx argues that in equilibrium 
prices of commodities, including that of labour-power, are 
proportional to the amount of labour currently required in 
their production. It was Marx's intention to probe beyond 
the two factors of supply and demand which many economists 
in his day thought sufficient to explain market phenomena. 
Marx called this reliance on supply and demand vulgar 
economics. However, in developing the theory in Vol.I of 
Capital [1867] Marx introduces a number of restrictions and 
qualifications which effectively repudiate the original 
theory, absorbing into the very conceptual structure of his 
theory supply and demand. The main immunising stratagem is 
carried through changes in the interpretation of the term 
"socially necessary labour time". These changes are not 
simply changes of conceptual structure, but changes in 
informative content.
In discussions about immunising stratagems it is normally 
taken for granted that the immunising stratagem is 
introduced much later than the original theory, only after 
the original has encountered much embarrassing criticism 
from outside sources. Part of the charm of Marx's theory is 
that it was issued with its own stratagem. Despite his 
failure, one can see in this Marx's sincere attempt to come 
to terms with facts and possible objections. It certainly 
can not be said of Marx's theory that it disregards 
criticism.
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4.6.1. The Problem the Labour Theory of Value 
was meant to Solve
As I pointed out in section ... to identify immunizing 
stratagems we must first understand clearly what the 
theorist's problem is and how he intends to solve it.
Marx begins his exposition of the labour theory of value in 
Vol I of Capital with this rather interesting argument:
Let us take two commodities, e.g., corn and iron.
The proportions in which they are exchangeable, 
whatever those proportions may be, can always be 
represented by an equation in which a given 
quantity of corn is equated to some quantity of 
iron: e.g., 1 quarter corn = x cwt. iron. What 
does this equation tell us? It tells us that in 
two different things - in 1 quarter of corn and x 
cwt. of iron, there exists in equal quantities 
something common to both. The two things must 
therefore be equal to a third, which in itself is 
neither the one nor the other. Each of them, so 
far as it is an exchange value, must be reducible 
to this third. (Marx, [1867], page 45.)
Thus Marx's problem is to discover this third quantity which 
will explain the exchange ratio of commodities, and hence 
their price. Marx conceived of his project as similar to 
John Dalton's work in explaining the ratios in which 
different chemical elements combine by postulating an 
underlying factor. However, Marx was also under the 
influence of Hegelian dialectic, which sometimes made Marx 
think that he could prove and derive scientific theories by 
mere argument. (On the other hand, Marx was not cocooned 
within this Hegelian approach and was not altogether 
insensitive to empirical facts.) In private communication 
David McDonagh has made the interesting suggestion that 
Marx's use of such aprioristic arguments has more to do with 
Marx's admiration for the work of Aristotle, especially, in
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this connection, his method of intuiting the essence of 
things. 38 Thus Marx proceeds with an argument by 
elimination to establish what this third quantity can be:
This common "something" cannot be a geometrical, 
a chemical, or any other natural property of 
commodities. Such properties attract our 
attention only in so far as they affect the 
utility of those commodities, make them use- 
values. But the exchange of commodities is 
evidently an act characterised by a total 
abstraction from use-value. If we leave out of 
consideration the use value of commodities, they 
have only one common property left, that of being 
products of labour. (Ibid. page 45.)
It is less my concern here to point out the fallacy in this 
argument than to note that Marx begins by assuming that 
prices are equal to values, defined as quantities of labour­
time. Defenders of this bold assumption from superficial 
criticisms have been keen to point out that Marx regarded 
this initial statement of the theory as a starting point for 
further development. (Recent examples are Roemer [1988], 
page 47; Elster [1987], page 121; Sowell [1985], page 
103.) What they have not noticed is that Marx not only 
qualifies this conclusion but completely contradicts it, 
finally producing a theory in which labour hours play no 
explanatory role at all. Marx begins by explaining prices 
in terms of labour time, but through a number of 
redefinitions of the term "socially necessary labour time" 
he produces a theory which explains labour time in terms of 
prices. The final theory makes essential use of use value 
(or utility), which Marx here explicitly excluded.
Marx's theory of value was also intended to explain the 
following problem: how can a capitalist buy capital and 
labour at their equilibrium market value then sell the 
finished product at equilibrium market value and still make 
a profit, without the aid of theft or fraud? This problem
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had to be solved in tandem with showing that the profit thus 
made in accord with justice is made by exploiting workers. 
(Roemer [1988], page 2, takes this to be the only point of 
the labour theory of value.) This special part of Marx's 
project is effectively abandoned by Volume III, which 
presents a cost of production theory of price and profit, 
though ostensibly maintaining the ultimate determining 
influence of labour time. Nevertheless, independently of 
this Marx abandons his project in Volume I because of the 
way socially necessary labour time is eventually defined.
Let us first examine this abandonment.
4.6.2. A Series of inadvertently Self-inflicted Injuries to
the labour theory of value.
On the way to the final theory in Volume I Marx can be seen 
struggling with counterexamples. And it is in trying to 
take account of these recalcitrant facts that Marx step by 
step abandons the original theory.
Marx begins by taking account of two obvious objections. If 
the labourer is lazy or inefficient, or uses inferior 
technology, then he would spend longer producing his 
product. Would this make his product more valuable, ie, 
fetch a higher price? Marx gets round this by stipulating 
that it is not any labour that counts, but only socially 
necessary labour.
Some people might think that if the value of a 
commodity is determined by the quantity of labour 
spent on it, the more idle and unskillful the 
labourer, the more valuable would his commodity 
be, because more time would be required in its 
production. However, the total labour-power of 
society counts as one homogeneous mass of human 
labour-power, composed though it be of innumerable 
individual units. Each of these is the same as 
any other, so far as it has the character of the 
average labour power of society, and takes effect 
as such, so far as it requires for producing a
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commodity no more than is needed on average, no 
more than is socially necessary. The labour-time 
socially necessary is that required to produce an 
article under the normal conditions of production, 
with the average degree of skill and intensity 
prevalent at the time. The introduction of power 
looms into England probably reduced by one-half 
the labour required to weave a given quantity of 
yarn into cloth. The hand-loom weavers continued 
to require the same time as before, but for all 
that, the product of one hour of their labour 
represented after the change only half an hours 
social labour, and consequently fell to one-half 
of its former value. What determines the value of 
any article is the amount of labour socially 
necessary. Each commodity is to be considered as 
an average sample of its class. (Ibid. pp. 46-47.)
Marx is saying that to calculate the value of each commodity 
we should take the total labour required to produce the 
whole supply of commodities of that particular kind, and 
divide by the number of commodities of that kind.
But even if we only count socially necessary labour as here 
defined, some labour - skilled labour - clearly produces 
more value than other labour. Marx's response to this 
problem is to treat skilled labour as multiples of unskilled 
labour - "simple, average labour". But by what means do we 
reduce the one to the other? Marx says that "Experience 
shows that this reduction is constantly being made", (ibid. 
p. 51.) That is, the reduction is made by the process of 
exchange. The ratio of skilled labour to unskilled labour 
is the ratio in which their products exchange. Marx has 
forgotten that the problem is to explain price in terms of 
labour time, not labour time in terms of price. Bohm-Bawerk 
seems to be the first to have noticed and criticised this 
aspect of Marx's argument. (Bohm-Bawerk, [1896]) It is true 
that Marx tries to deal with this in another way later by 
reducing skilled to simple labour via the labour expended by 
teachers in developing the skills. However, as Elster
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points out, this and subsequent attempts by defenders of the 
labour theory of value, have failed. 39
Suppose a great deal of socially necessary labour has been 
spent on a thing which is useless. No one will buy it, so 
it will have no exchange-value at all. Marx sees this 
obvious objection, but his solution is far from happy. He 
simply stipulates that:
...nothing can have value, without being an object 
of utility. If a thing is useless, so is the 
labour contained in it; the labour does not count 
as labour, and therefore creates no value. (Ibid. 
p. 48.) (We are reminded of the man who denied 
that black swans were swans simply because they 
contradicted his theory.)
Here we have a simple contradiction of what Marx had said 
earlier:
...the exchange of commodities is evidently an act 
characterised by a total abstraction from use 
value. (Ibid. p. 45.)
We no Longer have the original theory, but one which makes 
essential use of utility.
Is usefulness just a necessary condition, given the 
satisfaction of which the exchange ratio is then determined 
by the number of socially necessary labour hours spent? 
Apparently not. Marx says:
Suppose that every piece of linen in the market 
contains no more labour than is socially 
necessary. In spite of this all the pieces taken 
as a whole may have had superfluous labour-time 
spent upon them. If the market cannot stomach the 
whole quantity at the normal price of 2 shillings 
a yard, this proves that too great a portion of 
the total labour of the community has been 
expended in the form of weaving. The effect is 
the same as if each weaver had expended more
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labour-time upon his particular product than is 
socially necessary.
Thus we finally learn that how much labour counts as 
socially necessary labour time is itself defined in terms of 
the results of exchange, in terms of what it was supposed to 
explain! The semblance of a labour theory of value is 
maintained throughout by using the term "socially necessary 
labour time", but in the development of this notion the 
original theory is jettisoned, and replaced by one that 
actually contradicts it. It is significant that ammunition 
for the criticism of Marx's doctrine can be found in the 
canonical text, and this fact has been very important in the 
evolution of Marxism - specifically, its lack of success in 
the British socialist circles.
In 1884, the economist, active socialist and Unitarian 
Minister, the Reverend Philip Henry Wickstead criticized of 
Marx in a socialist journal. George Bernard Shaw replied to 
this article, defending Marx's labour theory of value. A 
debate ensued and Wicksteed, drawing on the material in 
Capital, convinced Shaw that the labour theory of value was 
false and the new marginal theory true. (By marginal theory 
I mean the theory of marginal utility developed in the 1870s 
by Jevons, Menger and Walrus.) This played a considerable 
part in ensuring that British socialism never became 
Marxist.
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Wicksteed pointed out that Marx himself had said that, to 
produce value, labour must be useful labour. It followed 
that it is not true that the only thing in common between
commodities is labour; they also have usefulness:
If only useful labour counts, then when the wares 
are reduced to mere indifferent products of such 
labour in the abstract, they are still useful in 
the abstract, and therefore it is not true that 
"nothing remains to them but the attribute of 
being products of labour", for the attribute of
being useful also remains to them.
Marx only completed and published Volume One of Capital 
during his lifetime. The other three volumes were composed 
by Engels from his notes and published after his death. Even 
though Marx had explicitly worked out the analysis in volume 
III of Capital several years before he published volume I, 
it was 16 years after the publication of volume I that 
volume III was published. Many have supposed that it was 
ill-health that delayed Marx. However, there is another 
possibility. One could argue that Marx's slowness in getting 
Capital finished was due to his seeing the faults in the 
whole enterprise. The problems with the labour theory of 
value became increasingly obstinate, leading Marx into 
contradictory positions which eventually demoralised Marx. 
It was only through Engels' pestering Marx continually that 
Volume One was completed.
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4.6.3. Summary of Development of the Labour Theory of Value 
in Vol I According to our Schema
Problem 1.
What determines the price of commodities in 
capitalism?
Theory 1.
Amount of labour time in producing the commodity. 
Problem 2.
But any labour will not count: namely lazy or 
inefficient labour.
Theory 2.
It is the socially necessary labour time that 
determines the price of a commodity.(socially 
necessary labour time defined at this stage only 
in terms of technical conditions of production.)
Problem 3.
But skilled socially necessary labour fetches a 
higher price than unskilled socially necessary 
labour.
Theory 3.
Skilled labour is just a multiple of unskilled 
labour. We can calculate this from observing the 
ratio in which skilled labour is exchanged for 
unskilled, that is, the ratio of their prices.
Supply and demand introduced and original 
intention violated. We therefore have an 
immunizing stratagem, and moreover one that 
abandons original theory.
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Problem 4.
If a commodity has no use, it will not sell. But 
we have defined S.N.L.T. independently of use 
value.
Theory 4.
The labour that went into its production does not 
count as labour. Socially necessary labour is now 
defined as necessarily useful. Use value is 
introduced and therefore original the intention is 
violated. We therefore have an immunizing 
stratagem. This also abandons the original 
theory.
4.6.4. Abandonment of the theory of 
Exploitation and Profit.
My central concern in section 5.6.3. was to show how Marx 
abandons his labour theory of value in Vol I of Capital. I 
should, however, say something about how Marx abandons the 
theory of exploitation derived from his general theory of 
prices, and also how this collapse in Marx's project 
together with Bohm-Bawerk's classic refutation has affected 
contemporary "Marxists".
Recall that the purpose of the theory of surplus value is to 
explain how, without resort to fraud, theft or violence, a 
capitalist, buying and selling goods at their value, can 
make a profit by exploiting workers. Some intellectuals 
before Marx, such as the English socialist John Bray and the 
notable contemporary of Marx, Pierr-Joseph Proudhon, argued 
that interest and profit were made through swindling the 
workers. To prevent this, Proudhon even proposed that 
interest be eliminated by making prices conform to labour 
values. Marx's method is to build a model of capitalism
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that ignores violence and fraud, in order to show that even 
so workers are exploited.
Marx first points out that labour itself is a commodity, and 
so its value will be proportional to the amount of socially 
necessary labour time required to produce it. This in turn 
will amount to the labour required to furnish the labourer's 
subsistence. Marx then makes a distinction between labour 
and labour power. It is labour power that the labourer 
sells, not labour as such. This arises because a capitalist 
contracts a labourer to work for a period of time and can 
within this period legally command the labourer to produce 
more than his means of subsistence. The difference between 
the labourer's means of subsistence, counted in labour time, 
and the extra labour time the capitalist makes the worker 
perform is what Marx calls surplus value. (He also takes 
this as a measure of exploitation.) Because prices are 
proportional to labour time, then it follows that profits 
will be proportional to surplus value. Moreover, since Marx 
had also maintained that labour time is the sole determinant 
of value and therefore price, it follows also that machines, 
raw material and factories etc, though made by labour, do 
not add any new value to the product, but simply pass on 
their labour values to the product. Thus surplus value is a 
necessary and sufficient condition of profits. It follows 
that profits should be proportional only to the amount of 
labour used; capital intensive industries should receive 
lower profits.
Marx noticed, however, that in a competitive market profit 
rates between industries are equalized with respect to the 
amount of total capital irrespective of the amount of living 
labour that a given capital represented. This meant that 
profits could not be proportional to surplus value, except 
in unusual circumstances - when the ratio between variable 
and fixed capital is the same in all industries, and when
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profit is zero. Bowm-Bawerk showed that Marx's attempt to 
save the theory of value from this hard fact in Vol III of 
Capital is unsuccessful. Marx substitutes a cost of 
production theory for the labour theory of value, but tries 
to maintain the semblance of the original claim by various 
arguments intended to show that prices are in some sense 
still ultimately governed by what he still calls "the law of 
value”.
Contemporary Marxists such as Steedman and Morishima have to 
a large extent absorbed the impact of Bowm-Bawerk's classic 
refutation of Marx's labour theory of value. However, they 
try to retain some of the flavour of Marx's theory of profit 
by asserting that there still is some relationship between 
surplus labour and profit. Thus Morishima, for example, 
maintains, as the "fundamental theorem of Marxist 
economics", that a positive rate of surplus value is a 
necessary and sufficient condition of a positive rate of 
profit. But as Elster points out, a similar theorem can be 
demonstrated for any commodity employed in production, and 
so does not show anything special about labour. Obviously, 
profits are possible only if workers do not consume the 
whole net product. Similarly, profits are possible only if 
the electricity bill does not consume the whole net product. 
Moreover, such a theorem does not establish a causal 
connection. (Elster [1987], page 141.) Thus, in order to 
retain some credible element of the labour theory of value 
the proportionality between value and price is jettisoned. 
The result is a replacement theory of vastly less 
information content than its predecessor. But more 
interestingly, one that is also open to obvious objections.
Many other so-called Marxists have trod a similar path from 
the original theory propounded in Capital. For example, 
Clarke ([1982], page 99.) reduces the labour theory of value 
to the observation that within the labour contract
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characteristic of capitalism the capitalist can require the 
labourer to perform more work than necessary to furnish his 
subsistence. Clarke fails to notice that in imasculating 
the theory in this way he jettisons a determinate theory of 
price and profit.
My conclusion to this section must be that through many 
twists and turns and obscure incremental concessions to both 
internal and external criticism, the labour theory of value 
has been substantially jettisoned either explicitly or by 
implication.
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4.7. Freudianism 
In this section I argue the following points:
(1) Some components of Freudianism are open to empirical 
falsification.
(2) The basic theory, whatever that is, may not be 
falsifiable; it may be metaphysical in Popper's sense. But 
it is nevertheless open to sound arguments, and therefore 
its persistence is not guaranteed by its being closed to
sound criticism in general.
(3) On the basis of conclusions reached in previous 
chapters, I argue that these sound arguments can be 
psychologically/sociologically effective in undermining 
Freudianism. The perpetuation of Freudianism cannot be 
guaranteed, therefore, by immunizing stratagems, or by 
adopting a metaphysical structure.
Popper's first argument against the scientific status of 
Freud's theory was propounded in 1919. This argument is 
intended to show that contrary to a good scientific theory, 
Freud's theory cannot clash with any particular empirical 
behaviour: whatever the conceivable behaviour the theory
can account for it. Popper argues that Freud's theory is
different to Marx's theory, because whereas Marx's theory 
was empirical at first and only later became empirically 
irrefutable, Freud's basic theory was irrefutable from the 
beginning. Popper says that the theory does not need any 
immunizing stratagems to make it irrefutable. Thus in 
Popper's terminology it is a pseudo-scientific theory from 
the start.
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Popper illustrates this with two radically opposite types of 
behaviour. A man pushes a child into the water with the 
intention of drowning it; and another sacrifices his life in 
an attempt to save the child. According to Freud the first 
man suffered from repression (possibly of some element of 
his Oedipus complex) while the second man had achieved 
sublimation. The same fault characterises Adler's theory. 
According to Adler the first man suffered from feelings of 
inferiority (making him want to dare to commit a crime); and 
so did the second man (who wanted to prove to himself that 
he dared take a risk). Popper is saying that the basic 
theory of Psychoanalysis does not have any basic statements.
This argument only shows that Freudian theory does not 
predict specific behaviours. It does not show that Freudian 
theory is devoid of empirical implications which can clash 
with experiment. (But is this same as having potential 
falsifiers?) The theory may still be open to statistical 
tests. To illustrate what I mean, consider Eysenck's theory 
of personality. This theory predicts that most variation in 
personality between persons can be explained as occurring 
along two dimensions - extroversion/introversion and 
emotionality. This theory does not predict specific 
behaviours. Any particular behaviour may be interpreted as 
either extroverted or introverted. Nevertheless, we do not 
reject this theory as being without empirical implications, 
since if a population of people is assessed by questionnaire 
for their specific position along these poles of variation 
we can then go on to make predictions about how the more 
extroverted, for example, will differ in their responses to 
various other tests from the more introverted. The 
predictions will concern more or less response to the 
different tests, not precisely delineated behaviours; for 
example, that the more introverted will respond more to 
alcohol than the more extroverted.
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Does Freud's or Adler's theory rule out any possibilities? 
Popper seems to accept S. Bernfeld's suggestion that Freud's 
theory predicts that the man will either repress or 
sublimate, but cannot tell which. (Popper, [1983], Vol I. 
page 169.) Is this verdict unfair? For example, it might 
be said Newtonian theory will not predict any particular 
event without the assistance of initial conditions: we do 
not thereby regard it as unscientific and closed to 
empirical refutation. Likewise, a Freudian interpretation 
must include details of the individuals whose behaviour is 
being predicted or interpreted. Given such details we may 
then be able to decide in advance whether a sublimation or a 
repression is to be expected. But as we saw in our 
discussion of Lakatos's views, Newtonian theory does make 
some kinds of prediction without initial conditions; it does 
exclude some states of affairs within its domain. Indeed any 
empirical theory, Popper argues, allows the derivation of 
what we might call "negative predictions". For example, from 
the theory "All swans are white" we can derive the 
prediction "You will not observe a black swan at 10 am at 
place p on the 14th February, 1992". (example adapted from 
Popper [1974], page 998.)
The important question for Popper is: do Freudians supply 
such initial conditions in a way that is governed by the 
general theory? Newtonian theory will tell you what the 
variables are whose values must be specified; does 
Freudianism do this? It would appear that for the basic 
theory no such initial conditions are specifiable.
Moreover, there do not seem to be even observable negative 
predictions. One might say that one can derive the negative 
prediction "Tomorrow at 10 a.m., if Jones is performing any 
psychologically important action, then he will not fail to 
be either sublimating or repressing". But such a prediction 
is unobservable, and therefore cannot be refuted.
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So we cannot argue that Freudianism is on the same footing 
as Newtonian theory. Clearly its predictions are more 
vague. Can it be argued that like the interpretations of 
everyday life, Freudian interpretations can be right or 
wrong and the subject of severe criticism, albeit criticism 
that is not as severe as that to which Newtonian theory is 
subject?
Jim Hopkins discusses this issue in his article 
"Epistemology and Depth Psychology". Arguing against 
Grunbaum's position that Freud's ascription of motives 
stands in need of inductive support, Hopkins says that 
Psychoanalytic theory seems to be an extension of 
commonsense understanding, and therefore if commonsense does 
not need inductive support - and Hopkins assumes it does not 
-, then neither does Psychoanalytic interpretations. In an 
extension of folk psychology, we try to extend motivational 
explanations to phenomena not covered by commonsense.
Hopkins illustrates his point in connection with Freud's 
theory of dreams:
In rational action motives produce willed 
intentions and real actions aimed at satisfaction.
Here they produce wishes and mere representations 
of satisfaction, on the pattern of wishful 
imagining. (Article in Clarke and Wright, eds,
[1988], page 41.)
Hopkins's argument is endorsed by Peter Binns ([1990], 
pages 531 - 552.). See also my discussion of Sabastion 
Gardiner's talk at the 1990 Annual Popper Conference, 
footnote 10. The argument seems to be invalid. A lot
hinges on the extent to which psychoanalysis is an extension 
of commonsense. Grunbaum might argue that if Hopkins' 
argument were allowed then one could argue by analogy that 
physics is in some sense an extension of commonsense, and 
could therefore jettison its inductive procedures - clearly 
a non sequitur. Grunbaum might also retort that commonsense
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employs induction, or even that Neo-Baconian rules of 
induction are an extension of commonsense, so that Hopkins' 
recourse to commonsense would not rule out Neo-Baconian 
rules of induction. Hopkins fails to examine the 
possibility that commonsense is at fault. As I point out in 
my comments on Gardiner's argument, Popper's proposal is not 
that Freudianism be abandoned, but that its advocates try to 
enhance its empirical content. Now while psychoanalysis may 
be an improvement on commonsense in this respect (for it may 
at least be moving in the direction of increased content, if 
not quite empirical), it is not sufficient to say that it 
has improved on commonsense, if this is thought to exonerate 
it from any further demands. This last point is especially 
important if Hopkins thinks that the last word on 
psychoanalytic method is commonsense.
Popper has accepted Bartley's critical point that Freud's 
theory of paranoia is refutable. Freud's explanation of 
paranoia in term of repressed homosexuality would seem to 
rule out active homosexual paranoids. (Popper [1983], Vol.I, 
page 169.) However, Popper says that this hypothesis is not 
part of the basic theory he was criticizing.
Nevertheless, whether Freudianism is refutable or not, my 
main contention holds: Freudianism, like Marxism, is 
criticizable and, moreover, has been abandoned in response 
to criticism. But we can say that at least some important 
components of Freud's theoretical edifice are refutable. To 
illustrate this thesis, I will focus on one of Popper's own 
examples: Freud's theory of dreams. We will then examine 
whether Freud's "basic theory" is refutable, and if not, the 
extent to which it is criticizable.
There is one theory of Freud's which is eminently refutable, 
since it is refuted every night: the theory of dreams.
Popper argues that it is not refutable, or at least that it
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has been made irrefutable by the addition of a number of 
immunizing devices. Specifically through the distinction 
between manifest and latent content, and finally by 
rejecting the original problem Freud set for his theory of 
dreams. Popper would accept that the theory is still open 
to criticism, for after all, that is the point of the term 
"immunizing stratagem". The adherent can still be taken to 
task for resorting to the immunizing stratagem. He may 
simply be unaware that the theory contains an immunising 
stratagem; in which case, pointing it out may have a 
considerable impact on his belief. However, we may also 
argue that Popper's own analysis shows that interpreted 
properly, Freud's theory of dreams is empirically refutable 
too, and that Freud effectively gives up the theory, 
"without explicitly saying so.". (Popper, [1983], Vol.I, 
page 165.)
In his The Interpretation of Dreams Freud embarks on the 
project of "proving that, in their essential nature, dreams 
represent fulfilments of wishes." (Freud, [1900], page 
286.) These frustrated instinctual impulses makes use of 
residues of the day's experience to produce a symbolic 
visual representation of their satisfaction. The symbolic 
form of the satisfaction is a disguise to get passed what 
Freud called the censor, another name for the super-ego or 
conscience, and to save the sleeper from waking. A dream, 
for Freud, then was a substitute gratification of impulses 
that are denied satisfaction in overt action because they 
contravene the dictates of conscience. More abstractly 
considered, Freud thought that a dream is a special way in 
which the psyche displays its general tendency to discharge 
tension.
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As Popper points out, Freud was aware of the obvious 
objection to his theory: the existence of anxiety dreams and 
nightmares, dreams which represent the opposite of the 
fulfilment of a wish, the fulfilment of a fear.
In the Interpretation of Dreams one finds that Freud quotes 
several writers who are keen to point out that dreams are 
often of a distressing nature. He even makes reference to a 
study done by Florence Hallam and Share Weed on their own 
dreams which showed a preponderance of unpleasure in 
dreaming. They found that 57.2% of dreams are disagreeable 
and only 28.6% positively pleasant. Freud writes:
It does in fact look as though anxiety-dreams make 
it impossible to assert as a general proposition 
(based on the examples quoted in my last chapter 
that dreams are wishfulfilments; indeed they seem 
to stamp any such proposition as an absurdity.
(ibid. p. 215.)
Here Freud looks like a model of the forthright scientist 
confronting and openly discussing the strong objections to 
his theory. Rather like Kepler trying to fit the circular 
hypothesis to the facts. In this he conforms to Popper's 
demand that a scientist look out for refutations. Popper 
would accept this, but, as is clear from our discussion of 
the demarcation problem, would also point out that it is the 
way the scientist deals with the apparent refutations that 
is just as important. Popper argues that this objection is 
dealt with by introducing a very powerful immunizing 
stratagem. The following is partly indebted to Popper's 
analysis of Freud's methodology, but my account differs to 
some extent in the hypothesized means whereby the shift from 
one theory to another is effected.
It is important to stress the meaning of Freud's earliest 
formulations of the theory. Careful reading of the text 
shows that as the problem of anxiety dreams looms larger in
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Freud's account the formulation changes. The crucial word 
which is dropped from the later formulations is 
"representation". Originally, the theory is about what 
dreams represent; what dreams picture to us. In the end the 
theory is about what they are essentially, with little talk 
of what they represent.
Popper points out that in an analysis of one of his own 
dreams, Freud concludes that
The dream represented a particular state of 
affairs as I should have wished it to be. Thus 
its content was the fulfilment of a wish and its 
motive was a wish. (Ibid. p. 196.)
Clearly the focus of Freud's discussion is what dreams 
depict, with their content. To reinforce Popper's point, 
this concern is reflected in further discussion:
We have learnt that a dream can represent a wish 
as fulfilled. Our first concern must be to 
enquire whether this is a universal characteristic 
of dreams or whether it merely happened to be the 
content of the particular dream (the dream of 
Irma's injection). (Ibid. p. 201).
Careful reading of The Interpretation of Dreams shows that 
the last time we see the original formulation with Freud's 
original concern with what dreams represent is when he is 
discussing the dreams of young children:
They (the dreams of young children) raise no 
problems for solution; but on the other hand they 
are of inestimable importance in proving that, in 
their essential nature, dreams represent 
fulfilments of wishes. (Ibid. p. 286.).
I also found this to be the first place at which the notion 
of essence comes in to play and which is meant (in a 
Popperian kind of interpretation) to function as protection 
from criticism.
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Popper argues that Freud proposed to overcome the objection 
posed by anxiety dreams by distinguishing between the latent 
and manifest content of a dream. Thus what appears to be an 
anxiety dream (manifest content) is in reality the 
representation of the fulfilment of a wish (latent content). 
But what we have here is not a protection, but an 
abandonment of the original theory.
Almost straightaway Freud begins to modify (ie rejects) the 
original theory. We now have the theory that "...a dream is 
a (disguised) fulfilment of a wish." (ibid. p. 240.)
The latent/manifest distinction marks the point at which 
Freud's concern has moved away from the problem as to what 
dreams represent and on to what lies behind them, what 
motivates them:
There is'no question that there are dreams whose 
manifest content is of the most distressing kind.
But has anyone tried to interpret such dreams? to 
reveal the latent thoughts behind them? (Ibid. p.
215.).
I conjecture that the transition from the early theory to 
the later one is assisted by the ambiguity of the word 
"represent". It can be synonymous with "depict" or, more 
broadly, "symbolize"; but it can also be synonymous with 
"indicates", as a high body temperature may indicate 
illness. Freud uses it in the first sense in his original 
formulation but in the other sense in his later formulation 
in which the dream simply indicates the presence of a wish.
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The latent/manifest distinction is supposed to be protection 
against criticism. Popper says that in Freud's mind this 
distinction solves the problem posed by anxiety dreams.
Freud writes:
The question raised was how dreams with a 
distressing content can be resolved into wish- 
fulfilments. We now see that this is possible if 
dream-distortion has occurred and if the 
distressing content serves only to disguise 
something that is wished for. (Ibid. p. 227.)
In Freud's theory the disguise is necessary to hide the wish
from the superego, what we might call the conscience.
Clarifying Popper's point, we now see why the 
latent/manifest distinction is so powerful. Freud nowhere 
makes it plain how one would distinguish between a dream in 
which wish fulfilment has been disguised and a dream which 
is not a wish fulfilment. But this is necessary to make it 
an empirically testable theory. Any apparent counterexample 
can be dismissed as involving distortion and in fact counted 
as a verification. There are no limits set to the sort and
extent of distortion a latent dream content may be subject
to. The illusion that limits are set is created, perhaps 
unwittingly, by the postulation of a certain number of 
processes of distortion: condensation, displacement and 
secondary revision. But in reality the details of latent- 
content distortion are only constrained by the end product, 
the manifest dream. With sufficient intermediate steps one 
can condense, displace and secondarily revise any thought 
into any other thought. Freud's theory of dreams is rather 
like the theory that goblins and fairies exist, but with 
their magical powers they always manage to cover their 
tracks and always remain undetectable. Someone points out 
that no signs of goblins or fairies were observed despite 
extensive monitoring of their traditional haunts, to which 
the goblinologist retorts: seel I told you they always
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manage to cover their tracks; they are so clever. From what 
you have told me, they must have escaped your view in this 
way....
In the light of Freud's attitude to experiment this should 
not surprise us. Freud was not interested in making his 
theories amenable to experimental testing. In a postcard to 
Rosenzweig in 1934 is a reply to Rosenzweig's attempts to 
study repression experimentally. Freud stated:
I cannot put much value on these confirmations 
because the wealth of reliable observations on 
which these assertions rest make them independent 
of experimental verification. (As quoted by 
Eysenck, [1986], page 149.)
Still, we must not lose sight of the fact that the original 
theory has been sacrificed in making room for an alternative 
theory that contradicts the original, (page 29) This is
an important point, not least because eminent interpreters 
of Freud's theory have taken the later causal theory to be 
the one and only basic theory of dreams propounded in The 
Interpretation of Dreams. There are in fact two theories:
(a) All dreams represent wishes as fulfilled.
(b) All dreams have wishes as their motives. These motives
are the "latent content" of the dream.
As I argue, (b) actually replaces (a) in the course of 
Freud's discussion. Adolf Grunbaum overlooks this important 
development when he asserts:
Freud's wish-fulfilment theory of dream production 
is clearly a causal hypothesis." (Grunbaum, "The 
Degeneration of Popper's Theory of Demarcation, in 
D'Agostino and Jarvie, eds, [1989], page 152.)
The proposition "All dreams have wishes as their motives" is
a causal hypothesis, but the proposition "all dreams
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represent wishes as fulfilled" is not. The latter is a 
universal interpretation of the content of dreams. In the 
case of the latent/manifest distinction we have an example 
of an immunizing stratagem that is tantamount to the 
rejection of the theory for which it was meant as protection 
(or that might be interpreted by Popper as protecting the 
theory). Moreover, it is a theory with less content for the 
introduction of the latent/manifest distinction brings with 
it no independently testable consequences: the manner of 
distortion is inferred purely from the ways the dream 
deviates from the representation of a wish.
Popper's own account of Freud's attitude to apparent 
counterexamples shows that Freud effectively gives up the 
original theory. Popper quotes a passage from The 
Interpretation of Dreams which shows signs of Freud's 
demoralisation over his theory:
in order not to confirm the impression that I am 
trying to evade the evidence of this chief witness 
against the theory of wish-fulfilment whenever I 
am confronted by it, I will now give at least some 
hints towards an explanation of the anxiety dream.
(p. 737)
This is in stark contrast to page 215, where Freud 
confidently says
...there is no great difficulty in meeting these 
apparently conclusive objections.
Now Freud can only promise "hints" at a solution.
Popper points out that the hints are unsatisfactory even in 
Freud's eyes, and that Freud at last concludes that the 
whole topic of anxiety dreams falls outside the 
psychological framework of dream formation.
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Popper quotes a revealing sentence from the 1911 edition:
Anxiety in dreams, I should like to insist, is an 
anxiety problem and not a dream problem. (Quoted 
in Realism and the Aim of Science, p. 167.)
Thus Freud effectively abandons the theory, though Popper 
would like to point out that it is not a conscious 
correction and admission of a mistake. But there are other 
comments by Freud which indicate this abandonment. In 
section ix of Freud's paper of 1923, Freud asserts 
unambiguously that some anxiety dreams are npt wish 
fulfilments but "are the only genuine exceptions". However, 
this acknowledgment is not included in any edition of The 
Interpretation of Dreams.
I think we do have a genuine immunizing stratagem in Freud's 
attempt to develop his theory of dreams. Remember that we 
must identify an immunizing stratagem by noting first what 
the original problem was that the theorist intended to solve 
and then compare this with how difficult evidence is 
treated. We have seen that Freud actually abandons not only 
the original theory - all dreams represent the fulfilment of 
wishes - but also the original problem.
This digression into Freud's theory of dreams has revealed 
that at least some components of Freud's theoretical edifice 
are open to empirical refutation. We may also conclude that 
this openness to empirical refutation was effective in 
making Freud abandon the original theory, though without 
explicit acknowledgment. Freud abandoned the theory without 
perhaps realizing he had done so as an unintended 
consequence of trying to defend it. We must now examine a 
further question.
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The original theory may have been empirically refutable, and 
Freud may have abandoned it. But is its replacement 
criticizable? Bear in mind Popper's current position on the 
criticizability of metaphysical positions. My conjecture is 
that Freudians who embrace the replacement theory are 
confused and attribute more empirical content to the theory 
than it contains. But their confusion can be dispelled by 
comparing the theory with an equally weak theory that 
contradicts Freud's replacement. For example, one might as 
well hypothesize that all dreams represent not the 
fulfilment of a wish but the fulfilment of a fear, if not 
manifestly then latently. No matter what is represented 
manifestly in a dream one could always imagine some 
mechanism of distortion that would convert the latent 
fearful content of the dream into the manifest content.
Such an argument might form a part of a set of sound 
arguments that would prompt the Freudians to embellish their 
theory with greater testable content in order to escape from 
the uncomfortable situation of indecision. This would be 
predicted on Festinger's theory of cognitive dissonance, 
ironically a theory much hailed by those who see ideologies 
as closed to argument. (See sections "Logical Rationality" 
and "Memetic Evolution of an Ideology" in chapter 2.) One 
might at first think that a Freudian could defend Freud's 
theory of dreams from such a criticism by pointing out that 
the choice of a wishful, rather than a fearful, latent 
content and motive is not arbitrary but is constrained by 
the natural assumption that humans seek to achieve their 
ends and avoid pain and anxiety, specifically to live and 
reproduce happily. This is part of what Hopkins is 
suggesting when he refers to the relevance of common sense. 
This might be true for commonsense, but there is no such 
recourse either in Freud's later developments of the theory 
of dreams in response to the problem of anxiety dreams or in 
the later developments of Freud's general theory. Fifteen 
years after the publication of [1900] Freud was driven by
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the problem of anxiety dreams to say that anxiety and 
punishment in a dream may be exactly what is wished for, 
though perhaps not pleasant. (Freud, [1915-1916], page 257.) 
Freud maintained this position at least as late as ([1932], 
page 57.), where he says his division of dreams into wish- 
fulfilment, anxiety-fulfilment and punsishment-fulfilment 
keeps his theory intact. The anxiety and punishment are 
produced not by the instinctual wishes but wished by "the 
other person", the censor. But this does not square with 
his intention quoted above of showing that the instinctual 
wish-fulfilling content of Irma's dream is not just an 
exception but "a universal characteristic of dreams". In 
the development of his general theory Freud postulated two 
fundamental drives: eros and thanatos. Eros is that 
instinct that strives to preserve and reproduce the 
organism; thanatos is that instinct that strives to return 
the organism to the ultimate state of quiescence - death. 
(Freud, [1920].) Thus the restraints on the attribution of 
different types of wishes are seemingly none existent.
4.7.1. Criticizability of Freud's "Basic Theory"
We have seen that at least some components of Freud's theory 
are empirically refutable, but we must return to the 
question that Popper's original criticism raised: is Freud's 
"basic theory" open to empirical refutation? If it were not 
we would have to conclude that the only sound arguments that 
might undermine any movement based on the basics of 
Freudianism could not be empirical refutations. But would 
it then follow that Freudianism cannot be undermined by 
sound argument because it is uncriticizable in any way?
What might be the structure of these non-empirical sound 
arguments? In answering this question I will examine 
arguments by Grunbaum, Binns and Gellner that bear directly 
on this question. Binns points out that "Freud's theory" 
really refers to a succession of theories, and so it is
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impossible to isolate the basic premises of the theory. 
(Binns, [1990], page 533.) Nevertheless, it is possible to 
analyse each conjectured basis of each theory. I will focus 
on Grunbaum's interpretation of the basis of Freud's theory, 
and argue that the theory thus interpreted is either open to 
empirical tests or must by implication be abandoned by 
attempts to save it by invoking the supposed special 
interpretive powers of psychoanalysts.
Grunbaum takes the centre-piece of Freud's theory to be the 
way that therapy is seen as confirming the truths of the 
theories that underlie it. This is expressed by Grunbaum in 
the following way:
(a) Only the psychoanalytic method of interpretation and 
treatment can yield or mediate for the patient correct 
insight into the unconscious causes of his neurosis.
(b) The patient's correct insight into the conflictual 
causes of his condition and into the unconscious dynamics of 
his character is in turn causally necessary for the durable 
cure of his neurosis. (Grunbaum, in Clarke and Wright, eds., 
[1988] , page 14.)
Grunbaum calls this the "Necessary Condition Thesis", NCT. 
Grunbaum argues that when this is conjoined with a clause to 
eliminate the effects of suggestion, we are left with a 
complete necessary and sufficient condition which is both 
observable and thus open to refutation. Indeed, Freud 
accepted in 1926 that (1) was false because of the existence 
of spontaneous remission, and by 1937 Freud admitted that 
neuroses could recur even after therapy and so (2) was also 
false.
Since Freud made these admissions more experimental work has 
been done to test the NCT. There are many studies that show 
that control groups do as well or, in some cases better,
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than comparable groups treated by psychoanalysis. (Farrell, 
[1981]; and Eysenck, [1985].) In many cases the control 
group are given a placebo. Binns has questioned whether 
this would isolate the control group from unintentional 
psychotherapy, for the subjects may think they are receiving 
some cure and, more importantly, they are given an 
opportunity to talk about their problems to a supportive 
councillor. If it were impossible to separate 
psychoanalytic therapy from a control group, then the theory 
might not be open to empirical testing. However, Binns 
inaccurately describes the purpose of the placebo. A placebo 
is used in this context not to eliminate the influence of 
all beliefs, but rather certain ranges of belief that are 
thought to be collectively essential in psychoanalytic 
treatment. Presumably, thinking that one has been given a 
curative drug is not essential to psychotherapy, and 
believing that one is being helped in conversation is not 
sufficient. This avenue of criticism, therefore, is still 
open for empirical testing.
I suspect that psychotherapists eager to maintain the 
integrity of their doctrine would be hesitant in adopting 
such a defence against the counterevidence. Because, if 
psychoanalysis may be given so frequently by accident, then 
another, seemingly more powerful defence would have to be 
sacrificed: what Gellner calls the monopoly of proper depth 
interpretation that the psychoanalytic guild claims for 
itself. (Gellner, [1985], page 79.) This power of decreeing 
what is and what is not a proper psychoanalysis and what is 
a cure is not constrained by publicly testable criteria and 
so it enables defenders to dismiss any allegedly failed 
psychotherapy as not really psychotherapy afterall or 
alternative cures as not really deep cures. What Gellner 
overlooks is the great propagandistic cost of such a 
defence. If the identification of psychoanalysis becomes 
such an arbitrary matter, then what meaningful content
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exactly is being saved and perpetuated? In order to save 
face, it would seem, the psychoanalyst has to abandon the 
doctrine.
4.7.2. Further Empirical Refutations
Eysenck [1986] has argued that Freudian theory is much more 
open to refutation than Popper would have us believe.
Freud's theory of repression, presumably a "basic" part of 
Freud's theory, is quite amenable to experimental study. 
According to Freud, Eysenck says, "the essence of repression 
lies simply in the function of rejecting and keeping 
something out of consciousness." Repression is a kind of 
defence mechanism to protect the individual from unpleasant 
emotional experiences. In one study two stories of a dream 
were used, one an Oedipal dream sequence and one a non- 
Oedipal dream sequence. Subjects were read either one or 
the other, and then had to recall the dream. Recall for the 
Oedipal sequence was significantly worse, as we would 
predict from Freud's theory. (See Eysenck, [1985], page 
158.) The actual result of the experiment is unimportant; 
what is important for my point is that Freud's theory can be 
interpreted in such a way as to make it falsifiable.
On the other hand, while one might see this experiment as 
predicated on a plausible interpretation of Freud's basic 
theory, can one be sure it is the correct interpretation? 
Perhaps it would be better to say, have psychoanalysts 
agreed on some criteria of falsifiability so that we can 
specify at least some potential falsifiers. We can always 
interpret any system of symbols as an empirical theory and 
impose on it our own class of potential falsifiers. But we 
want to know what the psychoanalysts are claiming, not what 
we might arbitrarily take them to be claiming. On the other 
hand, empirically testable interpretations of Freudianism
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need not be arbitrary: they can and must be constrained by 
our knowledge about the problems that psychoanalysis is 
trying to solve plus what it takes as background knowledge.
4.8. Refutation versus Elimination
The main conclusion to be drawn from the above examples of 
immunizing stratagems is the paradoxical one that an 
ideology may evolve by jettisoning its mistaken ideas in 
response to criticism without ever admitting a single 
mistake. An ideologist may abandon his ideology without 
explicitly recognizing that it was a refutation that lead 
him to do so.
The importance of these immunizing stratagem is not that 
they guarantees the preservation of an ideology, but that 
they entail the repudiation of the ideology as the price for 
avoiding openly admitting a mistake in the light of 
refutation. We now see that the immunizing stratagem offers 
no objection to the general claim that ideologies cannot 
guarantee themselves against the impact of criticism, but in 
fact is a way of taking account of criticism.
Popper has often made the distinction between the refutation 
and the abandonment of theories. He has criticized Lakatos 
for ascribing to him a confusion of the two. Popper has 
this to say:
...while the former is, given the acceptance of a 
refuting state of affairs, a matter of logic, the 
latter is a question of methodology, and will 
depend among other things, on what alternative 
theories are available. (I have often stressed the 
need for working with more than one hypothesis in 
connection with both falsification ["falsifying 
hypotheses"] and the growth of science in 
general). (Popper, [1974], page 1009.)
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That Popper was aware of the distinction is clear from his 
remarks about Einstein in his discussion of the demarcation 
problem. Popper points to the fact that Einstein regarded 
his theory as false, as simply an approximation to the 
truth, but continued to work on it right to the end of his 
life.
To be more precise the distinction we are interested in is 
that between:
(1) Accepting explicitly a refutation; and,
(2) Abandoning a refuted theory.
Thus it is quite possible for one Marxist or Freudian to 
explicitly accept that one of his theories has been refuted, 
but quite rationally continue to work on the theory; while 
another Marxist refuse or simply fail to explicitly 
recognize a refutation, but nevertheless jettison the 
theory. The consequence, is that, if one could look behind 
the camouflage of face saving devises and simple confusion, 
one might see the more scientific ideologist clinging more 
stubbornly to his theory (while recognizing its 
falsification) than the immunizing-prone ideologist who 
simply jettisons parts or the whole of the ideology.
Part of the methodological import of Popper's discussion of 
the immunizing stratagem is that if one wants to promote the 
growth of knowledge one must explicitly recognize error. 
Science has grown rapidly partly because of its adherence to 
these rules. But from our discussion we may conclude that 
while these rules expedite the evolution of theories in 
response to refutation, they are by no means necessary to 
such an evolution. Refutation can have an significant 
influence even in a non scientific context: it may eliminate 
error surreptitiously, albeit with the risk of its 
surreptitious return.
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4.9. Conclusion.
(1) A network of ideas can evolve under the impact of 
refutation and criticism, with the elimination of error, 
without any explicit acknowledgement of error.
(2) One of the ways this can happen is through the use of 
so-called immunizing stratagems. The class of Immunizing 
stratagems which have this structure are better seen as face 
savers, not theory savers.
(3) Immunizing stratagems do not prevent the critic from 
analysing the ideologist's doctrine, pointing to the 
immunizing stratagem involved as a criticism in itself, and 
then providing an empirical refutation of the reinterpreted 
doctrine.
(4) That therefore immunizing stratagems do not serve to 
preserve an ideology for which they have been instituted.
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Conclusion to Thesis
Though there are barriers to sound argument, none are 
insurmountable. All systems of ideas and their adherents 
are open to sound argument, albeit a long and difficult one. 
Nevertheless, we should expect error to be perpetuated even 
in a population of humans who infallibly eliminate error, 
because it may be passed on more quickly than it is 
repudiated.
In exploring my original question I have been led 
necessarily into fairly diverse areas. The arguments for 
barriers to argument locate the barriers in areas that are 
traditionally the preserve of different departments: logic, 
psychology, sociology. The thesis, as a consequence, does 
not have the traditional look. However, I think my approach 
is sound and has some merit. My original problem has 
remained definite throughout and my general thesis has 
dominated the structure of the work, hopefully bringing 
disparate topics into a coherent pattern of argument. My 
approach has enabled me to analyse in detail relationships 
between the realms of psychology, logic and sociology that 
have so far received scant attention: for example, how the 
unfathomable logical structure of an ideology may influence 
its sociological evolution. It has been said before that 
the attempt to relate apparently disparate domains can be 
fruitful, but some truths are worth repeating. Moreover 
such an attempt harmonises well with an internal criticism 
of the work of Popper and Bartley. Popper [1983] maintains 
that there are no subject matters as such, but only problems 
and the desire to solve them. To reinforce Popper's point, 
consider the following examples. Discoveries in biology may 
contribute to breakthroughs in psychology (witness the 
burgeoning science of physiological psychology); 
breakthroughs in biology may contribute to breakthroughs in
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economics (e.g. Darwin's use of Malthus's population 
principle); discoveries in politics may contribute to 
breakthroughs in biology (e.g. W.D. Hamilton's use of 
Axelrod's theory of games of the prisoner's dilemma type); 
discoveries in psychology may contribute to theories in 
politics (e.g. many political theorists have used Leon 
Festinger's theory of dissonance: e.g. Paul Verne and Jon 
Elsters).
The main points of contention were provided by Popper and 
Bartley, but in order to thoroughly assess their more 
suggestive assertions, I have explored the work of others 
whose positions are more explicit on these points. For this 
reason, among others, the thesis has broader implications 
than an internal criticism would at first suggest.
My thesis is greatly indebted to the work of Popper and 
Bartley. Nevertheless, I have tried to criticize their 
views on the limits to argument, in the hope that those who 
value sound argument can be more confident about its 
effectiveness.
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Endnotes;
1 It is appropriate here to make some methodological 
comments.
The question of definition has dogged many attempts to 
solve important problems that lie behind talk of ideology. 
This methodological impasse can be traced to the influence 
of Aristotle's doctrine of real or essential definitions. 
This doctrine is often associated with another baneful 
presumption of much social science; the idea that before one 
can have a rational discussion one must define one's terms.
This paper makes a clear distinction between two types 
of definition; the essential and the stipulative.
Essential, or real definitions, were an invention of 
Aristotle's. They were meant to state the essence of the 
species defined, along with the genus that includes it (Man 
is a rational animal). Traditionally, they have been called 
real definitions since they are concerned with objects 
rather than words, and also perhaps because they can be 
thought of as asserting the existence of the essences 
involved. Essential definitions are answers to questions of 
the form "what is water?", "What is democracy?", "What is 
ideology?". Most work on ideology has adopted this line of 
attack. Whatever might be the outcome of a metaphysical 
enquiry into essences, this approach is methodologically 
unsound. As a matter of historical record, those sciences 
that have adopted this approach have made the least 
progress, and those that have abandoned it, such as physics, 
chemistry and biology, have made tremendous advances.
There is an explanation for this. Essential 
definitions lead to infinite regresses or to a dogmatic 
starting point (cf. Popper, [1957], pages 9-13.) If an 
infinite regress is followed, there is no getting beyond 
definition; likewise, if a stopping point to definition is 
dogmatically adopted there is no rational method of deciding 
between those proposed by different investigators. Physics, 
chemistry, biology, game theory, and economics have quite a 
different attitude to definition. When a definition is 
required they employ what we may call stipulative 
definitions.
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A stipulative definition is one that furnishes us with 
an abbreviation of a longer, cumbersome expression. Take 
the well known definition: Democracy is government of the 
people by the people for the people. Read as an essential 
definition it states the essence of democracy. But read as 
a stipulative definition, it says that we can replace the 
expression "government of the people by the people for the 
people" with the expression "democracy". Contrary to 
Manning, a stipulative definition is really quite harmless. 
As Quine says, it is simply a method for eliminating 
expressions, (cf. Quine, [1976], chapter 7.)
In those sciences that have made conspicuous progress 
basic terms are "defined" implicitly and learned by context: 
for example "force", "energy", "space-time point". It was J 
D Gergonne who introduced the idea of implicit definition.
He gave the example of someone who knew the meanings of 
triangle and quadrilateral but not of diagonal. If the 
person then read that "quadrilaterals have two diagonals, 
each dividing the quadrilateral into two triangles," he 
would know what a diagonal was without an explicit 
definition. It is sometimes granted that one cannot define 
all of one's terms, but one must define all new terms. 
Gergonne's example nicely rebuts even this modest position.
Since this paper is an immanent criticism of Popper's 
theory of ideology then this approach to definition is quite 
in order as Popper is a defender of this approach to 
definition.
2 The idea that I am criticizing is held explicitly by 
many - though often without argument - and implicitly by 
many more. It is certainly not a straw man. The following 
quotations will show at least that writers have been very 
clumsy in the expression of their ideas. However, I intend 
to show that even if one excludes clumsy expression and 
hyperbole, there are still many who clearly assert or assume 
that some ideas are insulated from criticism.
Manning:
"An ideology cannot be challenged by either facts 
or rival theories."
Kolakowski:
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"Not only in the 'socialist bloc', where the 
authorities used every means to prevent 
information seeping in from the outside world, but 
also in the democratic countries, the Communist 
parties had created a mentality that was 
completely immune to all facts and arguments 'from 
outside, i.e.. from 'bourgeois sources."
Knox (quoted by William Sargent):
"If I have dealt at some length with this single 
side of Wesley's character - I mean his 
preoccupation with strange psychological 
disturbances, now commonly minimised - it is 
because I think he, and the other prophets of the 
Evangelical movement, have succeeded in imposing 
upon English Christianity a pattern of their own. 
They have succeeded in identifying religion with a 
real or supposed experience...for better or worse, 
the England which weathered the excitements and 
disappointments of the early nineteenth century 
was committed to a religion of experience; you did 
not base your hopes on this or that doctrinal 
calculation; you knew. For that reason the 
average Englishman was, and is, singularly 
unaffected by reasonings which would attempt to 
rob him of his theological certainties, whatever 
they may be." (William Sargent. [1963], page 115.)
Le Bon:
"In enumerating the factors capable of making an 
impression on the minds of crowds, all mention of 
reason might be dispensed with were it not 
necessary to point out the negative value of its 
influence...It is not necessary to descend so low 
as primitive beings to obtain an insight into the 
utter powerlessness of reasoning when it has to 
fight against sentiment. Let us merely call to 
mind how tenacious, for centuries long, have been 
religious superstitions in contradiction with the 
simplest logic...Let us leave reason, then, to 
philosophers, and not insist too strongly on its 
intervention in the governing of men. It is not 
reason, but most often in spite of it, that are 
created those sentiments which are the mainsprings 
of all civilization - sentiments such as honour,
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self-sacrifice, religious faith, patriotism, and 
the love of glory." (Le Bon. [1979], pages 77 - 
78.)
3 ,Popper argues in private correspondence (1989) that
Weismann's principle that the germ cell cannot be affected 
by the soma cannot be true for bacterial cells because the 
germ cell and soma are identical. However, Popper would 
probably agree that this caveat does not affect the present 
argument as it applies to humans in which the germ cells and 
soma cells are quite distinct.
To illustrate what I mean here I can point to the 
organisation called Alcoholics Anonymous. Alcoholics 
Anonymous is a Christian group. They used to refer to God 
in their meetings but they now use the phrase "higher 
power", apparently to avoid alienating some members. The 
term "higher power" is more abstract than the term "God" 
(used in a Christian context), and can be interpreted as 
referring to anything whose powers are greater than one's 
own.
5 It may also occur as a combination of the two 
processes. Hallpike [1988], arguing against a natural 
selectionist account of culture, makes much of the fact that 
for natural selection, variation has to be blind or random, 
whereas in human society variation can be the result of 
conscious action. However, Steele has argued that variation 
need not be entirely blind or random for natural selection 
theory to have some explanatory value. "When geneticists 
studying fruit flies deliberately stimulate certain kinds of 
mutations by, for example, radiation, this does not mean 
that the usual corpus of neo-Darwinian theory has to be 
abandoned." (Steele. "How we Got Here", in Critical Review. 
Volume 2, Number 1. page 126.)
6. Levine, in his study of over 800 members of 
religious movements, found that over 90% left within two 
years. (Saul Levine. [1984])
Bird and Reimer, in their study of 1,607 adults in 
Montreal, found that 75.5% of participants in new religious 
movements were no longer involved five years later. The 
defection rate ranged from 55.2% for Transcendental 
Meditation to 100% for the Church of Scientology. (Bird and 
Reimer. [1983], pages 221-2.)
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7 The following proof of the inadequacy of Popper's 
original proposal is from Tichy ("On Popper's Definitions of 
Verisimilitude", British Journal for the Philosophy of 
Science, 25, [1974], pages 155-160.)
Popper's proposal, stated in terms of sets of 
statements, is that a system Y has more verisimilitude than 
a system X if:
(P) XtC Yt and YfCXf or Xtc Yt and YfcXf
(Where Xt = X's truth content, Xf = X's falsity 
content, etc..)
Suppose Y is false and has more verisimilitude than X. 
There must be at least one false sentence in Y, which we 
will call C. By the proposal (P) either Xt C  Yt, in which 
case Yfcxf, or YfCXf, in which case X t c  Yt. In the first 
case let B be a sentence in the difference Yt\Xt. It 
follows that B & C is false and in Y, and therefore also in 
Yf. However, B & C cannot be in Xf, because if it were then 
B would be in X. Thus YfcXf does not hold.
In the second case let A be a sentence in the 
difference Xf\Yf. Then C-frA is true and in X, and therefore 
in Xt.’ However, C -►A cannot be in Yf, because if it were 
then A would also be in Y. Thus Xt C  Yt does not hold, 
either.
There are also problems with information content 
comparison as such, where the content of a theory is defined 
in terms of the set of all the problems that a theory can 
answer. (First proposed by Popper, [1974], pages 20-21.) 
Watkins (private communication presented in Popper [1972], 
pages 369-370.), Grunbaum [1976] and Miller [1975] have 
pointed to interesting cases where some questions that are 
decidable by a predecessor theory are undecidable by its 
successor.
Popper admits that the problems of information content 
comparison and verisimilitude may not be solvable by purely 
logical means, and that the theories may only be compared 
relative to relevant problems or even by reference to the 
historical problem situation.
o , . . .  . . . .In the light of scientific theories certain descriptions 
in the Bible of particular events have become increasingly 
difficult to maintain in their literal interpretation. For 
example, David Jenkins, now Bishop of Durham, wonders:
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"whether the actual discovery of the empty tomb 
was one of the preludes to discovering Jesus to be 
alive or whether the story came to be told as a 
symbol of the discovery that Jesus was alive." 
(David Jenkins. Living with Questions. 
Investigations into the Theory and Practice of 
Belief in God. S.C.M. 1969. page 137.)
This prompted the House of Bishops of the General 
Synod of the Church of England in 1986 to publish a 
statement and exposition of "The Nature of Christian 
Belief". The statement unequivocally affirms that the 
resurrection is "an objective reality, both historical and 
divine". But in partial concession to Jenkins, it allows 
that even though the canonical gospels assert that the tomb 
was found to be empty, this story may not be true. Jesus 
may have left his flesh and bones in the grave.
Q
Manning asserts that what makes an illegal seizure 
of power a revolution rather than a coup d'etat or a 
counter-revolution for the Marxist is the fact that the 
former was committed by a Marxist and the latter by a 
Liberal or Nazi. This is a distinction supposedly made 
independently of the actions, which could be exactly the 
same. The argument here is invalid. From the fact that a 
distinction between two actions is not based on the
intrinsic structure of the actions, it does not follow that
the distinction carries no descriptive content about the 
world other than about who committed the actions. Manning 
has neglected to consider the philosophical argument that 
actions are individuated by their goals and the beliefs that 
the actor has about how they relate to the world, especially 
how they serve as means to the goals (Searle, [1984]). I may 
sign my name in the same way whether I am filling out a 
cheque or concluding a letter, but these two actions are 
different. Both the Marxist and Nazi may take power by the
same means, but their actions are distinguished by the
differences in the theories they entertain regarding the 
place of the seizure of power within their scheme of means 
and ends. According to my thesis, therefore, the actions 
also differ with respect to the kinds of critical argument 
necessary to prevent them. (See my discussion of 
instrumental rationality in chapter 2.)
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Here I take for granted, in accord with an 
internal criticism, Popper's theory of propensities, as 
expounded in his book A World of Propensities. Antiquarian 
Books ltd. 1990.
11 It is not formally inconsistent, but perhaps more 
accurately described as a case of Austin's infelicity.
2 The main criticisms of C.C.R. are (i) trivial 
synthetic truths and tautologies are uncriticizable; (ii) 
C.C.R. is paradoxical; (iii) C.C.R. is committed to logic, 
which is uncriticizable; (iv) some doctrines are 
deliberately constructed so as to be uncriticizable 
(reinforced dogmatisms).
(i) Watkins contends that the statement "There exists at 
least one sentence written in English prior to the year two 
thousand that consists of precisely twenty two words." is 
uncriticizable because of its obvious truth. Another example 
is "I am more than 2 years old" said by a thirty year old 
man. Bartley's response to this is to claim that all he 
needs for his thesis is that it is logically possible to 
criticise any position. A clearer response is that of 
Miller, who argues that C.C.R. no more requires that any 
position be successfully criticizable than Popper's 
demarcation criterion demands that every scientific theory 
be successfully falsified. We have systematic methods of 
checking different sorts of claim; the fact that these 
methods apply to both difficult and easy cases is a 
consequence of the systematic nature of the methods and is 
no argument against their applicability. I would add that 
trying to exclude trivial cases in a systematic way may not 
even be possible; certainly, Watkins supplies no example of 
such methods
(ii) Both Watkins and Post have produced arguments in an 
attempt to show that C.C.R. is paradoxical. Both Post and 
Watkins's claim not that C.C.R. is not criticizable, but 
that the statement that C.C.R. is criticizable is not 
criticizable. Thus they show that a consequence of C.C.R. is 
uncriticizable. This latter statement is known as the C.C.R. 
generalization. Watkins's argument proceeds as follows.
(1) All propositions that are rationally acceptable are 
criticizable. (The C.C.R. generalization.)
C.C.R. is meant to be acceptable, so we also have
(2) (1) is rationally acceptable.
Therefore (3) (1) is criticizable.
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Suppose we have shown that (3) is false; then, given
(2), we would have shown that (1) is false. This would 
amount to a criticism of (1). But since this is what (3) 
asserts, (3) would be true. Thus our initial assumption that
(3) is false leads to absurdity, and therefore there is no
valid argument that (3) is false, and so it must be 
analytic. (Watkins, [1971].)
Bartley responded by contending that C.C.R., properly 
interpreted, applies to people not statements alone.
(Bartley, "The alleged Refutation of Pancritical 
Rationalism", Proceedings of the Eleventh International 
Conference on the unity of the Sciences, 1983, Vol.II, page 
1158.) Watkins then devised another version taking this in 
to account, but he gave the argument a psychological twist:
he took Bartley to be asserting that people are
psychologically open to the criticism of any position. 
(Watkins, [1987], page 273.) Contrary to Watkins, it can be 
argued that Bartley's point is methodological. A sustainable 
interpretation of Bartley's position is that given any 
problem and the position that is meant to be a solution to 
that problem, one can always develop a method for checking 
whether it is in fact a solution, without falling into 
inconsistency, vicious circularity, infinite regress, or 
dogmatism.
Post's argument is similar but uses only (1) and (3). The 
following is a compressed version of Post's argument, 
highlighting its general structure. Post argue that every 
criticism of (3) is a criticism of (1) - because (1) implies 
(3). But no criticism of (1) is a criticism of (3) because a 
criticism of (1) would verify (3). Thus every criticism of
(3) is a non-criticism of (1); there is no criticism of (3). 
(Post, [1983].)
One response to both Post and Watkins, due to Miller, is to 
argue that a Comprehensively Critical Rationalist needs to 
assert that all positions are open to criticism, but he need 
not assert that they are open to criticism in every way. 
C.C.R. is not obliged to hold that every consequence of a 
criticizable position is itself criticizable. Miller draws 
an analogy with Popper's requirement that all scientific 
statements be potentially falsifiable. All empirically 
falsifiable statements are not made unfalsifiable by having 
unfalsifiable consequences. To expand on this, I would Admit 
that a theory may contain metaphysical elements that reduce 
the theory's overall falsifiability, but our methodology can 
without difficulty require that such elements be removed,
(iii) It might be thought that in order for C.C.R. to be 
applied at all it presupposes logic, and so is committed to 
logic in the sense that it holds logic above criticism. 
Bartley himself accepts this. I would argue that even if 
one requires logic to carry through an argument, this does 
not mean that one presupposes it. One might be trying to 
show that logic is faulty by actually using it, as one might
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try to test a machine by using it. If logic were faulty, 
which it is not, one might obtain from such a test a good 
hint as to exactly what rules of logic are leading us into 
error.
(iv) The question of reinforced dogmatisms I leave for 
chapter 4, in which I deal with the so-called "immunizing 
stratagem".
13 Strangely, Gellner seems to repudiate this position 
in another essay:
"Even in cases when they possess the political 
power to proscribe rivals, they do not really have 
the conceptual power to make rival positions 
unthinkable...It is a most interesting and 
important trait of many, perhaps of all conceptual 
systems, that, unlike the artificial Newspeak of 
Orwell's 1984, they do not succeed in making 
dissent or heresy unsayable, unconceptualisable". 
(Ernest Gellner. Spectacles and Predicaments. 
Cambridge University Press. 1979. page 124.)
. The British and Irish Communist Organisation 
argue that the whole IRA campaign would collapse if they 
were convinced that the incorporation of the six counties 
into the Republic were impossible by terrorist action.
Manning sometimes asserts that ideologies have no 
descriptive content at all: "Ideological talk, unlike legal 
talk, does not give us information about the world in which 
we live. It cannot carry the appropriate descriptive 
content." (Manning, [1980], page 75.) But sometimes he 
admits that ideologies contain descriptive content: 
"Ideologists do make use of the findings of academic 
disciplines, but they confer on them a political 
significance which the methodology of those disciplines 
cannot confer." (Manning, [1976], page 142.)
Richard Gregory has given an explanation for our 
alternating perceptions of such ambiguous figures as the 
Necker cube and the girl/old hag:
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We do not perceive the world merely from the sensory 
information available at any given time, but rather we use 
this information to test hypotheses of what lies before 
us...We see this process of hypotheses testing most clearly 
in the ambiguous figures...Here the sensory information is 
constant (the figure may even be stabilized on the retina) 
and yet the perception changes...as each possible hypothesis 
comes up for testing. Each is entertained in turn, but none 
is allowed to stay when no one is better than its rivals. 
(Gregory, [1966], page 221.)
Gregory fails to generalize this insight to other 
types of belief:
Why should the perceptual system be so active in 
seeking alternative solutions, as we see it to be 
in ambiguous situations? Indeed it seems more 
active, and more intellectually honest in refusing 
to stick with one of many possible solutions, than 
is the cerebral cortex as a whole - if we may 
judge by the tenacity of irrational belief in 
politics or religion. (Ibid. page 222.)
His answer is that
The perceptual system has been of biological 
significance for far longer than the calculating 
intellect. (Ibid. page 222.)
Here Gregory comes close to seeing that evolution has 
a tendency to produce organisms that test their beliefs, 
discarding false ones. But he assumes too quickly that 
political and religious beliefs escape the logic of 
evolution. He fails to show why there has been too little 
time for evolution to produce flexibility in all our 
beliefs, and he fails to compass an alternative explanation. 
The explanation may lie in the fact that political and 
religious beliefs do not have as immediate a relationship to 
direct empirical testing as our perceptual beliefs. This may 
necessitate more protracted or indirect argument to change 
belief, but there is nothing irrational in a long or 
indirect argument. (By "indirect" I mean an argument that 
appeals to empirical observation but via other assumptions. 
This is explained in the chapter on the immunizing 
stratagem.)
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Research in psychology and physiology is 
consistent with this picture. All skills apparently involve 
scanning and correction of instantaneous belief by feedback 
mechanisms. It might be said (at least by someone from a 
geologically stable region) that it is hard to doubt the 
ground one walks on. But even in walking our brain 
continually tests its projections as to where the ground is.
18 ,. The Green Movement, for instance, may be based on
fearful thinking, the fear being over-population, 
destruction of the tropical forests etc. Where there is a 
fear there is a wish and vice versa, so we often find 
fearful and wishful thinking in the same movement. We may 
even conjecture that if a movement started by fearful 
thinking is unable to sustain wishful thinking (that the 
fearful possibility can be avoided or compensated for), then 
that movement would tend to collapse. Even movements like 
the Jehovah's Witnesses, who envision the destruction of the 
world, look forward to paradise. This would be an instance 
of instrumental rationality: if the Greens thought 
catastrophe were inevitable, they would see their propaganda 
as futile and cease to proselytise.
19 What are the relationships between agreement, 
criticism, commitment and understanding? It is often 
assumed that someone committed to a system (a theory, life­
style, institution etc) will always have a greater 
understanding than a critic of the same system. But a 
critic may have a better understanding. Understanding a 
system consists in knowing at least some of its implications 
or aspects. If one makes a sound criticism of a system, this 
means that one has noticed an implication (or aspect) of the 
system that the committed have overlooked (assuming they are 
sincere.)
The general point is that a theory has implications 
that are infinite. It follows that no psychological state, 
such as belief, commitment or understanding, can be 
correlated one-to-one with a theory's meaning or content.
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A theory or a contract has implications and 
ramifications that transcend anyone's understanding. In the 
case of patents this might be quite clear. It is always 
very difficult to describe an invention in such a way as to 
reap the maximum benefit from it. There always may be 
something that is overlooked. It therefore follows that the 
patentee can commit himself to something he does not fully 
understand.
2 0 . .This assumption is an elaboration of a much
neglected discovery of John Locke's as expressed in his book 
An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. But there are 
major disagreements between my assumption and Locke's full 
position. I make the involuntariness of belief very 
general, whereas Locke puts many restrictions on it. In 
Locke's account a belief is involuntary if and only if an 
opinion is thought highly probable on the basis of the 
argument and evidence for it, and providing that there is no 
suspicion of any fallacy in the argument or the possibility 
of contrary and equally valid proofs yet undiscovered.
Locke, [1689], page 425.) Locke allows that in cases in 
which the evidence for and against a belief is not clear a 
person may indulge in wishful thinking or suspend his 
judgement.
On the contrary, even if their explicit avowal may be 
voluntarily suspended, humans are continually making 
judgements that are involuntary. The process whereby a 
person acquires a belief never consists of a period of 
unbiased examination of evidence followed by a voluntary 
decision to accept or reject the belief. Rather, one 
approaches the problem guided by a prejudice. After 
thinking through the evidence one finds that one has come 
involuntarily to reject or maintain the prejudice, and that 
this cannot be revoked by an act of will but only by 
spontaneous variation in belief or by further argument.
Locke's insight that even in the sphere of so-called 
divine revelation reason must judge whether a supposed 
revelation is in fact a revelation is correct but it has 
more importance for the history of religious thought (and 
other supposed irrational systems of ideas) than he 
realized:
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In propositions therefore contrary to the clear 
perception of the agreement or disagreement of any 
of our ideas it will be in vain to urge them as 
matters of faith. They cannot move our assent 
under that or any other title whatsoever. (Ibid. 
page 426.)
Locke seems close to giving argument a prominent role 
in the life of religious ideas. But this is not the case: 
predominant passions may overrule beliefs thought to be 
highly probable (Ibid. page 439.); belief may be induced by 
force (Ibid. page 435.); by early education a belief can be 
made unresponsive to argument (Ibid. page 437.); adherence 
to principles can render all argument vain against the 
adherent's beliefs (Ibid. page 438) . If that is not a 
recipe for an absolutely closed system of ideas, it would be 
hard to think of one that was.
Locke's idea that a belief may be induced by force 
seems to be inconsistent with his claim that belief is 
involuntary. It would be stretching the imagination to 
suppose Locke was thinking of forcibly operating by 
electrical or chemical means on people's brains to induce 
beliefs. Let us consider a plausible interpretation of 
Locke. Someone puts a gun to my head threatening to blow my 
brains away if I do not start believing that the moon is 
made of cheese. Now is one to voluntarily believe this 
absurd proposition? I think we have to say that although 
force may restrict enquiry, it cannot induce a specific 
belief.
Others have rejected the idea that belief is 
voluntary: Quine, [1987], Ouidities: A Philosophical
Dictionary, page 19. ; Williams, [1973], "Deciding to 
Believe", in Problems of the Self. ; Elster, [1979], Ulvsses 
and the Sirens, chapter II.3,B ; Winters, [1979], "Willing 
to believe", Journal of Philosophy, 76, pages 243-56). None 
of these writers, however, take an evolutionary perspective.
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1. The best analogy I have thought of is that of 
molecules moving completely randomly within the constraints 
of a bottle. One cannot predict the precise position of any 
molecule in the bottle, but one can predict that its 
position will lie within the precisely delineated shape of 
the bottle is appropriate here to make some methodological 
comments.
22 . •My argument does not commit me to the hypothesis
that somehow logical rules as such are present in the brain, 
but only that thought tends to occur in accord with or 
simulates the following of these rules. As Searle points out 
in his criticism of Noam Chomsky's theory of generative 
grammar, the fact - if it be a fact - that all human 
languages seem to conform to essentially the same set of 
grammatical rules ("deep structures") does not mean that 
human brains contain these rules, just as the fact that 
falling stones obey the laws of gravitation does not mean 
that stones contain instructions or rules in order to obey 
these laws. (Searle, [1984], page 51.) Of course, the fact 
that human brains evolved a tendency to think in accord with 
the rules of logic made it easier to develop a formal 
understanding of logic. Formal understanding of logic may 
well have made its incipient appearance as simple rules of 
thumb or maxims similar to modern expressions such as "you 
can not have your cake and eat it." These early 
developments would have had a feedback effect on brain 
structures responsible for thinking in accord with logical 
rules. Those australopethicines that were more logical in 
their thinking would presumably remember these maxims with 
greater efficiency and thus gain more from them.
23 . . •Ralph Holloway uses a similar argument to link 
spoken language and tool-making, arguing that the cognitive 
processes underlying each are very similar. Both processes 
involve the sequential elaboration of component parts that, 
if inserted out of a prescribed order, make nonsenses of the 
final product. (Columbia University, New York.)
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Popper's idea is expounded in his book Unended 
Quest. (Karl Popper. Fontana/Collins. 1976. pages 173 - 
178.) Popper there ponders the problem of orthogenic 
trends, that is: why do so many evolutionary sequences 
appear to be in the same direction? This situation is 
contrasted with the concept of a "random walk" (for example, 
the track made by a man who at every step consults a 
roulette wheel to determine the direction of his next step.) 
Popper argues that changes in the organism's genetically 
permitted but not fixed preferences - because, say, some 
type of food has disappeared - may change genetically 
permitted but not fixed behaviour which in turn puts a 
selection pressure on the organism's genetically determined 
range of preferences. This change then puts pressure on the 
organism's genetically determined range of skills, which 
in its turn puts a selection pressure on the organism's 
anatomy. The process can be represented by the following 
schema: P-> S —► A. The important point is that even though 
a classic change outside the organism may trigger an 
evolutionary change, the exact sequence may be significantly 
controlled by the internal relationships of selection and 
elimination between the internal structures of preference, 
skill and anatomy. Popper presents a picture of organisms 
employing trial and error variation within the scope of 
their genetic make-up within their evolutionary niches.
Their trials may lead them into a new niche. The organism is 
not a passive subject of evolutionary selection but partly 
the (unintentional) producer of it.
. Walsby's book is a sustained attempt to argue that 
ideologies are irrational. His position rules out the 
rational selection of ideologies by the masses. The 
rational Darwinian-like filters (i - v. see Introduction.) I 
discuss have little room in Walsby's thesis. I am 
discussing Chakotin and Le Bon because Walsby uses their 
positions as fundamental premises in his thesis.
5 £
Although Schumpeter argues that The Wealth of 
Nations was a synthesis of ideas and not something radically 
new; he dismisses it as unimportant in the history of 
economic analysis.
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2 7 . Popper had used the term "conventionalist 
stratagem" in The Logic of Scientific Discovery. First 
published in Vienna in the autumn of 1934. Cf. Hans 
Albert. Marktsoziologie und Entscheidunaslogik. Neuweid and 
Berlin: Herman Luchterhand Verlag. 1967.
David Miller subsequently informed Popper of note 1 on page 
560 of Arther Pap, "Reduction Sentences and Dispositional 
Concepts", in The Philosophy of Rudolph Carnap, ed. by Paul 
Arther Schilpp. La Salle, IL. Open Court Publishing Co.
1963. pp. 559-97. In this note Pap anticipates Popper's 
usage.
28 . Cohen points out that Copernicus placed the sun 
slightly away from the centre of the earth's orbit. It 
might be preferable to speak of a heliostatic rather than 
heliocentric system. But this does not affect the boldness 
of the conjecture. (Bernard Cohen, [1987], The Birth of a 
New Physics. Penguin, page 44.)
. Popper admits that this is an 
"oversimplification for Copernicus, but is almost certainly 
true of Aristarchus". Realism and the Aim of Science. 
Presumably, he is thinking of the bi-annual parallax of the 
stars that should be observable from the Earth if the Earth 
orbits the sun. This surely counted as the prediction of a 
new "appearance" and a crucial difference between Copernicus 
and Ptolemy's theory. It was only because of the great 
distance to the stars, and therefore a small parallax, that 
this effect was not observable until 150 years ago with the 
development of adequate telescopes. One could also add that 
with Copernicus it became possible to calculate the relative 
distances of the planets from the Sun, and Copernicus 
actually made these calculations. But though one could 
derive new observations from these calculations, Copernicus 
did not do so, presumably because the technology that would 
make them possible did not yet exist. Another crucial 
difference between the Copernican and Ptolemaic theories is 
that according to the Copernican theory the distances of the 
planets from the Earth vary and so the apparent size of at 
least a near planet, such as Venus, should also vary; but no 
such variation in apparent size was observed by astronomers.
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3 0 #. From Popper's work it may be inferred that he 
defines empirical refutation thus: the acknowledgment that 
an accepted basic statement, b, is inconsistent with either 
another basic statement, b', or a universal statement, U, 
and by inference classifying b' or U as false. A universal 
statement is a statement applying to every spatio-temporal 
region (for example, "All swans are white." , which is 
logically equivalent to "There are no non-white swans.") A 
basic statement is a singular existential statement 
describing an observable event at a particular spatio- 
temporal temporal region ( for example, "There is a white 
Swan at place-time k", or "There is a black Swan at place­
time k). There is also the proviso that the event is a 
reproducible effect, so that the basic statement can be 
intersubjectively tested and the odd stray basic statement 
that contradicts the theory in question can be ignored.
This kind of hypothesis is called a falsifying hypothesis. 
(Popper, [1934], pages 86-87.)
The term "basic" does not imply that basic statements are 
either (a) untheoretical; or (b) a firm grounding for 
science. All basic statements are regarded as theory 
impregnated and tentative conjectures, which may in their 
turn be subjected to tests and rejected. (Ibid. page 111.) 
The term "observable" does not imply a reference to 
immediate experience, as it might do in the works of other 
empiricist philosophers such as Carnap or Ayer. It can be 
defined in terms of the positions and movements of 
macroscopic objects. (Ibid. page 103.) Indeed, "observation" 
can be defined quite harmlessly in terms of the positions 
and movements of macroscopic objects. This is clear when we 
say that a computer at Jodrell bank is making automatic 
observations of radio galaxies. It might even be programmed 
to perform refutations.
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31 . . •The predictions concerned the bending of light rays 
by gravitational fields, elongation of the wavelength of 
radiation by gravitational fields, and the precession of the 
perihelion of the planet Mercury. From general relativity 
it can be predicted that the trajectory of light from a star 
passing near to the Sun will be bent towards the Sun at a 
certain angle. It is not strictly true that the bending of 
light was a radically new prediction, for Johann Georg von 
Soldner (1776 - 1833) showed that Newton's theory predicts 
bending by 0.875 seconds of arc for a ray grazing the Sun's 
edge. But Einstein's theory predicts a figure double this 
value: 1.75 arcseconds and Eddington's expedition obtained a 
figure of 1.60 + or - 0 .31 arcseconds, or 0.91 + or - 0.18 
times the Einsteinian value. (Figures quoted from Will,
[1986], Was Einstein Right? page 77 to 78.) Einstein's 
prediction, therefore, was closer to the test results.
The second prediction is that the frequency of 
electromagnetic radiation should be reduced by an increase 
in gravitational potential. Experiments carried out by R 
Pound and G A Rebka showed that the frequency of gamma 
radiation on the roof of the physics building at the 
University of Harvard was higher than gamma radiation from 
the same source in the basement of the same building. This 
effect cannot be predicted from Newton's theory; Newton's 
theory is in fact silent on this question.
The third prediction accounted for the anomaly in the 
precession of the perihelion of Mercury. Joseph Le Verrier 
discovered that Mercury's elliptical orbit rotates at 574 
arcseconds a century. Le Verrier found that the Newtonian 
affects of the other planets were insufficient to account 
for all of this precession, leaving 38 arcseconds 
unaccounted for. (The modern figure is 43 arcseconds.) 
Einstein's theory gave a much closer prediction than 
Newton's theory; in fact, it coincides with the modern 
figure of 43 arcseconds.
32 The idea of information content is derived from 
the intuitive idea that the more a statement prohibits, the 
more it tells us about the world. The methodological demand 
for greater generality and precision may both be reduced to 
the demand for greater information content, (cf. Popper, 
[1934], page 121.) Popper defines the term "information 
content" thus: "the set of statements which are incompatible 
with the theory." (Popper, Unended Quest. Fontana, 1976, 
page 26.)
J . This conjecture has often been confused with the 
purely methodological rule. For instance Thomas Kuhn 
asserts:
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No process yet disclosed by the historical study 
of scientific development at all resembles the 
methodological stereotype of falsification by 
direct comparison with nature." (Structure of 
scientific Revolutions, page 77.) Later on the 
next page, Kuhn asserts that his alleged 
historical examples are ..." counterinstances to a 
prevalent epistemological theory.
Although this is meant as an allusion to Popper's views, it 
is a gross misrepresentation. And if it is interpreted as 
suggesting that Popper's recommended methodology has had no 
role in the growth of scientific knowledge, then it is also 
mistaken. Popper may grant that knowledge has grown even 
when his rules have been neglected (he himself cites 
Copernicanism as a possible example, (cf. [1983], Realism 
and the Aim of Science, page xxvi.)
A.F Chalmers expresses a view similar to Kuhn's. Criticizing 
what he takes to be falsificationism, Chalmers says:
Given any example of a classic scientific theory, 
whether at the time of its first proposal or at a 
later date, it is possible to find observational 
claims that were generally accepted at the time 
and were considered to be inconsistent with the 
theory. Nevertheless, those theories were not 
rejected... (Chalmers. What is this thing Called 
Science. Open University Press. 2nd Edition.
Reprint. 1988. p. 66.)
But there are hundreds of examples of where knowledge has 
grown through the refutation of a theory. Rutherford's 
refutation of Thomson's theory of the atom is a particularly 
striking example. See the list on pages xxvi - xxx of 
Realism and the Aim of Science.
Popper does not claim that science has always proceeded in 
the correct methodological way; just that most of the major 
revolutions in science have been brought about by attempts 
to follow the falsificationist methodology. But the 
methodology itself is unaffected by what scientists happen 
to do. As Popper has made clear as early as [1934], 
sections 10 & 11, he does not regard methodology as an 
empirical pursuit, to be tested by the history of science. 
(Neither is it purely logical, though it may help us to 
solve some.) Popper's methodology is better characterised 
as based on metaphysical realism and a situational analysis 
of a scientist trying to discover a reality behind the 
appearances.
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Miller argues that even if the whole of science tomorrow 
rejected falsificationism, Popper's theory would remain 
untouched. Afterall, being fallible, every scientist could 
be wrong. So Kuhn is quite wrong to suppose that his 
historical examples undermine Popper's methodological 
theory. (Miller, D. "Conjectural Knowledge: Popper's 
Solution of the Problem of Induction." From Levinson, In 
Pursuit of Truth.)
Popper's examples drawn from Newton, Einstein, Kepler 
and Bohr were intended as suggestive case studies. They 
were arguably good examples of momentous advances in the 
approximation to truth, and so an analysis of them could be 
expected to suggest methodological rules. But once 
distilled, these rules would transcend what these particular 
scientists did or thought, and could even be used to correct 
their own faults.
In discussions of Kepler's investigation of 
planetary motion it is generally assumed that Tycho's theory 
was explicitly applied to our Sun's planets identified 
independently of the law that planets move in circular 
orbits. The statement that all planets move in circular 
orbits, if construed as an essentialist definition, is empty 
of content; but if "planet" is understood as equivalent to 
"large, non-gaseous, Sun-orbiting body" then the circular 
hypothesis loses some of its information content but not all
3 5 •. Several writers have misunderstood the 
demarcation criterion in this way. For example it is often 
noticed that Freudianism does make some at least truth-like 
observations on human beings, and even that these 
observations and explanations are akin to those we accept in 
everyday explanations of human action. It is then asked why 
Freudianism should be rejected; if it ought to be rejected 
so should all our daily explanations of peoples actions - 
clearly an absurd position. Sabastion Gardiner (of Birkbeck 
College, London) suggested this at The Annual One-Day 
Conference on the Philosophy of Sir Karl Popper (2 6th May, 
1990). The answer is that the demarcation criterion does 
not demand that Freudianism be rejected; only that its 
advocates try to increase its information content to the 
point at which it becomes empirically testable. Why settle 
for less knowledge?
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David Bohm (Science. Creativity and Society). has 
misunderstood Popper's prescription that our theories be 
capable of and subject to severe criticism. Bohm points to 
the importance of encouraging the invention of new ideas and 
cultivating them in a noncritical environment. As an 
illustration of the benefits of this he points to the 
success of the method of "brain-storming". In brain­
storming a number of people get together and for, say, half 
an hour will think of as many solutions as they can to a 
problem without bothering to criticize them. It it only 
after this open-door policy to ideas that possible solutions 
are whittled down through criticism. There is nothing in 
this method that is at odds with the method of bold 
conjecture and severe criticism or with the demarcation 
criterion. Brain-storming is simply a psychological tactic 
in the application of the strategy of bold conjecture and 
severe criticism. Brainstorming can be understood as takes 
into account the fact that people are often too reserved 
about making their ideas public. Conjecture no more rules 
out brain storming as a tactic in the application of 
conjecture and refutation than it rules out drinking a 
strong cups of coffee to stay awake into the early hours to 
finish a scientific paper.
3 6 This was the problem that led through the work of 
Leibniz, Kant and Boscovic to field theory. Cf. section 20 
of volume III of Popper's Postscript to the Logic of 
Scientific Discovery, and The Self and its Brain. [1977], 
pages 177 - 196.
37 Also m  the Hayek Volume are important essays by 
Hayek, Pierson, and Halm. Mises continued his argument in 
Socialism (New Haven. Yale University Press. 1951.) pages 
135 to 163. and refutes more recent criticisms in his Human 
Action. (William Hodge and Company Ltd. English edition. 
1949. pages 194 to 711.) With regard to "market socialism", 
see F.A.Hayek's "Socialist Calculation III, The Competitive 
'Solution'/1 in Individualism and the Economic Order.
38 No where does Marx criticise Aristotle. More 
particularly, Aristotle himself had held that an exchange 
of goods indicates an exchange of things of equal value.
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Elster points out that the attempt to reduce 
skilled labour via the labour expended in (education makes 
the value of all commodities sensitive to changes in the 
real wage, which, in a Marxist account, is in turn sensitive 
to the class struggle. Thus the value of commodities would 
be partly caused by the class struggle. But the purpose of 
the labour theory of value is to explain not only the price 
of labour power but also the nature of the class struggle, 
so this approach would put two horses before the cart.
Even if this were allowed there seems to be an insuperable 
problem in the existence of non-producible skills, including 
natural skills and skills whose acquisition becomes 
irreversibly blocked after a certain time, such as language 
skills. Elster [1987], Roemer (a Marxist) [1988] and Blaug 
[1982] "Another look at the reduction problem in Marx" in I. 
Bradley and M. Howard, eds Classical and Marxian Political 
Economy. pages 188-202. all agree on this point. Critics 
have also pointed to differences in equilibrium real wages 
caused, independently of differences of skill, by 
differences in the unpleasantness of the work required. As 
Elster point out, Steedman's attempt ([1981], page 88.) to 
come to terms with this fails to save Marx's theory because 
far from denying the near-obvious facts he tries to absorb 
them into the theory, making the value of commodities partly 
dependent on the subjective disutility of the labour 
process. My main point in mentioning these attempts to 
defend Marx is to illustrate how in attempting to defend 
Marx's system, it is being unwittingly replaced by modified 
versions much nearer to the marginalist (i.e. now orthodox) 
position from which most of the attacks have been mounted.
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